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Large and persistent current account and fiscal deficits coexisting alongside high public debt levels 
pose significant risks to macroeconomic stability and limit policymaking options. This thesis 
focuses on the current account dynamics and fiscal policy in the sub-Saharan Africa region. Over 
the past two decades, countries in this region have experienced large and persistent current account 
and fiscal deficits as well as a recent upsurge in public debt. In response to this situation, these 
countries are beginning to adopt fiscal rules whose primary objective is to rein in discretionary 
fiscal policy. This thesis examines the attendant issues within a broad context of three interrelated 
empirical studies, presented in separate chapters.  
The first study (chapter two) examines the overall sustainability of current account balances in 
sub-Saharan Africa and evaluates the pattern of current account adjustment in the region. The 
common approach for testing current account sustainability involves testing the violation of the 
intertemporal budget constraint. This was implemented by testing for a cointegrating relationship 
between exports and imports plus net interest payments on external debt using a panel error 
correction model. Based on a sample of 35 sub-Saharan Africa countries from 1980-2017, the 
study found evidence that current account balances are weakly sustainable in the region. In 
addition, countries in the region face a gradual current account adjustment pattern. On average, it 
takes six years for the current account to return to its long-run equilibrium after a disturbance, 
exposing these countries to prolonged spells of current account deficits and rising debt levels when 
corrective measures are not put in place. 
The second study (chapter three) examines the twin deficit hypothesis, or the effect of fiscal deficit 
on the current account deficit, and how the level of public debt impacts this relationship. Empirical 
studies that test this hypothesis often arrive at mixed results, possibly due to the omission of debt 
threshold effects on the current account. Thus, debt thresholds were included in the model used in 
this chapter. Using 2000-2016 data from 33 sub-Saharan Africa countries, a linear dynamic panel 
data model was estimated to address the twin deficit question. Next, a dynamic panel data threshold 
model was estimated to investigate how different debt regimes affect the twin deficit relationship. 
The empirical results for the linear model show that the fiscal deficit worsens the current 
account―thus the twin deficit hypothesis holds. However, introducing a debt threshold into this 
model resulted in different outcome. Based on an endogenously determined threshold level of debt, 
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which splits the sample into low and high debt regimes, the results reveal that the fiscal deficit 
continues to worsen the current account in the lower debt regime, whereas in the higher debt 
regime the pattern changes and the fiscal deficit loses its effect on the current account. These 
findings point to the uncertain effects of fiscal policy on the external imbalance when public debt 
reaches high levels.  
The third study (chapter four) examines the overall impact of fiscal rules on fiscal performance in 
the sub-Saharan Africa region. In addition, it evaluates whether there are any differences in fiscal 
performance between countries with and without the fiscal rules. The study used the fiscal balance 
as a measure of fiscal performance, while a time varying composite fiscal rule index was used to 
capture the effects of fiscal rules. The fiscal rule index was based on the updated IMF’s fiscal rules 
dataset. Baseline regression examined the effect of fiscal rules on fiscal performance and a fiscal 
policy reaction function was estimated on 1997-2015 data from 24 sub-Saharan Africa countries 
that implemented these rules. The regression results suggest that fiscal rules improve fiscal 
performance. In particular, the fiscal rules for the budget balance, debt and revenue, are found to 
have positive and significant effects on fiscal performance. The same regression was repeated 
based on supranational rules. The results reveal that supranational rules are more effective 
compared to national rules. The second part of the empirical analysis compared the fiscal 
performance between these 24 countries that have fiscal rules and 16 countries that do not 
implement the rules. The time period was also expanded to include 1980-1996, prior to adoption 
of fiscal rules. A difference in differences model was then estimated using the treatment effect 
method. The results reveal that there is a significant improvement in fiscal performance for 
countries which have fiscal rules compared to those without fiscal rules. The main conclusion from 
this exercise is that fiscal rules have been effective in instilling fiscal discipline in the region; 
therefore, there is significant benefit for countries to adopt fiscal rules. 
This research supports the view that there is a causal relation between the fiscal deficit and the 
current account balance in most sub-Saharan Africa countries. The nature of this dynamic 
relationship appears to depend largely on the level of public debt. Thus, fiscal rules present an 





1.1 Background and Motivation 
The debate on whether the current account is relevant to a country’s overall economy has featured 
prominently in both academic and public policy discourse (Corden, 1994; Edwards, 2004). The 
past two decades have witnessed an increase in current account imbalances across the world. While 
most countries located in the oil exporting region and emerging economies in Asia have recorded 
surpluses in the current account, a significant majority in developing countries face large and 
persistent current account deficits. Most of developing countries are vulnerable to macroeconomic 
shocks due to limited buffer against such shocks hence running current account deficit is seen as 
a strategy to smooth consumption. This argument is supported by Friedman (1953), Ando & 
Modigliani (1963) and Hall (1978), who view the current account as a buffer or shock absorber 
for smoothing consumption in the wake of transitory shocks to changes in output, investment and 
government expenditure. 
 
Although there is validity in consumption smoothing argument for current account deficit, the 
economic tumult experienced in Mexico due to the peso crisis in 1994 coupled with the 2007/8 
global financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis, especially in the peripheral European countries, has 
prompted a rethink. It is a commonly held view that current account is an important indicator of 
economic performance. Hence, a large and persistent current account deficit is a sign of trouble 
ahead (Donoso & Martin, 2014). A deficit level exceeding 5 percent should flash a warning light 
especially if it is financed through short-term debt or foreign exchange reserves (Milesi-Ferretti & 
Razin, 1996; Summers, 1996). In advanced economies, a level ranging between 4 and 5 percent is 
enough to trigger economic forces which could change the trajectory of current account, raising 
cause for concern (Mann, 2002). At the same time, persistent deficit may be viewed as a reflection 
of underlying distortions in the economy (Camarero et al., 2013). 
 
The level of deficit gives an indication of the ability of a country to borrow and the willingness of 
lenders to advance credit. A country that runs persistent current account deficits accumulates 
2 
 
foreign liabilities. This may not be bad provided that resources are directed toward investment 
rather than consumption spending as this creates future growth opportunities that allow the debt to 
be serviced. However, when resources are not put to proper use and the deficit grows quickly, a 
country may fail to meet its debt obligations that can pose significant challenges to its 
macroeconomic stability. When the current account deficit becomes persistent, the exchange rate 
depreciates, puts pressure on debt service, and poses significant threat to intergenerational equity 
(Sahoo et al., 2016). 
 
Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have experienced large and persistent current account 
deficits over the past three decades. It is also worth noting that these countries have had large and 
persistent fiscal deficits. More than half of the countries in the region have a level of fiscal deficit 
exceeding 4 percent of GDP. The few exceptions were the oil exporting countries of Nigeria and 
Angola, but even these have lately come under increasing pressure due to frequent fluctuation in 
commodity export. This emerging trend of large and persistent current account and fiscal deficits 
existing side by side rekindles memories of the twin deficit debate prevalent in the United States 
in the 1980s during the Reagan administration1. At the heart of the twin deficit argument is the 
hypothesis that current account deterioration is largely attributed to the fiscal deficit. Due to the 
dominant role of the public sector in sub-Saharan Africa, fiscal deficit could be a major driver of 
current accounts fluctuations.  
 
In a bid to deliver on their mandates, many governments in sub-Saharan Africa face growing 
spending pressures that are not adequately financed by the limited revenue options. The growth of 
total revenue has not matched the growth of overall government spending in the region. The slow 
growth in revenue can be attributed to commodity related revenues shortfalls from key exports that 
form a significant share of the budgetary revenue for many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
most affected countries are oil exporters such as Nigeria and Angola. The boom in global 
commodity prices that begun in the early 2000s dissipated after prices begun to fall in 2011 due to 
weak global demand.  In addition, the revenue streams to fragile states2 also face an uncertain 
 
1 During the tenure of President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), the United States experienced simultaneous increase in current 
account deficit and fiscal deficit. 
2 These are states faced with political uncertainty or instability due to civil conflicts and weak institutions. Among the fragile SSA 
states are Burundi, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Central African Republic and Zimbabwe. 
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future due to reductions in aid flows. The sub-Saharan Africa region further faces challenges in 
containing the rising expenditure pressures driven mainly by a push to implement major 
infrastructure projects, the rising costs of servicing public debt coupled with the need to extend 
social safety nets and pro poor programs aimed at addressing rising poverty levels (Berg et al., 
2009). Furthermore, similar to most developing countries, fiscal policy has largely been 
procyclical in this region with the trend being more pronounced in resource rich countries (Konuki 
& Villafuerte, 2016). Procyclicality arises when fiscal policy tends to be expansionary in good 
times and contractionary in bad times. This is possibly driven by political economy pressure to 
increase spending in good times. Procyclicality is undesirable as it amplifies the business cycles, 
making the booms larger and recessions deeper.  
 
Debt financing is the dominant mode for financing current account and fiscal deficits in the sub-
Saharan Africa region. The capital markets with the potential to act as alternative avenues for 
mobilizing private sector resources are narrow and underdeveloped. The region heavily relies on 
both domestic and foreign public borrowings hence raising the levels of public debt. The only 
countries whose debt levels have not risen significantly are the oil exporters and Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC)3 relief recipient countries. Debt accumulation in less developed countries 
may be driven by lack of political consensus, which requires more spending to satisfy all 
stakeholders.   It is understandable for countries to accumulate debt as a mode of bridging financing 
shortfalls, but the levels become of concern when they exceed some thresholds. The IMF in 2005 
introduced the debt sustainability framework as a tool for assessing sustainable debt thresholds for 
developing countries. According to this framework, countries are classified based on policies, 
quality of institutions and macroeconomic prospects such that a threshold of 35 and 55 percent of 
GDP is set for a country with weak and medium quality institutions respectively. For countries 
with strong institutions, the threshold is set at a much higher level of 70 percent. Most countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa region fall in the category of weak institutions with only a few with medium 
quality institutions. Thus, the HIPC initiative offered much needed relief for most countries already 
burdened by public debt in the region. As a result, the aggregate level of public debt in the region 
substantially declined to 24 percent of GDP in 2008 down from 67 percent of GDP in 2000. 
 
3 The Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative is a joint IMF and World Bank program that writes off or forgives 
debt owed by poor countries after meeting certain set conditions. 
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However less than a decade later, this trend has reversed substantially. Based on a 2018 report of 
the Regional Economic Outlook for sub-Saharan Africa by the IMF, the median level of public 
debt was above 50 percent of GDP by the end of 2017.   
 
The coexistence of high public debt with large and persistent current account and fiscal deficits, 
poses significant risks to macroeconomic stability. It also restricts the policy choices available to 
policymakers. For instance, a persistent current account deficit not only exerts negative multiplier 
effects on growth but also increases exposure to currency crisis due to falling foreign exchange 
reserves. This is particularly problematic for small developing economies that usually struggle to 
attract more inflows. The current account deficit can also contribute to the depreciation of the 
exchange rate which impacts the cost of living and triggers an inflationary spiral. Similarly, a 
persistent fiscal deficit is problematic if it raises interest rates, that could crowd out private 
investment and reduce consumption. These effects are a major drag on GDP growth, and the risks 
are further elevated in a high debt environment where conducting fiscal policy becomes uncertain. 
With rising debt, investors increasingly become wary as the risk of default grows. At the same 
time, the risk premia increase makes it even more difficult for government to service existing debt. 
Consequently, few options remain available for fiscal stabilization (Combes, Minea, & Sow, 
2017). 
 
As the economic theory postulates, the fiscal deficit drives the current account deficit; therefore, 
the fiscal policy becomes a major tool for controlling external imbalances. In other words, 
resolving the current account deficit, simply requires a reduction in the level of fiscal deficit in the 
economy. Some of the foremost fiscal reform packages proposed to address growing fiscal deficits 
are fiscal rules. The essence for adoption of fiscal rules is to reign in discretionary fiscal policy 
which is likely to breed government failures and incentive structures promoting deficit bias. In this 
regard, as a tool of fiscal governance, properly designed and implemented fiscal rules can help 
reduce fiscal deficit bias and the time inconsistency problem in fiscal policy, as well as strengthen 
the commitment of the authorities to fiscal adjustment (Ter-Minassian, 2010). In addition, rules 
can correct perverse incentives in policymaking, such as the common pool problem and 
government shortsightedness. In other words, well designed fiscal rules can result in improved 




The link between fiscal rules and current account balance can be both direct and indirect. For the 
direct channel, fiscal rules affect the current account balance through interest rates. A strong fiscal 
institutional framework can lower interest rates on bonds issued by the government which can lead 
to a further fall in the general interest rates in the economy (Hallerberg & Wolff, 2008; Iara et al., 
2011; Johnson & Kriz, 2005). While this reduces capital inflows, it enhances consumption and 
investment that contributes to the depreciation of exchange rate, which could further impact the 
current account (Abbas et al., 2011; Baxter, 1995). Such a conclusion points to a direct association 
between fiscal rules and the current account balance. For the indirect channel, a country with strong 
fiscal institutions in terms of budget-making processes and executions as well as an adhearance to 
the set fiscal or debt limits is likely to experience improvement in the fiscal balance (Debrun et al., 
2008; Nerlich & Reuter, 2013). This relationship can create spillover effects on current account 
balance considering the close linkage between the current account and fiscal balances.  
 
Until the last two decades, fiscal rules were prevalent in advanced and emerging economies but 
few countries in the sub-Saharan Africa region had fiscal rules. However, this trend is changing as 
adoption of fiscal rules in this region is steadily picking up. The last two decades have seen a 
significant increase in countries with fiscal rules in this region, with more than double the number 
in the past two decades. Most of these rules are supranational in nature as compared to national 
rules. Despite this leap, the level of fiscal deficit remains high in the region and it is not clear 
whether the rules have had any significant impact on fiscal performance. 
 
The issues highlighted above about current account, fiscal deficit and the fiscal rules form the basis 
of the three distinct yet interrelated empirical studies in this thesis. The first examines whether the 
current account balances are sustainable in the sub-Saharan Africa region. In addition, it evaluates 
the pattern of current account adjustment in the region. The second probes the effect of fiscal 
deficits on current accounts and considers whether this relationship is in direct relation to the level 
of indebtedness in the economy. The third investigates the effect of fiscal rules on fiscal 
performance and analyses differences in fiscal performance between countries with and without 




1.2 Overview of Empirical Chapters 
The first study examines whether the levels of current account balances experienced in sub-
Saharan Africa are sustainable. The chapter goes beyond the question of sustainability to also 
assess the pattern of current account adjustment in the region, that is, how long it takes for countries 
to return back to a sustainable path in the event of disequilibrium. Current account sustainability 
is closely linked to solvency. The economy is solvent if it can service its net foreign liabilities 
without defaulting on them (Milesi-Ferretti & Razin, 1996). Solvency is theoretically defined in 
relation to the intertemporal budget constraint (IBC). In this sense, an economy is solvent if the 
current level of external debt is equal to the present value of the future trade surpluses. Therefore, 
a formal way of determining the solvency of economy is to test for violation of the IBC. Intuitively, 
a sustainable current account is understood to be one that does not violate the IBC. According to 
the literature, the common approach to test this hypothesis is to check whether past current account 
series follow a stationary process or if there is cointegration between the components of current 
account (Taylor, 2002; Trehan & Walsh, 1991). Such evidence in the data forms the basis for 
concluding that the current account balance is consistent with solvency and hence sustainable. This 
thesis adopts the latter approach that is based on the cointegration of current account components 
namely exports and imports including interest payments on external debt. This method is preferred 
as it enables the study of both the dynamics of current account adjustment as well as the strength 
of sustainability. 
 
Existing studies on current account sustainability yield mixed results, showing that the conclusion 
on current account sustainability depends on the approach and estimation techniques used. Most 
studies in the SSA region are based on stationarity tests (Chu et al., 2007; Hashiguchi & Hamori, 
2012; Holmes, 2003). Such an approach is limited when investigating the strength of sustainability 
and the adjustment path back to equilibrium when the current account deviates from its equilibrium 
path. This thesis extends the literature and differs from existing studies on the region in several 
respects. Firstly, in addition to investigating whether the current account is sustainable or not, this 
study evaluates the strength of sustainability. Secondly, this study uses an error correction 
framework that allows for analysis of how the adjustment process of current account imbalances 
differ across countries in the region. This technique allows for comparison of the speed of 
adjustment back to equilibrium across the countries when the current account balance is off the 
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equilibrium path. Using a panel error correction model on data from a sample of 35 of the SSA 
countries for 1980-2017, the evidence suggests that largely current account balances are weakly 
sustainable in the region with 16 out of 35 countries showing evidence of unsustainable balances. 
In addition, these countries face gradual current account adjustment patterns as it takes an average 
of six years for the current account to return to its long-run equilibrium after disturbance. 
 
The second study investigates the effect of the fiscal deficit on the current account deficit and 
further assesses whether this relationship depends on the level of public debt. This study is 
motivated by the fact that studies testing the twin deficit relationship often arrive at mixed results. 
Whereas some studies show evidence of the twin deficit holding true, in the sense that the fiscal 
deficit contributes to the deterioration of the current account, others find that fiscal deficit improves 
the current account. The latter group of studies conform to the twin divergence hypothesis after 
Kim & Roubini (2008). Moreover, other studies find no significant relationship between fiscal and 
current account deficits in line with the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. A possible explanation 
for mixed findings in testing this hypothesis is that the models used do not account for threshold 
effects in current account dynamics. Empirical studies have clearly demonstrated that current 
account dynamics are characterized by threshold effects with debt level being a potential candidate 
(Nickel & Tudyka, 2014; Nickel & Vansteenkiste, 2008). In summary, the current account 
responds differently to fiscal deficit depending on the level of public debt. This hypothesis is tested 
within the broad context of sub-Saharan Africa and is the first study of this region that explores 
the link between current account and fiscal deficit on the one hand and public debt on the other. 
This study provides an interesting insight given that this region is beset with persistent current 
account and fiscal deficit coexisting side by side with rising public debt. Another notable 
contribution of this study is that most studies testing the twin deficit hypothesis are concentrated 
in developed countries with only a few considering sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, there is substantial 
heterogeneity in the factors driving the current account in advanced and low income countries 
(Chinn & Prasad, 2003). The forces driving current account dynamics in advanced economies 
should not be generalized and applied to low income settings like sub-Saharan Africa. As such, a 
specific study on the region would better explain the current account dynamics. To fulfil the 
objective of this chapter, a dynamic panel data model with threshold effects is estimated on a 
sample of 33 countries in sub-Saharan Africa for the period 2000-2016. Based on an endogenously 
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determined threshold level of debt at 54 percent, the results suggest that twin deficit exists at levels 
below this threshold but cease to hold at higher levels.  
 
The third chapter investigates the effect of fiscal rules on fiscal performance. In addition, it 
compares fiscal performance between countries with and without the fiscal rules. Fiscal 
performance is measured using the fiscal balance. Existing empirical studies in this area are mainly 
concentrated in advanced countries. In comparison, the sub-Saharan Africa region has not received 
similar attention. This study fills a critical gap in the literature by conducting a study with a specific 
focus on sub-Saharan Africa using the updated IMF Fiscal Rule dataset (Lledo et al., 2017). The 
dataset is comprehensive and enables the assessment of various aspects of fiscal rules, both at 
national and supranational level. This study also contributes to the literature by assessing fiscal 
performance differences between countries with fiscal rules (treated) and those without fiscal rules 
(control) in the region using a treatment effect method. This assessment is yet to be performed 
previously for countries in this region. To implement this study, a strength index of fiscal rules is 
constructed based on the updated fiscal rules dataset. This index is used to capture the effect of 
fiscal rules. A fiscal policy reaction function within a dynamic panel data model framework that 
controls for economic, political and institutional variables is estimated. The results suggest that 
fiscal rules have a positive and significant effect on fiscal performance. This finding is further 
confirmed in the difference in differences treatment effect model which compares the fiscal 
performance in countries with fiscal rules to those without. The results show that there is a 
significant improvement in fiscal performance over time for countries with fiscal rules as 
compared to those without the rules. 
 
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter two examines current account sustainability 
in the sub-Saharan Africa region. Chapter three examines the effect of fiscal deficit on current 
account and assesses whether this relationship depends on the level of indebtedness in the 
economy. Chapter four investigates the effect of fiscal rules on fiscal performance. Chapter five 
concludes with a summary of the thesis findings, draws policy implications, and recommends areas 




Current Account Sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa 
2.1 Introduction 
Most countries have opted to fund their widening current account deficits by escalating 
borrowings. This response contributes to a build-up of the country’s external debt burden and 
hence raises concerns on the sustainability of these deficits. A sustainability assessment is 
therefore necessary to ascertain whether the level of deficits observed in the region is consistent 
with solvency conditions. An economy is deemed solvent if it can repay its debt without defaulting. 
Stationarity or mean reverting property of current account is indicative of a country’s ability not 
to default on its debt.  
 
Existing studies on this subject have taken place within the context of individual and groups of 
countries. Most attention has focused in the US and OECD countries (Camarero et al., 2013; Chen, 
2011; Hamori, 2009; Holmes, 2006b; Husted, 1992; Raybaudi, Sola, & Spagnolo, 2004; Wu, 2000; 
Wu, Chen, & Lee, 2001), with a few other studies in Asia (Baharumshah, Lau, & Fountas, 2003, 
2005; Lau & Baharumshah, 2003; Sahoo et al., 2016; Singh, 2015), Latin American region 
(Chortareas, Kapetanios, & Uctum, 2003; Donoso & Martin, 2014; Holmes, 2006a; Kalyoncu & 
Ozturk, 2006). A few more have also been on sub-Saharan Africa (Chu et al., 2007; Gnimassoun 
& Coulibaly, 2014; Hashiguchi & Hamori, 2012; Holmes, 2003; Shuaibu & Oyinlola, 2017). 
 
The empirical studies on sub-Saharan Africa shows mixed results, a clear indication that the 
conclusion on current account sustainability depends on the approach and estimation techniques 
used. Furthermore, most studies in this region focus on stationarity of current account (Chu et al., 
2007; Hashiguchi & Hamori, 2012; Holmes, 2003), but this technique has limited use when 
investigating the dynamics of current account sustainability such as the strength of sustainability 
and the adjustment mechanism back to equilibrium when current account is off the equilibrium 
path. The framework in Gnimassoun & Coulibaly (2014) captures these aspects and therefore 




This work extends the literature and differs from existing studies in the region in the following 
respects. Firstly, this study not only investigates whether the current account is sustainable or not 
but also assesses the strength of sustainability. This relates to determining whether the level of 
sustainability is weak or strong. Secondly, this study uses an error correction framework which 
allows for an analysis of how the adjustment process of current account imbalances differs across 
countries in the region. This technique enables us to compare the speed of adjustment back to 
equilibrium across the countries whenever current account balance is off the equilibrium path. The 
following three key research questions emerge and are addressed in this study; First, are current 
account balances sustainable in sub-Saharan Africa region? Second, what is the strength of 
sustainability? and finally, what is the pattern of the current account adjustment across countries 
in the region? 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two provides a conceptual definition of 
current account sustainability. Section three discusses the current account trends in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Section four reviews the relevant literature. Section five presents the methodology 
followed by empirical results in section six. Section seven concludes the chapter.  
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2.2 Current Account Sustainability: Definition of the Main Concepts 
The current account is a component of the balance of payment that captures international flows of 
goods and services, primary income (also known as net factor income) and secondary income (also 
known as unilateral current transfers) between residents and nonresidents of a country (IMF, 
2009). The balance on this account is known as the current account balance and shows the 
difference between the sum of exports and income receivable and the sum of imports and income 
payable. According to this definition, exports and imports refer to both goods and services, while 
income refers to both primary and secondary income (IMF, 2009). 
 
Another definition considers the current account as changes in net foreign asset accumulation. 
Particularly, it captures the difference in private saving and private investment plus the difference 
in tax revenue and government expenditure. Hence when the current account is in deficit, either 
the value of private savings is insufficient to finance gross investment (gross fixed capital 
formation) and/or tax revenue is less than government spending on goods and services. In both 
contexts, it means that the private and/or public sector must borrow from external markets to 
finance this gap. This in turn reflects a negative change in net foreign asset accumulation which 
means that the country is accumulating foreign liabilities, and thereby reducing its claim against 
the rest of the world. As such, persistent current account deficit implies accumulation of foreign 
liabilities which raises concerns over sustainability of these deficits.  
 
In common parlance, a situation is sustainable if it can be maintained or kept at a certain level for 
a prolonged period. Accordingly, Mann (2002) views current account deficit as sustainable if it 
does not generate economic forces which change the trajectory of other macroeconomic variables.  
That is, it does not generate effects on domestic variables such as savings and investment or does 
not lead to significant international portfolio adjustments that cause changes in the trajectory of 
the interest rate. Conversely, an unsustainable current account generates economic forces that 
induce changes in macroeconomic variables that in turn change the path of current account. For 
instance, when a country runs persistent current account deficit, the stock of debt expands quickly 
to an extent that foreign investors lose confidence in the economy’s ability to service its debt. This 
could trigger knock-on effects that may continue in the economy, for instance a rise in interest rate 
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or currency depreciation. Thus, in this regard, current account deficit is viewed as unsustainable if 
it triggers massive systemic changes.  
 
In addition, current account sustainability can be viewed within the context of solvency. There is 
a close link between the sustainability of the current account balance and the solvency of the 
economy. The economy is viewed as solvent if it can service its net foreign liabilities without 
defaulting on them (Milesi-Ferretti & Razin, 1996). Solvency is theoretically defined in relation 
to the IBC. In this sense, an economy is solvent if the current level of external debt is equal to the 
present value of the future trade surpluses. To determine the solvency of an economy, it is 
imperative to test for violation of the IBC. It follows that a sustainable current account is one that 
does not violate the IBC.  
 
Practically, it is difficult to test for solvency due to the forward-looking nature of the IBC which 
requires equating the current level of external indebtedness to present discounted values of future 
trade surpluses. There is considerable uncertainty involved in determining the level of future trade 
surpluses. Therefore, a commonly used approach is to check whether the past realizations of 
current account series follows a stationary process or if the current account components are 
cointegrated (Taylor, 2002; Trehan & Walsh, 1991). Such evidence in the data forms a basis for 
the conclusion that the current account balance is consistent with solvency and hence sustainable.  
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2.3 Current Account Trends in sub-Saharan Africa 
The current account deficit has been a persistent feature in sub-Saharan Africa over the past three 
decades. Compared to other group of economies, the region has borne the brunt of prolonged 
deficits. Figure 2.1 shows a historical trend of current account deficits for selected economic 
groups namely, advanced economies, major advanced economies (G7), emerging markets and the 
sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Figure 2.1: Trends in current account balance (% of GDP) for selected group of economies, 
1980-2018 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook, 2018 
 
The figure shows that the deficit in SSA has not only been persistent but also large in magnitude 
compared to other group of economies. While the deficit averaged below 0.5 percent in other 
economic groups, it maintained a higher average of 1.5 percent in SSA, even rising to 4.5 and 3 
percent in 1981 and 1998 respectively. The only period the region experienced a surplus was 
between 2000 and 2007. The high deficits experienced in SSA in the early 1980s and early 1990s 
were due to commodity price shocks and the global recessions in 1981-82 and 1991-93. In 
addition, protectionist policies in the developed world increased around early 1990s. These events  
largely affected developing countries, many sub-Saharan Africa countries included due to their 
heavy reliance on commodity exports (Holmes, 2003). However, from 2000 onwards up to 2007, 
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position. This upward momentum begun to reverse following the onset of the 2007/8 global 
recession, reaching a deficit of 6 percent in 2015 before edging up again. A closer examination of 
country specific circumstances shows cross-country variations with majority of countries in the 
region experiencing large deficits. This analysis is shown in Figure 2.2   
 
Figure 2.2: Current account balance in selected sub-Saharan African countries (Annual 
average for the period 2000-2017) 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook, 2018 
 
The summary statistics in Appendix A2.5 show that the average annual current account balance 
for the period 1980-2017 ranged between a deficit of 17.8 percent in Mozambique to a surplus of 
7.2 percent in Gabon. It further reveals that, overall, 22 out of 35 countries in the sample exhibit 
deficits exceeding 5 percent, breaching the threshold considered acceptable by international 
standards (Mann, 2002; Milesi-Ferretti & Razin, 1996; Summers, 1996). Only few countries 
experienced current account surplus over the same period. These are Eswatini (formerly 
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2.4 Review of Literature 
2.4.1 Theoretical literature 
There are three main approaches that explain external sustainability. These include the 
intertemporal approach to current account, the portfolio or stock equilibrium approach and the 
intertemporal solvency approach. The first two approaches are based on the optimal decisions of 
economic agents while the later uses arithmetic methods.  
 
The intertemporal approach to the current account developed by Sachs (1981) and later extended 
by Obstfeld & Rogoff (1995) is premised on the permanent income hypothesis of Friedman (1957) 
and expectation theory of Hall (1978). This approach argues that the current account balance 
results from intertemporal optimization by forward-looking rational agents. Current account 
imbalances are therefore viewed as necessary to serve as a buffer for smoothing consumption 
against transitory shocks. Accordingly, when the output falls below its permanent level, agents 
borrow to smooth consumption therefore running current account deficits and vice versa. The 
intertemporal approach provides an equilibrium benchmark model (since it arises out of an agent’s 
optimal decision) which can be used to compare actual and optimal levels of current account. For 
instance, if the actual deficit is significantly higher than the level considered optimal, then current 
account is seen as unsustainable (Milesi-Ferretti & Razin, 1996). This is because the optimal level 
of current account provides an indication of an ideal state and therefore an opportunity for 
corrective action whenever there is a divergence. 
 
The intertemporal solvency approach advanced by Husted (1992), much like the intertemporal 
approach to current account, builds on the notion of the IBC. This approach links current account 
sustainability to the solvency of the economy, which is seen as solvent when the IBC is not violated 
i.e. when the net foreign debt is equal to the present value of future trade surpluses. In this model, 
current account is considered sustainable if agents satisfy the long-run IBC, which is obtained by 
forward iteration of the single-period budget constraint and imposition of no-Ponzi game 
restriction.  
 
This approach makes use of several techniques to test whether the IBC is met. The commonly used 
techniques are stationarity tests of the current account and tests examining the cointegration of the 
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components of current account. As far as stationarity of the current account is concerned, some 
tests assume that current account follows a stationary process while others presuppose that it 
follows a nonstationary path. The first category considers the current account as following a 
stationary process exhibiting zero mean and constant variance. This means that the current account 
series is mean reverting hence shocks have no permanent effects and it is not possible to have 
current account deficits or surpluses that grows indefinitely (Herzberg, 2015). This sustainability 
criterion is regarded to be in a strong sense since a current account fluctuating around its mean can 
be maintained indefinitely.  
 
The second category asserts that current account follows a nonstationary path in which it becomes 
stationary after first difference (i.e. integrated of order one). This implies that shocks do not decay 
and therefore have a permanent effect. As such, current account does not return quickly to its 
equilibrium value after deviation hence the economy is likely to experience persistently growing 
deficits or surpluses. Again, a stationary current account after first difference is equivalent to a 
stationary net foreign asset (NFA) position after second difference4. This form of sustainability is 
in a weak sense because an economy in this situation is likely to experience a prolonged spell of 
current account deficits and even a rise in the levels of net foreign debt. Such a situation can easily 
degenerate into macroeconomic instability, liquidity or debt crisis.  
 
Another method for examining the validity of the IBC is by testing the cointegration of the 
components of the current account which include; exports and imports inclusive of interest 
payments on external debt as well as savings and investment5. The existence of a cointegration 
relationship implies that there is a long-run relationship between the components of current 
account and any deviation from the equilibrium is only temporary. Thus, current account is seen 
as sustainable in this case. Furthermore, cointegration of exports and imports implies that the two 
variables share a common stochastic trend, implying a long-run relationship and that any deviation 
 
4 Note that, ignoring capital account, current account can also be defined a change in the NFA. This can be expressed 
as;  𝐶𝐴𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡−1 = ∆𝑁𝐹𝐴, where 𝐶𝐴𝑡 and 𝐷𝑡  are the current account and net foreign assets at period 𝑡 
respectively. 
 
5 When unilateral current transfer is excluded, current account can be defined as the difference between exports and 
imports plus net factor income. Similarly, current account can be expressed as the gap between gross domestic savings 
and gross domestic investment plus the gap between tax revenue and government spending. 
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is only temporary. This testing procedure was advanced by Husted (1992) and most empirical 
studies are based on this approach due to its simplicity and apt theoretical foundation. 
 
Another approach for examining external sustainability is the portfolio or stock equilibrium 
approach to the current account advanced by Kraay & Ventura (2000) and extended by Calderón 
et al.(2000). This approach views current account sustainability from the perspective of NFA 
position based on the outcome of portfolio decisions by rational investors across countries. The 
current account sustainability results from long-run portfolio equilibrium conditions as well as 
short-run dynamics that drive asset reallocation. Equilibrium in the long-run can be attained when 
domestic and foreign investors achieve the desired portfolio across countries. When viewed from 
this perspective, the current account is therefore simply a means through which an investor can 
achieve a desired asset position. Hence, short run equilibrium adjustments driven by current 
account deficits are necessary since the investors face imperfections in the financial and factor 
market that may hinder them from achieving their desired optimal portfolio.  
2.4.2 Empirical literature 
This study examines the empirical literature on current account sustainability in several broad 
themes. The first group of studies focuses on stationarity of current account balance and the NFA. 
The second group delves into the cointegration of components of current account balance while 
the final group focuses on the negative feedback effects between trade balance and the NFA. The 
next sub-section reviews empirical studies along these themes. 
 
2.4.2.1 Stationarity of current account and the NFA 
The rationale behind the studies under this category is that the stationarity of current account in 
levels or stationarity of NFA in first difference is enough to satisfy the IBC. Several empirical 
studies have tested this hypothesis. For instance, Wu (2000) used a panel unit root test of Im-
Pesaran-Shin to examine the stationarity of current account balances in 10 OECD countries for 
period 1977-1997. The findings suggest that current account is stationary in the sampled countries 
confirming that the IBC is not violated in those countries. A similar conclusion was arrived at by 




Holmes (2003) investigated the same question but using a different technique for a group of 21 
African countries for the period 1960-2000. The study adopted a seemingly unrelated ADF 
(SURADF) panel unit root test method over standard unit root test methods due to the former’s 
ability to account for cross-section dependence and to also distinguish results for each country. 
Holmes study found that 5 out of 21 countries had unsustainable current account balances, namely 
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Lesotho, Mauritania and Senegal. A follow-up study by Chu et al., (2007) 
employed the same method but on a larger sample of 48 countries for the period 1980-2004. The 
evidence suggests that the current account for 11 countries contained unit root and was therefore 
unsustainable. Similarly, Hashiguchi & Hamori (2012) applied panel unit root tests that control 
for cross-section dependence on an unbalanced panel of 37 sub-Saharan Africa countries for the 
period 1980-2006. The findings indicate that current account balance is not sustainable in the 
region. 
 
Studies have also employed nonlinear unit root methods to test for current account sustainability. 
For instance, Raybaudi, Sola, & Spagnolo (2004) used a nonlinear Markov switching ADF model 
to identify periods when current account balances evolve in a non-stationary manner. The study 
used a sample of five countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, Japan, the UK and the US. The evidence 
suggests that three out of the five countries considered, namely Brazil, Japan and the UK had 
sustainable balances. Chen (2011) investigated whether current account deficits for eight OECD 
countries are characterized by unit root process with regime switches. This technique sought to 
find out whether current account was sustainable in some periods compared to others. The study 
used an unbalanced panel covering 1970-2009. The evidence from the Markov switching unit root 
regression suggests that IBC does not hold in Australia, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, New 
Zealand, Portugal and Spain. 
 
Only a few studies investigate the stationary properties of the NFA. For instance, Chortareas et al. 
(2003) used non-linear unit root methods to tests for sustainability based on the debt-to-GDP ratio 
for a group of Latin American countries. The result suggests evidence of strong sustainability in 
all countries except Chile. These findings overturn previous results obtained using the traditional 
unit-root test. Sawada (1994) applied the same method to investigate whether heavily indebted 
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countries (HICs) were solvent. Using a sample period of 1955-1990, the evidence suggests that 
HICs were facing a debt overhang problem. 
 
2.4.2.2 Cointegration between the components of current account 
Empirical studies in this category investigates the presence of a cointegrating relationship between 
various components of current account including; exports and imports with net interest payments 
on external debt, and savings and investment. However, much of the focus is on the cointegration 
relationship between exports and imports inclusive of net interest payments. Few studies are based 
on cointegration between savings and investment. 
 
The seminal study using this approach was by Husted (1992) who investigated current account 
sustainability in the US for the period 1967-1989. The study found that until the end of 1983, the 
US current account was sustainable, i.e. the IBC was not violated. But thereafter, from 1983 
onwards, the current account became unsustainable due to a structural shift in the economy. In 
another study by Wu, Chen, & Lee (2001) for a group of G7 countries, using quarterly data for 
period 1973Q2-1998Q4 found evidence for strong current account sustainability. However, their 
finding was later overturned by Hamori (2009) based on annual data between 1960 and 2005. 
Arize (2002) found evidence of strong current account sustainability in New Zealand, Mexico and 
Tunisia but weak current account sustainability in Canada, Chile, Egypt and Indonesia. 
Baharumshah et al. (2003) focused on ASEAN-4 countries namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Thailand for the period 1961-1999. The study finds evidence of strong 
sustainability in Malaysia only while in the remaining three countries, the evidence of weak 
sustainability is found. Narayan & Narayan, (2005) examines a group of 22 least developed 
countries for evidence of cointegration using a bounds testing approach. The results indicate that 
current account is only sustainable in six out of the sampled 22 countries. Holmes (2006b) 
examines the long-run sustainability in the OECD countries. The results suggest that six out of 11 
countries investigated had sustainable current account. Gnimassoun & Coulibaly (2014) 
investigates whether current account sustainability depends on the exchange rate regime in sub-
Saharan Africa. Based on a sample of 44 countries covering 1980-2011, the evidence suggests that 
current account is sustainable in the region. However, sustainability is dependent on the exchange 
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rate regime. There was stronger sustainability in flexible exchange regime countries compared to 
those with fixed regime. 
 
Baharumshah, Lau, & Fountas (2005) examines current account sustainability in eight East Asian 
countries in the period before and after the Asian crisis. The eight countries are Singapore, Taiwan, 
South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines and Japan. Using a dynamic OLS 
(DOLS) model, the study finds that current account was not sustainable in the pre-crisis period 
(1970-1997), while it was sustainable in the post crisis era (1970-2000). The return to sustainable 
path was attributed to large currency depreciations and economic recovery. Shuaibu & Oyinlola 
(2017) applies both unit root and cointegration tests robust to structural changes to examine 
whether the current account balance in Nigeria is sustainable for the period 1981-2013. The results 
obtained suggest that the current account in Nigeria is sustainable and that there were no structural 
changes during the period under consideration. 
 
Few studies focus on the cointegrating relationship between savings and investment. Based on this 
criteria, Dash (2017) investigates the sustainability of current account for a group of countries in 
three regions, namely Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and sub-Saharan 
Africa for the period 1981-2014. Using Pooled Mean Group estimator in an error correction 
framework, the result suggest that current account is weakly sustainable in Latin America and 
Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa while strongly sustainable in Europe and Central Asia. 
Applying the same criteria, Matsubayashi (2005) investigates whether the current account is 
sustainable in the US for the period 1975Q1 to 1998Q2 using time series estimation techniques. 
The findings suggest that current account was sustainable.  
 
2.4.2.3 Responsiveness of the trade balance to the NFA 
These studies test the negative response of trade balance to the NFA. In this case, current account 
is regarded as sustainable if it responds to rising net foreign debts (assets) by increasing 
(decreasing) the trade balance. Based on this approach, Camarero et al., (2013) investigates 
external solvency for a group of 23 OECD countries for the period 1970-2012. The study adopts a 
multicointegration approach which combines both flow and stock analysis. The findings indicate 
that there is weak sustainability for all countries in the flow analysis and strong sustainability for 
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six countries in the stock analysis. These countries are Austria, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Japan and New Zealand. Similarly, Durdu et al. (2013) adapts Bohn (2007) error-correction 
reaction function approach to test the negative feedback effect between net export (NX) and NFA. 
Using a panel of 21 industrial countries and 29 emerging markets over the period 1970-2006, the 
evidence shows that there was a negative response of NX on NFA. Hence the observed imbalances 
were not inconsistent with external solvency. This analysis further suggests that a stronger 
response was necessary for countries with weaker fundamentals compared to those with stronger 
ones. 
2.4.3 Overview of the literature 
The portfolio equilibrium model provides a better analytical framework for assessing external 
imbalances from a stock perspective. However, this approach has limited application in sub-
Saharan Africa countries that are small and poorly integrated to the international financial markets. 
Due to underdeveloped capital markets, portfolio inflows in terms of equity and bonds remain 
insignificant (Osakwe & Verick, 2007). Therefore, trade flows in the form of exports and imports 
remain the dominant factor driving current account imbalances in that region (Gnimassoun & 
Coulibaly, 2014). Hence, IBC criterion based on trade flows is more relevant for sub-Saharan 
African countries. This approach becomes the focus of the analysis in this study. 
 
Turning to empirical literature,  the geographical focus for most studies is in the US and OECD 
countries (Camarero et al., 2013; Chen, 2011; Hamori, 2009; Holmes, 2006b; Husted, 1992; 
Raybaudi et al., 2004; Wu, 2000; Wu et al., 2001), with a few other studies in the Asian region 
(Baharumshah et al., 2003, 2005; Lau & Baharumshah, 2003; Sahoo et al., 2016; Singh, 2015), 
Latin American region (Chortareas et al., 2003; Donoso & Martin, 2014; Holmes, 2006a; 
Kalyoncu & Ozturk, 2006) and sub-Saharan African region (Chu et al., 2007; Gnimassoun & 
Coulibaly, 2014; Hashiguchi & Hamori, 2012; Holmes, 2003; Shuaibu & Oyinlola, 2017). With 
the focus largely on the US and OECD countries, other regions have been neglected, particularly 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Furthermore, analysis of empirical findings in the sub-Saharan Africa region shows mixed results, 
which is a clear indication that current account sustainability depends on the approach and 
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estimation techniques used. Most studies in this region focus on stationarity of current account 
(Chu et al., 2007; Hashiguchi & Hamori, 2012; Holmes, 2003). Such an approach has limited use 
when investigating the dynamics of current account sustainability including the strength of 
sustainability and adjustment mechanism back to equilibrium when current account is off the 
equilibrium path. The framework in Gnimassoun & Coulibaly (2014), however,  provides  a useful 




2.5.1 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework on the intertemporal solvency approach developed by Husted (1992) 
and extended by Kónya (2009) is adopted in the assessment of current account sustainability in 
sub-Saharan Africa. This framework considers a representative agent of a small open economy 
that produces and exports a single composite good and has no government. The agent can borrow 
and lend in the international market using one-period financial instruments at the prevailing world 
interest rate and aims at maximizing lifetime utility subject to budget constraints. The agent faces 
the following budget constraint; 
 
𝐶𝑡  =  𝑌𝑡  +  𝐵𝑡  −  𝐼𝑡 – (1 +  𝑟𝑡)𝐵𝑡−1                                                 (2.1) 
 
where 𝐶𝑡 denotes consumption, 𝑌𝑡 is aggregate output, 𝐼𝑡 is investment, 𝐵𝑡 is net stock of debt,  𝑟𝑡 
is the one-period world interest rate, and (1 +  𝑟𝑡)𝐵𝑡−1 is the net debt from the previous period. 
Equation (2.1) can be expressed in terms of  𝐵𝑡 as follows: 
−𝐵𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 −  𝐶𝑡  −  𝐼𝑡 –  (1 +  𝑟𝑡)𝐵𝑡−1                                                   (2.2)    
  
Defining the trade balance as  𝑇𝐵𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡 and substituting in equation (2.1) result in the 
following single period budget constraint: 
 
𝐵𝑡 = −𝑇𝐵𝑡 +  (1 +  𝑟𝑡)𝐵𝑡−1                                                                    (2.3)    
 
Through forward iteration and recursive substitution of equation (2.3), (see Appendix A2.1 for 
derivation), the following intertemporal budget constraint is derived:  
 











             (2.4) 
                                        
Equation (2.4) is the economywide IBC. It implies that the present value of outstanding foreign 
debt at the end of period 𝑡 should be equal to the sum of the discounted values of all future trade 
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surpluses. This holds so long as the second term on the right-hand side is zero (i.e.  lim
𝑛→∞
𝜆𝑛𝐵𝑡+𝑛 =
0 ). This terminal restriction is known as the transversality condition which must be satisfied for a 
country to remain solvent. In other words, when a country is solvent, the future external debts (in 
the limit) tends to zero in the long run. This assumption in the literature is referred to as the ‘no 
Ponzi-game’ condition. It limits the ability of the government to roll-over its debt indefinitely and 
happens when the net foreign debt grows at slower pace than the interest rate (Herzberg, 2015). 
From equation (2.4), either of two scenarios can imply violation of the IBC. The first scenario 
occurs if the current level of outstanding debt (𝐵𝑡) exceeds the present discounted value of future 
trade surpluses, and the country is over borrowing to refinance maturing external debt by new 
loans which is not optimal. The second scenario takes effect if the current level of outstanding debt 
( 𝐵𝑡), is less than the present discounted value of future trade surpluses. This is also not optimal as 
the welfare can be improved through more borrowings. 
2.5.2 Empirical implications of the intertemporal budget constraint 
To test the validity of the IBC empirically, this study follows the approach of Hakkio & Rush 
(1991) on fiscal sustainability. In this context, this would imply testing for a cointegrating 
relationship between exports and imports inclusive of interest payments. This is a sufficient 
condition for current account sustainability. Before proceeding, the following assumptions are 
made; the world interest rate is stationary with unconditional mean 𝑟, so that 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟 + 𝜇𝑡 and 
𝐸(𝑟𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑟) + 𝐸(𝜇𝑡) = 𝑟.  Further, the trade balance is noted as the difference between exports 
𝑋 and imports 𝑀. These assumptions are applied to equation (2.3) to obtain: 
 
𝑋𝑡 − 𝑀𝑡 = −𝐵𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡)𝐵𝑡−1                                          (2.5) 
 
 
Adding −𝑟𝐵𝑡−1 on both sides of equation (2.5) and introducing an auxiliary variable  𝑍𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡 +
(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟)𝐵𝑡−1 to capture deviation of interest rate from conditional mean. Further rearranging the 
equation for 𝐵𝑡 to obtain: 
 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝑍𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟)𝐵𝑡−1                                               (2.6) 
 
 











𝜆𝑛+1𝐵𝑡+𝑛                              (2.7)   
 
Assuming that  𝑋𝑡 and  𝑍𝑡 follow a random walk with drift so that the data generating process is 
given by AR (1).  The following representation is obtained: 
 




𝑍𝑡 = 𝛼2 + 𝑍𝑡−1 + 2,𝑡;     ⇒  ∆𝑍𝑡 = 𝛼2 + 2,𝑡            ⇒      ∆𝑍𝑡+𝑗 = 𝛼2 + 2,𝑡+𝑗             (2.8𝑏)     
 
Where 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 are drift parameters, 1,𝑡 and 2,𝑡 follow a white noise process
6 and further noting 
that 0 < 𝜆 < 1.  
 
Substituting equation (2.8a) and (2.8b) into equation (2.7), to obtain: 
 




[𝛼1 − 𝛼2 + 1,𝑡+𝑗 − 2,𝑡+𝑗] + 𝑟 lim
𝑛→∞
𝜆𝑛+1𝐵𝑡+𝑛                  (2.9)      






𝑗=1 =  
1
𝑟
 ,   equation (2.9) becomes: 
 






( 1,𝑡+𝑗 − 2,𝑡+𝑗) + 𝑟 lim
𝑛→∞
𝜆𝑛+1𝐵𝑡+𝑛               (2.10)   
 
Imposing transversality condition on the last term of equation (2.10), i.e. 𝑟 lim
𝑛→∞
𝜆𝑛+1𝐵𝑡+𝑛 = 0 and 
using the fact that by definition  𝑍𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡 + (𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟)𝐵𝑡−1  ⇒   𝑍𝑡 + 𝑟𝐵𝑡−1 = 𝑀𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡𝐵𝑡−1, and 









( 1,𝑡+𝑗 − 2,𝑡+𝑗),     𝑀𝑀𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡𝐵𝑡−1       
 
Making these substitutions into equation (2.10) yields the following simple linear relationship 
between exports (𝑋𝑡) and the sum of imports and interest payment on net debts: 
 
6 A sequence { 𝑡} is a white noise process if each value in the sequence has a mean zero, has a constant variance and 




𝑍𝑡 + 𝑟𝐵𝑡−1 = 𝑋𝑡 + 𝛼 + 𝑡        ⇒      𝑀𝑀𝑡 =  𝑋𝑡 + 𝛼 + 𝑡     
 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑡 + 𝑡                                                    (2.11) 
 
Equation (2.11) forms the basis for testing current account sustainability. It shows that provided 
𝑡 is stationary i.e. 𝑡~𝐼(0), then the sufficient condition for the IBC to be satisfied is that the trade 
flows  𝑋𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀𝑡 are each 𝐼(1) and cointegrated of order [1,1] with cointegrating vector [1, −1] 
(Husted, 1992).  In addition, the coefficient term 𝛽 = 1. If these conditions are met, then current 
account is sustainable in a strong sense.  
 
However, strictly speaking, the condition that 𝛽 = 1 is not necessary for the IBC to hold (Hakkio 
& Rush, 1991). If 0 < 𝛽 < 17 and 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀𝑡 are cointegrated then current account would still 
be sustainable but in a weak sense. Otherwise, if 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀𝑡 are cointegrated with the  𝛽 = 1, 
then current account is sustainable in a strong sense. On the other hand, if 𝛽 = 0, then there is no 
cointegration, hence current account is unsustainable (Coakley, Kulasi, & Smith, 1996; Jansen, 
1996; Quintos, 1995). 
2.5.3 Model specification and empirical strategy.  
The empirical strategy for this study follows two steps. First, a cointegration test between exports 
and imports is carried out. Second, a long-run estimation of the relationship between exports and 
imports in an error correction framework is done. 
 
2.5.3.1 Panel cointegration test 
The series are said to be cointegrated when they are nonstationary individually but their linear 
combination is stationary (Engle & Granger, 1987). The cointegration between exports and 
imports gives evidence for existence of long-run relationship between them such that even though 
the two variables may wander arbitrarily in the short run, they move together in the long-run.   
 
The cointegration tests are also grouped into first- and second-generation, where the former 
assumes cross-section independence while the latter relaxes this assumption. The residual based 
 
7 A scenario where 𝛽 > 1 would imply a surplus since export growth exceeds imports. 
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tests by Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1999) are examples of first generation cointegration tests. The 
Kao test assumes that there is a uniform cointegrating vector (homogeneous cointegration) while 
the Pedroni test assumes that there is panel specific cointegrating vector (Pedroni cointegration 
test results with panel-specific AR parameter). Most residual based cointegration tests require the 
long-run cointegrating vector for variables in levels to be equal to short-run parameters in their 
first difference. This strict requirement referred to as common-factor restriction has been blamed 
for the low power of residual based tests (Kremers et al., 1992). 
 
The second-generation tests, on the other hand do not impose any restriction on common factors. 
Furthermore, they allow for heterogeneous cointegration as well as cross-section dependence. A 
notable example is by Westerlund ( 2007), who developed four panel cointegration test statistics 
based on structural rather than residual dynamics. Each test can include individual-specific short-
run dynamics, including serially correlated error terms, non-strictly exogenous regressors, 
individual specific intercepts and trend terms, and individual-specific slope parameters. The set-
up for this model is presented below following Persyn & Westerlund (2008): 
 
Δ𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖






+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡  (2.14) 
 
where 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇 and 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁 denotes the time-series and cross-sectional units, 
respectively, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀𝑖,𝑡 represent exports to GDP ratio and imports including interest on 
external debt to GDP ratio in country 𝑖 at time 𝑡,  respectively. While 𝑑𝑡 contains the deterministic 
components, for which there are three cases. In the first case, 𝑑𝑡 = 0 such that equation (2.14) has 
no deterministic terms; in the second case, 𝑑𝑡 = 1 such that equation (2.14) is generated with a 
constant; and in the third case 𝑑𝑡 = (1, 𝑡)′ so that equation (2.14) is generated with both a constant 
and a trend. 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is the error term which is assumed to be independent across both 𝑖 and 𝑡. The 
presence of cross-sectional dependence can be handled by bootstrap methods. 
 











+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡     (2.15) 
 
where 𝜆𝑖 = −𝛼𝑖𝛽𝑖. The parameters 𝛼𝑖 is the speed of adjustment that determines the speed at which 
the system corrects back to equilibrium relationship after a sudden shock. If 𝛼𝑖 < 0, then there is 
error correction, which implies that 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀𝑖,𝑡 are cointegrated; if 𝛼𝑖 = 0, then there is no 
error correction and, thus no cointegration. Hence, the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be 
formulated as 𝐻0: 𝛼𝑖 = 0.  The alternative hypothesis formulation depends on assumption about 
the homogeneity of 𝛼𝑖. Two of the tests, called group-mean tests (𝐺𝑡 and 𝐺𝑎), assume that 𝛼𝑖 is 
not equal across 𝑖, implying that 𝐻0 is tested against alternative, 𝐻1
𝑔
: 𝛼𝑖 < 0 for at least one 𝑖.  The 
second pair of tests, known as panel tests (𝑝𝑡 and 𝑝𝑎), assume that 𝛼𝑖 is equal for all 𝑖 and are 
designed to test 𝐻0 versus 𝐻1
𝑝: 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼 < 0 for all 𝑖. This study relies on both residual based and 
non-residual based tests by Pedroni (1999) and Westerlund ( 2007), respectively to test for 
cointegration. 
 
2.5.3.2 Error correction model specification 
For every cointegrating relationship, there exists an error correction representation (Engle & 
Granger, 1987). As such, the long run relationship between exports and imports is estimated within 
an error correction framework after establishing that both variables are cointegrated. The 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model is used to estimate the long run relationship between 
exports and imports with the advantage that it can accommodate a mix of both 𝐼(1) and 𝐼(0). This 
model can be specified as follows:  






+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                                (2.16) 
where the number of countries is 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁 and the number of years is 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇. In this 
case,  𝑇 is large enough for the model to fit for each country separately. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀𝑖,𝑡 represent 
exports to GDP ratio and imports including interest on external debt-to-GDP ratio in country 𝑖 at 
time 𝑡, respectively;  𝜇𝑖 represents country specific fixed effects and 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is a set of normally 
distributed error terms with country specific variances, Var (𝜖𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜎𝑖
2. The optimal lag length 




If  𝑋𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀𝑖,𝑡 are 𝐼(1) and cointegrated, then the error term is an 𝐼(0) process. Thus equation 
(2.16) can then be expressed in the following manner as an error correction representation: 
 








+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡               (2.17) 
 
where 𝜙𝑖 = −(1 − ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑗)
𝑝
𝑗=1 , 𝛽𝑖 = ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗 (1 − ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑘𝑘 )⁄
𝑞
𝑗=0 , 𝜆𝑖𝑗
∗ = − ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=𝑗+1     𝑗 =
1,2, … , 𝑝 − 1, and 𝛿𝑖𝑗
∗ = − ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑚
𝑞
𝑚=𝑗+1   𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑞 − 1. 
 
The parameter  𝜙𝑖 is the error-correction speed of adjustment term. It represents the speed at which  
𝑋𝑖,𝑡 adjusts back to long-run equilibrium following a change in 𝑀𝑀𝑖,𝑡. If 𝜙𝑖 = 0, then there would 
be no evidence for a long-run relationship between 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀𝑖,𝑡 and by extension no 
cointegration. This parameter is expected to be significantly negative under the assumption that 
the variables return to long-run equilibrium. The parameter 𝛽𝑖 represents the coefficient of long-
run relationship between 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀𝑖,𝑡. 
 
A major finding of the large 𝑁 and large 𝑇 dynamic panel literature is that it is inappropriate to 
use fixed or random effects estimators or even instrumental variable estimators, such as the 
Arellano & Bond (1991) generalized method of moments (GMM) to estimate equation (2.17). This 
is because they assume that the slope coefficient is homogeneous and the series is stationary (Im 
et al., 2003a; Pesaran et al., 1999; Pesaran & Smith, 1995).  Using these methods when slope 
coefficients are heterogeneous across groups could result in inconsistent and misleading estimates. 
 
The literature therefore suggests two techniques for the estimation of dynamic panels with 
heterogeneous parameters across groups. These are the mean-group (MG) and pooled mean-group 
(PMG) estimators. Firstly, the MG estimator proposed by Pesaran & Smith (1995) allows both the 
intercepts, slope coefficients, and error variances to differ across the panels. Essentially, it fits the 
error correction model separately for each group and then calculates a simple arithmetic average 
for the coefficients. This yields consistent estimates if country-specific coefficients are 
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independently distributed and regressors are exogeneous. However, if some coefficients are similar 
for some groups, then MG estimates are inefficient.  
 
Thus, the second approach by Pesaran et al. (1999) known as the PMG estimator is recommended. 
This PMG estimation technique involves both pooling and averaging as the name suggests. 
Moreover, it also allows the intercept, short-run coefficients and error variances to differ across 
the groups. The only difference with MG estimator is that it constrains the long-run coefficient to 
be identical (homogeneous) across the groups. This restriction is relevant for this study as it 
imposes solvency constraints on all countries under consideration in a uniform manner. Similar 
justification cannot, however, be made for short-run dynamics and error variances given that it is 
reasonable to assume that short-run adjustments vary across countries due to country 
heterogeneities. To choose between MG and PMG estimators,  Pesaran et al., (1999) suggests a 
Hausman test on homogeneity restriction of the long-run coefficient. Since equation (2.17) is 
nonlinear in parameters, Pesaran et al. (1999) proposes a maximum likelihood method to estimate 
the parameters. Equation (2.17) therefore forms the main estimation equation in this study. 
2.5.4 Data  
The data used in this study is annual secondary data for the period 1980-2017 covering 35 sub-
Saharan African countries.  The selected sample is based on availability of data and the list of 
countries can be found in Appendix A2.4. The data is sourced from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) and comprise exports, imports and net interest payments on external debt. The 
series on exports (𝑋) comprise exports of goods and services while imports (𝑀𝑀) comprise 
imports of goods and services plus net interest payment on external debt. 𝑀𝑀 series is constructed 
from the imports and net import payment on external debt. The series are then scaled by the GDP. 
The variable description and descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix A2.3 and A2.5, 
respectively.   
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2.6 Empirical Results 
This section reports and discusses empirical results based on the cointegration tests and the error 
correction model. 
2.6.1 Cointegration test results 
The second step in our empirical strategy is to test for cointegration between exports and imports 
inclusive of interest payments. The error correction procedure of Westerlund (2007) is applied and 
also perform a confirmatory test based on the Pedroni (1999) testing procedure. Table 2.2 reports 
the results based on the two sets of tests. According to the Westerlund (2007) test, all the four test 
statistics reject the null of no cointegration in favour of the hypothesis that exports and imports 
inclusive of interest payments are cointegrated in some panel units. The finding generally shows 
that exports and imports have a long-run relationship. These results continue to hold even when 
the alternative residual based testing procedure of Pedroni (1999) is done as shown in the right 
panel of Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.1: Panel cointegration test 
Westerlund (2007) cointegartion test8   Pedroni cointegration test 
Test statistic Value Z-value p-value  Test statistic Result p-value 
Gt -2.613 -5.460 0.0000  Modified Phillips-Perron -2.1195 0.0170 
Ga -10.813 -3.943 0.0000  Phillips-Perron -3.0896 0.0010 
Pt -12.400 -3.629 0.0000  Augmented Dickey-Fuller -3.2262 0.0006 
Pa -7.692 -4.301 0.0000         
Notes: Both Westerlund (2007) and Pedroni (1999) cointegration test have the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the 
alternative that some panels are cointegrated. Gt and Ga denote group mean tests. Pt and Pa denote panel test. 
 
 
Despite the above evidence rejecting the null hypothesis of no cointegration, the way the 
alternative hypothesis is formulated signals the possibility that cointegration may not hold for some 
countries. Therefore, there is a need to devise a test that goes beyond the general group to specific 
countries. In addition, given that the dual purpose of this study is to establish whether current 
account is sustainable or not, and to determine the degree and pattern of current account 
adjustment. Such analysis is performed using the error correction model which is estimated next.  
 
 
8 We thank Persyn & Westerlund (2008) for providing a user written program for carrying out this test. 
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2.6.2 Error correction model estimation results 
The dynamic heterogeneous panel data model specified in equation (2.17) is estimated using the 
PMG estimator. The results are reported in Table 2.3, which also details the MG and dynamic 
fixed effects (DFE) estimators for comparison purposes. This analysis focuses on PMG estimator 
because it gives consistent and efficient estimates as shown by the Hausman test statistics. The test 
statistic is 1.28 distributed as a 𝜒2(1) with a p-value of 0.257, indicating that the null hypothesis 
restriction of homogeneous long-run coefficient cannot be rejected.  
 
Table 2.2: Error correction model estimation results9 
  PMG   MG   DFE 
Variable Coefficient S.E   Coefficient S.E   Coefficient S.E 
Long-run Coefficient        
𝑀𝑀 0.3463855*** 0.04307  1.204685* 0.72593  0.1949519** 0.08925 
𝐻0: 𝛽 = 1? 230.29***   0.08   81.37***  
         
Short-run coefficient         
Error-correction term -0.1979339*** 0.02322  -0.2454635*** 0.02866  -0.1108987*** 0.01337 
Δ𝑀𝑀 0.1615204*** 0.03666  0.1545707*** 0.03329  0.0756973*** 0.01609 
Constant 0.0325289*** 0.00571  0.0389409*** 0.01064  0.0228049*** 0.00514 
Hausman test 1.28        
p-value 0.2572        
No of Countries 35     35     35   
Notes: * ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  PMG refers to panel mean group 
estimator; MG is mean group estimator and DFE is difference fixed effects estimator. The Hausman test is a test statistic on the 
long-run homogeneity restriction between PMG and MG. The null hypothesis is that PMG estimator is more efficient than MG.  
𝑀𝑀 is a ratio of imports inclusive of net interest payment on external debt. 
 
The long-run coefficient (𝛽) is positive and highly significant with a coefficient value of 0.35, the 
DFE estimator is within the same range at 0.19 while the MG estimator is much larger at 1.2. These 
findings indicate that on average, exports and imports inclusive of interest payments have a long-
run relationship in most countries. Hence, the IBC seems to hold. The magnitude of this coefficient 
is however significantly less than unity according to the PMG estimator. This is confirmed by the 
Wald test which rejects the hypothesis that 𝛽 = 1 at all conventional levels of significance. The 
MG estimator is unable to reject this hypothesis. However, this study adopts the more robust 
interpretation given by PMG estimator. This result implies that current account is weakly 
 
9 We thank Blackburne & Frank (2007) for providing a user written program for carrying out this test. 
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sustainable in the region, confirming similar results by Dash (2017) and Gnimassoun & Coulibaly 
(2014). 
 
The error correction term that measures the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is 
negative and statistically significant with an estimate of -0.198. Similar results are observed across 
the other two estimators indicating generally that there is convergence towards a long-run 
equilibrium relationship. This is in turn a confirmation of a cointegrating relationship between 
exports and imports inclusive of interest. The absolute value for the error correction term for the 
PMG estimator (0.198) is lower than the MG estimator (0.245), suggesting a slower rate of 
adjustment. Particularly, this translates to a half-life10 of three years; meaning on average it takes 
approximately six years for complete adjustment to long-run equilibrium in case of a short-term 
disturbance. A situation which may be contributing to weak current account sustainability in the 
sub-Saharan Africa region. The slow adjustment appears to be driven mainly by persistent current 
account deficits in the region over the past two decades. The short-run coefficient on imports and 
interest payments on external debt is positive and significant, implying that in the short run, exports 
and imports move in the same direction. 
2.6.3 Current account sustainability- country level analysis 
The advantage of PMG estimation is that it allows for short run dynamics (coefficients) to differ 
across the panel units, thus enabling short run analysis across countries. The sign and magnitude 
of coefficient of the error correction term gives an indication of the speed of adjustment back to 
long-run equilibrium in case of exogenous shock between exports and imports inclusive of interest 
payments. A negative and significant coefficient term indicates convergence.  
 
Furthermore, this analysis enables for identification of countries that do not adjust back to long-
run equilibrium. Recall that the null of no error-correction relation is equivalent to evidence of no 
long-run relationship between exports and imports which signifies that current account is not 
sustainable. Similarly, an insignificant error correction coefficient is indicative of non-
 
10 The half-life is calculated as log (0.5) log (1 − |𝐸𝐶𝑇|)⁄ , where ECT is the error correction term for speed of 




convergence between exports and imports and by extension is evidence that current account is 
unsustainable. This background enables us to analyze the pattern of current account adjustment of 
individual countries in the sub-Saharan Africa region. 
 
Table 2.4 reports the error correction estimates by country and half-life estimates for sub-Saharan 
African countries. The table only reports the results for countries with significant error correction 
terms (For the list of countries with non-significant error correction term, see Appendix A2.6.). 
 
Table 2.3: Error correction term (ECT) and half-life estimates 
Country ECT Std. Err. Half-life 
Malawi -0.5102018*** 0.1516 0.971 
Cameroon -0.4458864*** 0.1253 1.174 
Sierra Leone -0.4214473*** 0.1211 1.267 
Nigeria -0.4098699*** 0.1346 1.314 
South Africa -0.3617356*** 0.1151 1.544 
Gabon -0.3311755** 0.1423 1.723 
Niger -0.3273892*** 0.1156 1.748 
Swaziland -0.3141645*** 0.1180 1.838 
Burundi -0.3036833*** 0.1158 1.915 
Botswana -0.3013474*** 0.1081 1.933 
Uganda -0.2917297** 0.1146 2.010 
Togo -0.2630096*** 0.1004 2.271 
Ethiopia -0.2424201* 0.1327 2.497 
Zambia -0.2218922** 0.1045 2.763 
Côte d'Ivoire -0.2107433** 0.0996 2.929 
Chad -0.1957978*** 0.0722 3.181 
Benin -0.1642348* 0.9181 3.864 
Rwanda -0.1397844* 0.0841 4.603 
Ghana -0.137521* 0.0727 4.685 
Notes: * ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  ECT is the error correction term 
for speed of adjustment. Only countries with significant ECT estimates are reported. The half-life is calculated as 
log (0.5) log (1 − |𝐸𝐶𝑇|)⁄ , where the higher the |𝐸𝐶𝑇|, the lower the half-life and the faster is the adjustment. 
 
The results indicate negative and significant adjustment coefficient for 19 out of the 35 sampled 
countries. This means that 19 meet the criteria for convergence and sustainability; the remaining 
16 countries (see Appendix A2.6) have unsustainable current account balances, which is a 




The magnitude of the speed of adjustment term varies across the sampled countries. Malawi has 
the fastest adjustment followed by Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and South Africa in that order. 
Malawi has a half-life of about a year, implying that it takes only two years for a complete 
adjustment whenever there is disequilibrium in the current account. On the other hand, Ghana 
shows the slowest adjustment followed by Rwanda, Benin and Chad in that order. Rwanda has a 
half-life of about 5 years, implying that it takes roughly 10 years for complete adjustment to take 
place whenever the current account is in disequilibrium. 
2.6.4 Robustness tests 
The purpose of this exercise is to assess the implications of splitting the sample into different 
income groups on the results. After estimating the model in full sample, a re-estimation is done 
based on country characteristics and income groups, such as those that have benefitted from debt 
relief under the HIPC initiatives11; the fragile countries; the oil exporters; the middle income 
countries; and the lower income countries (see Appendix A2.4 for a breakdown of countries). The 
estimation results based on the PMG estimator are reported in Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.4: Current account sustainability by income group 
Variable Full sample 
HIPC 
countries 








𝑀𝑀 0.346***     0.338*** 0.664***    0.633***   0.382***    0.330*** 
    (0.043) (0.048)    (0.094) (0.158)      (0.082) (0.049) 
𝐻0:  𝛽 = 1? 230.29*** 187.42*** 12.88***        5.36**   58.17***     184.03*** 
       
Short-run coefficient 
Error-correction term -0.198*** -0.196 *** -0.202 *** -0.294*** -0.203*** -0.194*** 
   (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.041)   (0.081)   (0.036)   (0.032) 
Δ𝑀𝑀 0.162*** 0.165 *** 0.053 *** 0.003 0.209 *** 0.119 *** 
  (0.037)   (0.042)   (0.041)   (0.152)   (0.068)   (0.035) 
Constant 0.033***      0.024***   0.006*      0.036***      0.048***      0.018*** 
   (0.006)   (0.004)   (0.003)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.004) 
       
Half-life 3.14 3.18 3.08 1.99 3.05 3.22 
       
 
11 HIPC debt relief initiative reduced the level of external debt for recipient countries in this region. A fact which is 
expected to have strong effects on sustainability of current account balances for these countries. 
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Variable Full sample 
HIPC 
countries 







No of Countries 35 25 13 5 16 17 
Notes: * ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis. The 
half-life is calculated as log (0.5) log (1 − |𝐸𝐶𝑇|)⁄ , where the higher the |𝐸𝐶𝑇|, the lower the half-life and the faster is the 
adjustment. ECT is the error correction term for speed of adjustment. 𝑀𝑀 is a ratio of imports inclusive of net interest payment on 
external debt. 
 
Again, the results indicate that the long-run coefficient is positive and significant across the five 
income groups.  The magnitude of long-run coefficient is almost similar across all income groups 
except for fragile and oil exporting countries. Nevertheless, the Wald test still rejects the null 
hypothesis that the long-run coefficient is equal to unity even though this hypothesis is rejected at 
a higher level for oil exporters compared to the remaining categories (5 percent compared to 1 
percent for other income groups). This suggests that even though current account is weakly 
sustainable in all the cases, it is less weak, or relatively strong for oil exporting countries. 
Generally, these findings confirm our earlier results that current account balance is weakly 
sustainable in the sub-Saharan Africa region even after controlling for different income groups. 
 
The speed of adjustment coefficient is again negative and significant across all five income 
categories with similar half-life except for oil exporters. The oil exporters have a half-life of two 
years compared to three years for the other income groups, with the low-income category recording 
the highest half-life of 3.22 years. These results suggest that it takes approximately four years to 
reduce the current account imbalances in oil exporting countries compared to six years in other 
income groups. As such, current account balance in oil exporting countries adjusts back to 
equilibrium at the fastest rate whenever there is a shock in the external accounts while the slowest 
adjustment is experienced in the low-income countries. A finding which points to the fact that non-
oil exporting countries have limited buffer to withstand negative external shocks on their current 
account. In summary these results further confirm that our earlier findings are robust to different 
income groupings in the region. 
 
The overall finding is that current account is weakly sustainable in sub-Saharan Africa, with a 
significant number of countries having unsustainable balances. In general, this implies that these 
countries are likely to experience prolonged spells of current account deficit. The slow pattern of 
adjustment back to equilibrium provides further evidence to this finding. For a vast majority of 
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countries in the region, it takes an average of about six years for a complete adjustment to long-
run equilibrium in response to a short-run disturbance. Under these conditions, a build-up in levels 
of external debt is likely to occur, since the current account deficits are not cleared quickly enough. 
Such a situation could prove problematic for these countries in the long term for several reasons. 
Firstly, it can lead to a rise in net interest payment for servicing debt, which could crowd out private 
investment and hence reduce GDP growth. Secondly, net interest payment could outstrip GDP 
growth, which in turn could impair the ability of these economies to service their debt. Finally, 
rising levels of foreign debt in these countries could increase their vulnerability to adverse 

























This chapter sought to examine the sustainability of current account balances in the sub-Saharan 
Africa region.  In addition, it attempted to assess the strength of sustainability of these balances 
and their pattern of adjustment in the region. A test for cointegrating relationship between exports 
and imports was done within the error correction framework, testing whether there was a long-run 
relationship between these two variables. The model estimates the long-run coefficient as well as 
the speed of adjustment across the countries in sub-Saharan Africa and results confirm existence 
of a long-run relationship for most countries but with weakly sustainable current account balances. 
Furthermore, the evidence reveals that a significant number of countries (16 out of 35) in this 
region face unsustainable balances. This situation is likely to result in prolonged spells of current 
account deficits, which is also evidenced by the slow pattern of adjustment back to equilibrium. 
On average, it takes about six years for a complete adjustment to long-run equilibrium in case of 
a short-run disturbance. The resulting build-up of external debt, since the current account deficits 
are not cleared quick enough, could crowd out private investment if not addressed, and hence 
reduce GDP growth. It could also impair the ability of these countries to service their debt. Further, 
the rise in the levels of foreign debt raises the vulnerability of these countries to exogenous shocks. 
In view of these findings, the next chapter explores whether the public sector, which is dominant 
in sub-Saharan Africa, could be contributing to this current account situation given that, during the 
period of this analysis, the region was also encountering large and persistent fiscal deficits.   
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Appendix A  
Appendix A2.1: Intertemporal Budget Constraint 
 
The single period budget constraint in section 5.1 is expressed as: 
𝐵𝑡 = −𝑇𝐵𝑡 + (1 +  𝑟𝑡)𝐵𝑡−1                                                                    (2.18)    
 
Forward iteration and recursive substitution of  (18) yield: 
 
𝐵𝑡+1 = −𝑇𝐵𝑡+1 +  (1 +  𝑟𝑡+1)𝐵𝑡                                                             
 
𝐵𝑡+2 = −𝑇𝐵𝑡+2 +  (1 +  𝑟𝑡+2)𝐵𝑡+1                                                        
 
        = −𝑇𝐵𝑡+2 − (1 +  𝑟𝑡+2)𝑇𝐵𝑡+1 +  (1 +  𝑟𝑡+2)(1 +  𝑟𝑡+1)𝐵𝑡  
 
   ⋮ 
 
 𝐵𝑡+𝑛   = −𝑇𝐵𝑡+𝑛 − (1 +  𝑟𝑡+𝑛)𝑇𝐵𝑡+𝑛−1 − ⋯                                    
−(1 +  𝑟𝑡+𝑛)(1 +  𝑟𝑡+𝑛−1) ⋯ (1 + 𝑟𝑡+2)𝑇𝐵𝑡+1 
+(1 +  𝑟𝑡+𝑛)(1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑛−1) ⋯ (1 + 𝑟𝑡+1)𝐵𝑡 
 




(1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑛)(1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑛−1) ⋯ (1 + 𝑟𝑡+1)
+
𝑇𝐵𝑡+𝑛−1






(1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑛)(1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑛−1) ⋯ (1 + 𝑟𝑡+1)
 
 
Alternatively, by letting 𝑛 approach infinity, we obtain the following expression: 











                                     (2.19) 
                                          
40 
 
Appendix A2.2: Intertemporal Budget Constraint 
 
The single period budget constraint in section 5.1 is expressed as: 
 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝑍𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟)𝐵𝑡−1                                           (2.20) 
 
Forward iteration and recursive substitution of equation (xx) n times gives: 
 
𝐵𝑡+1 = 𝑍𝑡+1 − 𝑋𝑡+1 + (1 + 𝑟)𝐵𝑡                                               
 
                  = 𝑍𝑡+1 − 𝑋𝑡+1 + (1 + 𝑟){𝑍𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟)𝐵𝑡−1}              
 
                  = 𝑍𝑡+1 − 𝑋𝑡+1 + (1 + 𝑟)(𝑍𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡) + (1 + 𝑟)
2𝐵𝑡−1            
 
                                    ⋮ 
 
 𝐵𝑡+𝑛 = ∑(1 + 𝑟)




                     (2.21) 
 
Making 𝐵𝑡−1 the subject of the formula we obtain: 
 
 𝐵𝑡−1 = ∑(1 + 𝑟)




                                 
 




 ,        𝜆 =
1
1 + 𝑟
                      
 
Letting n approach infinity, we get: 
 
𝐵𝑡−1 = ∑ 𝜆





                                                   (2.22) 
 
With further manipulation of equation (22), we get: 
 
𝐵𝑡−1 = ∑ 𝜆





                                                    
 
     = 𝜆(𝑋𝑡 − 𝑍𝑡) + 𝜆
2(𝑋𝑡 − 𝑍𝑡) + 𝜆




                     = 𝜆(𝑋𝑡 − 𝑍𝑡) + 𝜆
2(𝑋𝑡 − 𝑍𝑡) − 𝜆
2(𝑋𝑡 − 𝑍𝑡) + 𝜆
2(𝑋𝑡 − 𝑍𝑡) + 𝜆
3(𝑋𝑡 − 𝑍𝑡)
− 𝜆3(𝑋𝑡 − 𝑍𝑡) + 𝜆






                                         











Making use of the fact that 𝐵𝑡−1 − lim
𝑛→∞
𝜆𝑛+1𝐵𝑡+𝑛 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝜆
𝑗+1(𝑋𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑍𝑡+𝑗)
∞
𝑗=0 , we obtain: 
 
                                    = 𝜆(𝑋𝑡 − 𝑍𝑡) + 𝜆 ∑ 𝜆
𝑗(∆𝑋𝑡+𝑗 − ∆𝑍𝑡+𝑗)
∞









+ (1 − 𝜆) lim
𝑛→∞













𝜆𝑛+1𝐵𝑡+𝑛     
 
              ∵    𝜆 =
1
1 + 𝑟
  ⇒  𝑟 =
1−𝜆
𝜆
  , we then obtain: 
 






𝜆𝑛+1𝐵𝑡+𝑛     
 










Appendix A2.3: Description of variables 
 
Variable Name Description Units Source  
Exports of goods 
and services  
Exports of goods and services comprise all transactions 
between residents of a country and the rest of the world 
involving a change of ownership from residents to 
nonresidents of general merchandise, net exports of goods 




Imports of goods 
and services  
Imports of goods and services comprise all transactions 
between residents of a country and the rest of the world 
involving a change of ownership from nonresidents to 






on external debt 
Interest payments on external debt which comprise of long-
term debt, IMF charges, and interest paid on short-term 
debt. Long-term external debt is defined as debt that has an 
original or extended maturity of more than one year and 
that is owed to nonresidents by residents of an economy and 
repayable in currency, goods, or services. Short-term 
external debt is defined as debt that has an original maturity 
of one year or less. 
current US$ WDI 
Imports plus 
interest payment on 
external debt 
The series constructed by adding the value for imports of 
goods and services on interest payments on external debt 
and scaling by GDP 
% of GDP WDI 




Current account balance is the sum of net exports of goods 
and services, net primary income, and net secondary 
income. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
% of GDP WDI 




Appendix A2.4: List of selected countries 
 
# Full sample 
HIPC 
countries 





1 Benin Benin Benin Cameroon Botswana Benin  
2 Botswana Burkina Faso Central African 
Republic 
Chad Cabo Verde Burkina Faso 
3 Burkina Faso Burundi Chad Gabon Cameroon  Burundi 
4 Burundi Cameroon Comoros Nigeria Cote d'Ivoire Central African 
Republic 
5 Cabo Verde Central African 
Republic 
Cote d'Ivoire Republic of 
Congo 
Gabon Chad 
6 Cameroon Chad Gambia 
 
Ghana Comoros 





8 Chad Côte d'Ivoire Madagascar 
 
Lesotho Gambia 
9 Comoros Ethiopia Malawi 
 
Mauritius Guinea-Bissau 
10 Côte d'Ivoire Gambia Mali 
 
Nigeria Madagascar 





12 Gabon Guinea-Bissau Sierra Leone 
 
Senegal Mali 
13 Gambia Madagascar Togo 
 
Seychelles Mozambique 
14 Ghana Malawi 
  
South Africa Niger 
15 Guinea-Bissau Mali 
  
Swaziland Rwanda 
16 Kenya Mozambique 
  
Zambia Sierra Leone 
17 Lesotho Niger 
   
Tanzania 
18 Madagascar Republic of 
Congo 
   
Togo 
19 Malawi Rwanda 
   
Uganda 
20 Mali Senegal 
    
21 Mauritius Sierra Leone 
    
22 Mozambique Tanzania 
    
23 Niger Togo 
    
24 Nigeria Uganda 
    
25 Republic of Congo Zambia 
    
26 Rwanda 
     
27 Senegal 
     
28 Seychelles 
     
29 Sierra Leone 
     
30 South Africa 
     
31 Swaziland 
     
32 Tanzania 
     
33 Togo 
     
34 Uganda 
     
35 Zambia 




Appendix A2.5: Descriptive statistics for selected sub-Saharan African countries, 1980-2017 
 
Country 
CAB-to-GDP   Exports-to-GDP   Imports-to-GDP 
Mean Min Max   Mean Min Max   Mean Min Max 
Benin -7.42 -28.53 -1.64  21.52 13.50 31.30  35.07 24.01 53.07 
Botswana 5.53 -29.27 26.45  53.66 34.80 75.10  50.77 33.34 84.43 
Burkina Faso -6.41 -13.16 0.52  13.11 7.90 26.00  28.22 20.34 39.98 
Burundi -7.50 -21.46 1.72  8.60 4.70 12.90  26.81 14.37 39.79 
Cabo Verde -8.92 -45.33 5.32  27.80 13.30 47.40  62.72 37.41 85.77 
Cameroon -3.07 -5.97 1.45  23.63 13.90 33.50  24.87 12.48 36.88 
Central African Republic -5.13 -14.82 -0.49  17.62 10.70 26.90  27.86 18.06 41.49 
Chad -8.48 -84.40 8.15  24.04 6.60 51.00  36.58 7.75 114.24 
Comoros -5.88 -27.75 3.44  9.04 8.20 11.60  26.39 16.35 39.04 
Côte d'Ivoire -3.27 -18.19 10.37  40.74 29.40 53.80  37.96 1.07 52.11 
Ethiopia -3.60 -12.64 1.54  10.02 3.24 16.70  22.34 5.95 39.87 
Gabon 7.21 -19.39 27.33  54.54 35.20 69.00  38.36 25.15 59.62 
Gambia -4.07 -18.60 1.57  31.95 12.40 59.90  43.53 25.79 79.03 
Ghana -5.07 -11.93 0.12  25.83 3.30 48.80  39.40 17.17 70.37 
Guinea-Bissau -11.37 -35.71 2.93  15.61 4.90 27.50  36.50 18.64 62.90 
Kenya -2.67 -10.37 11.42  24.11 13.20 38.90  38.92 23.54 90.52 
Lesotho 3.66 -31.41 47.25  29.79 11.04 56.42  146.12 82.43 250.19 
Madagascar -7.62 -21.10 0.57  22.35 10.60 35.40  31.65 17.18 50.71 
Malawi -7.36 -17.42 -0.14  24.45 15.90 35.70  37.30 23.25 55.64 
Mali -6.09 -14.70 1.26  20.56 13.30 28.40  33.81 27.84 44.20 
Mauritius -3.53 -13.50 6.29  55.96 42.30 68.50  62.37 50.62 74.00 
Mozambique -17.77 -44.74 -5.70  18.70 2.50 40.70  44.57 12.16 85.56 
Niger -10.30 -25.08 0.08  18.60 14.10 24.60  32.85 24.12 49.26 
Nigeria 3.10 -5.10 21.53  19.61 5.20 36.00  17.45 8.00 37.11 
Republic of Congo -10.07 -73.65 19.67  66.88 39.80 94.00  62.25 38.27 111.54 
Rwanda -5.05 -15.76 8.29  10.10 5.20 18.20  26.45 14.54 65.16 
Senegal -6.45 -11.23 -3.50  25.34 19.20 35.20  32.35 23.78 41.71 
Seychelles -12.68 -27.51 6.45  48.93 8.90 108.00  87.61 55.14 133.47 
Sierra Leone -9.12 -65.03 10.71  20.02 7.80 34.70  33.80 15.07 84.63 
South Africa -1.18 -6.02 5.76  27.40 20.70 35.60  25.26 15.91 38.58 
Swaziland 0.45 -17.19 26.08  61.86 44.90 84.40  74.57 40.45 115.91 
Tanzania -8.15 -26.23 -1.13  14.77 4.04 24.10  26.45 9.00 49.98 
Togo -6.80 -13.15 2.89  37.62 24.40 51.20  53.80 40.18 70.82 
Uganda -3.77 -9.89 1.82  13.40 7.10 24.30  25.41 11.58 37.38 
Zambia -5.13 -19.81 7.53   33.75 23.90 44.50   38.48 25.14 60.07 








Appendix A2.6: Error correction term (ECT) for countries with unsustainable current 
account balances 
Country ECT Std. Err. 
Madagascar -0.2000061 0.123893 
Central African Republic -0.1475387 0.090738 
Guinea-Bissau -0.1412041 0.093994 
Mauritius -0.1306584 0.092519 
Mali -0.1289271 0.079629 
Tanzania -0.1199654 0.076653 
Senegal -0.112219 0.082456 
Republic of Congo -0.0992996 0.074605 
Kenya -0.0760946 0.086122 
Gambia -0.0751383 0.089895 
Seychelles -0.0571772 0.050853 
Comoros 0.00041690 0.050903 
Cabo Verde -0.0337308 0.062626 
Burkina Faso -0.0108231 0.080691 
Lesotho -0.0098026 0.026536 
Mozambique 0.0085156 0.045502 
 Notes: * ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  ECT is the error correction term 





Effect of Fiscal Deficit on the Current Account in sub-Saharan Africa: Does 
the level of Public Debt matter? 
3.1 Introduction 
Given the conclusion of chapter two that current account is weakly sustainable in the sub-Saharan 
Africa region, this chapter continues with this discussion to find out if the public sector drives the 
behaviour of current account in the region. The sub-Saharan Africa has maintained large and 
persistent levels of both current account deficit and fiscal deficit over the past two decades. This 
rekindles the twin deficit debate that was prevalent in the US in the 1980s during the Reagan 
administration12. The only exceptions are oil exporters, although lately they have also come under 
increasing pressure due to frequent fluctuations in commodity exports, all against the backdrop of 
a recent upsurge in public debt in the region. It is notable that the HIPC13 debt relief program 
initially contributed to substantial decline in the average level of debt in the region. The level of 
debt-to-GDP ratio declined sharply from a high of 67 percent in 2000 to 24 percent in 2008. 
However, since 2008, less than a decade later, there appears to be a reversal as the debt ratio is 
again rising steadily. The median level of public debt stood at 50 percent of GDP as at the end of 
2017, according to the IMFs Regional Economic Outlook report for sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
The debate whether the fiscal deficit drives the current account deficit has featured prominently in 
the literature. There are three possible causal relationships between current account and fiscal 
deficit.  The twin deficit hypothesis argues that an increase in the fiscal deficit increases the current 
account deficit. The alternative view is that fiscal deficit does not affect current account deficit in 
line with the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. Further, a more extreme view is that fiscal deficit 
improves the current account deficit in line with the twin divergence hypothesis.  
Empirical tests on this question often yield mixed results; the debate on this subject is therefore 
still wide open. Some studies have provided evidence for the twin deficit hypothesis (Abbas et al., 
2011; Chinn & Prasad, 2003; Egwaikhide, 1997; Forte & Magazzino, 2015; Kalou & Paleologou, 
 
12 During the tenure of President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), the United States experienced simultaneous increase in current 
account deficit and fiscal deficit. 
13 The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative launched in 1996 by the IMF and World Bank with an aim of debt 
reduction or forgiveness to poor countries facing debt burden. 
47 
 
2012; Monacelli & Perotti, 2007; Rafiq, 2010; Salvatore, 2006). Others have confirmed the twin 
divergence view (Kim & Roubini, 2008; Sakyi & Opoku, 2016). Moreover, others have found no 
significant relationship at all (Aristovnik & Djuric, 2010; Burcu, 2011; Bussière, Fratzscher, & 
Müller, 2010; Corsetti & Müller, 2006; Kaufmann, Scharler, & Winckler, 2002). One possible 
explanation for mixed findings is that the models addressing this problem do not account for 
threshold effects in the current account dynamics. 
The existence of threshold effects in current account dynamics has been confirmed by a number 
of studies (Aizenman & Sun, 2010; Clarida et al., 2005; Duncan, 2014; Freund, 2005; Holmes, 
2011; Nickel & Vansteenkiste, 2008). In particular, one of the threshold variable that could be 
driving the relationship between current account and fiscal deficit is the level of public debt   
(Nickel & Tudyka, 2014; Nickel & Vansteenkiste, 2008). It follows that current account would 
respond differently to fiscal deficit depending on the level of public debt. We seek to test this 
hypothesis within the context of sub-Saharan Africa in this chapter. 
 
This study follows closely the literature in Nickel & Vansteenkiste (2008) and uses the estimation 
technique proposed by Caner & Hansen (2004), which assumes that the threshold variable is 
exogenous. However, debt ratio in a current account model can be endogenous because of possible 
correlation with other factors affecting current account but omitted from the model. Similarly, 
countries with high current account deficit are more likely to accumulate more debt than those 
with lower deficits. This work therefore extends the literature by allowing the public debt as a 
threshold variable to be endogenous. It then employs an estimation technique of Seo & Shin (2016) 
for dynamic panel threshold model which allows for endogenous threshold.  
 
So far, there is no study in sub-Saharan Africa that has explored the linkage between public debt 
on the one hand, and current account and fiscal deficit on the other. This is an in interesting 
dimension in the context of the region which is beset with persistent current account and fiscal 
deficit coexisting side by side with rising public debt. Another notable contribution of this study 
is that most studies testing the twin deficit hypothesis are concentrated in developed countries with 
only a few focused on sub-Saharan Africa (Ahmad, Aworinde, & Martin, 2015; Egwaikhide, 1997; 
Sakyi & Opoku, 2016). Even for these few, majority of studies are country specific; those that 




In view of the foregoing, this chapter examines the effect of fiscal deficit on current account and 
assesses whether this relationship depends on the level of indebtedness in the economy. The 
following two research questions are addressed. Firstly, does fiscal deficit lead to current account 
deficit. Secondly, does the relationship between fiscal deficit and current account deficit depend 
on debt level.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two reviews recent fiscal and current 
account developments in the sub-Saharan Africa region. Section three reviews the relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature. Section four presents the methodology while section five 
reports and discusses the empirical results. Section six concludes the chapter.  
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3.2 Review of Recent Fiscal and Current Account Developments in sub-Saharan Africa 
This section examines the recent fiscal, current account and public debt developments in the sub-
Saharan Africa region over the past two decades.  Figure 3.1 presents the trends in total revenue 
and total expenditure in the sub-Saharan Africa. The left axis plots the ratios of total revenue and 
expenditure while the right axis plots the ratio of fiscal balance which in this case defines the gap 
between total revenue and total expenditure. The total revenue comprises of the tax and nontax 
revenue while total expenditure comprises of expenditures on goods and services, compensation 
of employees including wages and salaries, subsidies and other transfers.  
 
Figure 3.1: Trends in total revenue and total expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: WEO, 2019 
 
Several stylized facts emerge from the analysis of Figure 3.1. The region shows a general trend of 
higher levels of expenditure compared to revenue receipts throughout the period under review 
(2000-2018) except for a period between 2004 and 2008. The main drivers of higher expenditure 
in the region during the review period were compensation to employees as well as expenditures 
on goods and services (World, Bank 2018).  
 
Figure 3.2 shows the trends in fiscal balance and the current account balance (left axis) as well as 
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appear to move in the same direction for quite a while throughout the period. Whenever the current 
account balance improves, the fiscal balance also improves and vice versa. This shows a strong 
evidence of co-movement between them.  
 
Figure 3.2: Trends in current account balance, fiscal balance and public debt in sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
Source: WEO, 2019 
Figure 3.2 shows the current account and fiscal balance in deficit between 2000 and 2004 before 
briefly moving to surplus and reaching a peak in 2006. The region experienced improved balances 
in the period leading to the great recession of 2007/8 between 2003 and 2006. The fiscal balance 
increased from a deficit of 2 percent in 2003 to a surplus of 5 percent in 2006. At the same time, 
the current account balance also improved from a deficit of 0.5 percent to a surplus of 4 percent.  
 
However, the events of the 2007/8 global financial crisis, which weighed down heavily on 
developed countries, appear to have also spilled over to sub-Saharan Africa. Hence, just like in 
advanced economies, the region embarked on fiscal stimulus program to boost aggregate demand. 
The program involved huge public spending which largely affected the fiscal balance more than 
the current account balance. This is evident from considerable deterioration in fiscal balance from 
a surplus of 0.5 percent in 2007 to a deficit of 4.5 percent in 2009, compared to a current account 
balance that declined marginally from 1.5 percent in 2007 to 2.3 percent in 2009. This represented 
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account balance. After the end of recession in 2009, there was significant improvement in both 
balances, with fiscal deficit improving to 1.2 percent and current account deficit climbing to 0.6 
percent in 2011. This improvement was however short-lived as the two balances begun 
deteriorating again thereafter. 
 
The opposite trend is apparent with the public debt in the region (right axis of Figure 3.2). For the 
period of improvement in current account and fiscal balance, public debt was falling and vice 
versa. However, the question as to whether there was any causal relationship between these 
variables is an empirical one and can only be determined empirically. Between 2000 and 2008, the 
public debt fell steadily from a high of 67 percent in 2000 to 24 percent in 2008 as shown in Figure 
3.2. This decline coincided with improved fiscal performance during the period and debt 
forgiveness extended to selected countries in the region under the HIPC program. Majority of 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa benefited from this program with 30 out of a total of 36 eligible 
countries coming from this region. However, from 2008 onwards, public debt begun to rise again. 
The debt rose steadily, reaching 48 percent of GDP in 2018. Accordingly, more countries are 
entering into debt distress, with more than 40 percent of countries in this situation coming from 
sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2018).  The implication of growing debt is that greater share of 





3.3 Review of Literature 
3.3.1 Theoretical literature 
Viewed through the lens of the national accounting framework, the relationship underpinning 
current account and fiscal balance can be derived from the national income identity of an open 
economy as shown below: 
𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝑋 − 𝑀                                                                         (3.1) 
Where 𝑌 represents the gross domestic product, 𝐶 is consumption, 𝐼 is gross investment, 𝐺 is 
government expenditure, 𝑋 is exports and 𝑀 is imports. Adding the net factor receipts from abroad, 
(𝑅) to (3.1) we obtain: 
                        𝐺𝑁𝐼 = 𝑌 + 𝑅  
                             = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝑋 − 𝑀 + 𝑅                                                             (3.2) 
Where 𝐺𝑁𝐼 is the gross national income. Further, using the fact that 𝐶𝐴 = 𝑋 − 𝑀 + 𝑅,  and re-
arranging (3.2), we obtain: 
𝐶𝐴 = 𝐺𝑁𝐼 − (𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺)                                                                         (3.3) 
Adding and subtracting taxes (𝑇) on both sides of (3.3) and further re-arranging, to obtain: 
                       𝐶𝐴 = (𝐺𝑁𝐼 − 𝐶 − 𝑇) − 𝐼 + (𝑇 − 𝐺)  
Where (𝐺𝑁𝐼 − 𝐶 − 𝑇) = 𝑆 is gross domestic savings and (𝑇 − 𝐺) is the public sector balance. 
Thus, the current account can be expressed as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴 = (𝑆 − 𝐼) + (𝑇 − 𝐺)                                                                          (3.4) 
Where, (𝑆 − 𝐼) is the net saving of the private sector and (𝑇 − 𝐺) is the net saving from 
government (fiscal balance). Thus, current account can be viewed as a savings investment gap in 
the public and private sector. This relationship can also be expressed as: 
𝐶𝐴 = (𝑆 − 𝐼)𝑝 + (𝑆 − 𝐼)𝑔                                                                         (3.5) 
Where subscript 𝑝 and 𝑔 in equation (3.5) denote private and government sectors respectively. 
Equation (3.5) is an important identity which shows that current account deficit arises due to saving 
gaps in either the government or private sector. In low-income countries, the deficit is mostly 
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driven by the saving gap in the government sector which is not fully offset by the net saving in the 
private sector. Therefore, this identity demonstrates that fiscal balance is an important driver of 
the current account balance, assuming equality of the private savings and investment. Hence, 
persistent current account deficit may reflect persistent government spending in excess of receipts. 
This co-movement of the current account and fiscal balance in the same direction as ‘twins’ is the 
core idea behind the twin deficit hypothesis. However, if private savings fully offset the changes 
in fiscal deficit, then there will be no deficit in the current account, which is consistent with the 
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. These two competing views are discussed further in the next 
paragraphs. 
The framework described in equation (3.5) above broadly explains the possible channels of 
transmission from fiscal balance to current account balance. The Mundell-Fleming framework 
predicts that in an economy operating under a flexible exchange rate, a fiscal expansion arising 
from the increase in government expenditure or tax cuts worsens the current account. This occurs 
through a rise in domestic interest rates, which attracts capital inflows leading to the appreciation 
of the exchange rate, which in turn results in a fall in net exports assuming the Marshall-Lerner 
conditions14 hold. Ultimately, this worsens the current account balance. However, it is important 
to note that the chain of events leading to deterioration in the current account balance are not 
instantaneous but happens after some time lapse; current account responds sluggishly to changes 
in exchange rate. In fact, it is possible for current account to improve initially to an appreciation 
of the exchange rate before eventually worsening. This phenomenon could be described as inverse 
J-curve effect.  
Another channel of transmission is the Keynesian framework which argues that fiscal expansion 
due to tax cut, for instance, has a wealth effect on household income by raising the disposable 
income. This in turn increases private consumption, leading to a reduction in private savings and 
hence causing current account deficit to widen. However, Sutherland (1997) posits that the impact 
of fiscal expansion on private consumption depends on debt levels. At moderate levels, fiscal 
policy has Keynesian effects because the current generation of consumers discount future taxes 
knowing that they may not be alive when taxes are raised at that time; or assuming there will be a 
 
14 According to this condition, exchange rate depreciation leads to the balance of payment improvement only if the 
sum of export and imports demand elasticities is greater than unity. 
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larger population available to pay the taxes by then. However, when debt rises to extreme levels, 
the current generation of consumers perceive that there is a high probability that they will be alive 
to pay the extra taxes. Because of that, the households are likely to save more to offset future tax 
increase. The rise in private savings reduces consumption, leading to improvements in the current 
account. Hence, in this case, fiscal deficit could be contractionary. Perotti (1999) expresses a 
similar view, predicting that fiscal policy shocks have asymmetric effects depending on debt ratios. 
At lower debt ratios, expenditure shocks have Keynesian effects, and non-Keynesian effects are 
felt at higher debt ratios. The level of debt, therefore, acts as an important determinant of the 
expectations of the private agents.  
The Keynesian framework working through government spending can also directly impact the 
current account. According to this concept, a fiscal expansion through an increase in government 
expenditure impacts the current account through a direct effect on absorption. The argument here 
is that when the economy is at full employment, a fiscal expansion worsens the current account 
balance by raising aggregate demand beyond the productive capacity of the economy. In other 
words, current account deficit arises when the absorptions15 exceed the national income.  
An alternative view to the standard Keynesian theory is provided by the Ricardian equivalence 
hypothesis, which argues that there is no relationship between fiscal deficit and current account 
deficit because the intertemporal shifts between taxes and government expenditures do not affect 
interest rates, investment and, by extension the current account balance (Barro, 1989). Central to 
this argument is that consumers being rational agents with perfect foresight can perceive that fiscal 
deficit arising from tax cuts or bond issuance does not alter the present value of household wealth, 
given that both represent tax liabilities to be repaid in future. Therefore, fiscal expansion is offset 
by a proportionate rise in private savings which supports the notion that the current account is not 
affected by fiscal policy actions.  
Besides the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, another view that counters the Keynesian 
understanding of the twin deficit is the twin divergence hypothesis.  Kim & Roubini (2008) is the 
proponent of this school of thought, arguing against the co-movement between current account 
and fiscal balance. Instead, these two variables follow divergent paths in that fiscal deficit 
 
15 These are domestic expenditure on total consumption, government expenditure and investment  
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improves the current account deficit, possibly due to the countervailing impact of output 
fluctuations on budget and current account deficit. For instance, a positive productivity shock 
promotes economic boom which induces an increase in private investment relative to private 
savings. This is because investment expenditure reacts more strongly to the business cycle than 
private savings; current account deteriorates as a result. At the same time, a boom in the economy 
improves the fiscal balance due to effect of automatic stabilizers on taxes and spending (output 
expansion generates tax increment and decline in government expenditure due to cuts in 
unemployment benefits, for instance). The full chain of events results in a situation where the 
current account worsens (improves) as the fiscal balance improves (worsens).  
3.3.2 Empirical literature 
The empirical studies on the effect of fiscal balance on current account balance are premised on 
three broad categories. The first category reviews studies that support the twin deficit hypothesis 
while the second one looks at realms of studies supporting the alternative view of either the 
Ricardian equivalence or twin divergence hypothesis. The final category reviews studies that 
examines whether twin deficit hypothesis holds in the presence of threshold effects. 
The studies on twin deficit hypothesis draws largely from experiences in the US in the 1980s and 
1990s  (Abell, 1990; Darrat, 1988). Studies supporting the concept argue that an increase in fiscal 
deficit leads to the deterioration of the current account. Notably, Salvatore (2006) tests this 
hypothesis in G-7 countries for the period 1973-2005. The empirical result provides strong support 
for the twin deficit in this group of economies.  Monacelli & Perotti (2007) also arrives at the same 
conclusion after investigating the effect of government spending shocks on real exchange rate, the 
trade balance, output and private consumption on a set of OECD countries. Using structural VAR 
on a quarterly series for period 1975Q1-2006Q2, the study finds support for the twin deficit 
hypothesis, except for the US, where the effect of spending shock seems negligible. Kalou & 
Paleologou (2012) also tests for the twin deficit hypothesis in Greece for the period 1960-2007. 
Using a vector error correction model allowing for structural break, the study finds support for the 
twin deficit hypothesis. Rafiq (2010) also investigates for evidence of twin deficit hypothesis in 
the UK and the US using a time varying vector autoregressive model. Based on data for the period 
1973Q1-2008Q4 and 1973Q1-2009Q1 for the UK and the US respectively, the study finds 
evidence for twin deficit hypothesis in both countries, however with a reduced impact in the last 
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20 years of the sample period. 
Egwaikhide (1997) investigates the effect of budget deficit on the current account balance in 
Nigeria for the period 1973-1993. The study develops a structural model that captures the 
interrelationships between budget deficit, domestic credit, aggregate demand, price level and the 
balance of payment. After solving the model, a counterfactual simulation exercise is done and 
reveals that raising the budget deficit contributes to deterioration of the current account balance.  
Chinn & Prasad (2003) conducts the same test but using panel estimation techniques on a group 
of industrial and developing countries. Controlling for a broad set of macroeconomic variables and 
using annual data for the period 1971-1995, the study finds a positive correlation between current 
account and government budget balance. Abbas et al (2011) also performs this test for a large 
group of economies in advanced, emerging and low-income countries using a variety of statistical 
methods including panel data methods. Their findings indicate that, on average an increase in fiscal 
balance by 1 percentage points of GDP is associated with a current account improvement of 0.3-
0.4 percentage points of GDP. This relationship is especially pronounced in emerging and low-
income economies when the exchange rate is flexible, the economies are more open; output is 
above potential; and the initial debt is above 90 percent of GDP.  
Magazzino (2012) examines the relationship between fiscal deficit, trade deficit and private 
consumption in European countries for the period 1970-2010. Using different panel model 
specifications, the study arrives at mixed findings. For the static panel data model, the results 
support the twin deficit hypothesis, with a 1 percent increase in fiscal deficit contributing to a 0.21 
percent increase in current account deficit. Conversely, for dynamic panel specification, the 
findings vary according to the estimator used. When difference GMM is used, the findings support 
twin deficit hypothesis, while when the system GMM is used, the results lose significance, hence 
lending support to the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. Later on Forte & Magazzino (2015) 
repeats the same study with the sample split into two set of periods 1970-1991 and 1992-2010. 
The common correlated effect mean group estimator is then used on the sample. The results show 
evidence of twin deficit in the second sub-period, while the former shows evidence of Ricardian 
view. 
The second category of empirical studies argue that fiscal deficit does not cause current account 
57 
 
deficit to deteriorate; instead, there is either no relationship at all (Ricardian equivalence view) or 
fiscal deficit improves the current account balance (twin divergence view). This category of studies 
therefore negates the twin deficit hypothesis. For instance, Kim & Roubini (2008) examines the 
effects of government deficit shocks on the current account and real exchange rate in the US. Based 
on a VAR model, the empirical results provide evidence of improvements in the current account 
due to government deficit shocks. This finding supports the twin divergence hypothesis. Similar 
evidence is found in Sakyi & Opoku (2016), which tests for empirical evidence of twin deficit 
hypothesis in Ghana. The study employs a cointegration technique allowing for structural break 
on annual time series data for the period 1960-2012. The results suggest improvement of current 
account as a result of fiscal deficit in accord with Kim & Roubini (2008). 
Corsetti & Müller (2006) also performs a twin deficit test on Australia, Canada, the UK and the 
US using VAR. Their model predicts that the effect of fiscal shock on external balance depends 
on the degree of openness and shock persistence. Their empirical findings suggest that fiscal policy 
shock worsens the trade account in economies with persistent fiscal expansion and less open. 
Noting that the US and Australia are less open compared to Canada and the UK, the effect of fiscal 
policy shock on current account is limited in these countries. These findings support the conclusion 
that fiscal expansion has negligible effect on trade balance in less open economies. 
Burcu (2011) investigates for evidence of twin deficit hypothesis in Turkey using annual data for 
the period 1975-2009. Based on a fractional cointegration approach, the study finds little evidence 
for a relationship between trade deficit and budget deficit, and by extension, the twin deficit 
hypothesis in Turkey. Similarly, Aristovnik & Djuric (2010) conducts the same investigation for 
the EU region. Based on annual data for the period 1995-2008, the study finds no evidence of twin 
deficit hypothesis. Bussière et al. (2010) also investigates the role of government budget balance 
and productivity shock on current account balance in 21 OECD countries. To assess this 
relationship, the paper extends the standard intertemporal model of current account to include non-
Ricardian household behaviour. Based on annual data for the period 1960-2003, the study finds 
evidence of Ricardian behaviour in the data. Kaufmann et al. (2002) tests for twin deficit 
hypothesis in Austria using quarterly data covering the period 1976Q1-1998Q4. Based on vector 
error correction model, the study arrives at same conclusion of no evidence of the twin deficit 
hypothesis in the data. 
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The final category of studies examines the threshold effects in the relationship between fiscal 
deficit and current account balance. There are few studies in this category. For instance, Nickel & 
Vansteenkiste (2008) investigates how the debt to GDP ratio affects the relationship between fiscal 
policy and current account balance. The paper estimates a sample of 22 industrialised countries 
using a dynamic panel threshold model for the period 1985-2005. It finds three debt thresholds 
that have significant effect on the relationship between fiscal policy and current account. At low 
and medium level (up to 44 percent), the relationship is positive in that, an increase in fiscal deficit 
increases current account deficit, and at medium and high level (between 44 and 90 percent), the 
relationship is still positive but with reduced effect. However, at a very high debt level (above 90 
percent), the relationship turns negative and insignificant, suggesting that rising fiscal deficit has 
no effect on the current account deficit.  
Nickel & Tudyka (2014) also explores the effect of fiscal stimulus at varying degrees of public 
indebtedness on real GDP, private investment and trade balance. The study adopts Bayesian 
techniques in the estimation of panel VAR on a sample of 17 European countries for the period 
1970-2010. The results suggest that trade balance reacts negatively to fiscal stimulus shock when 
the level of indebtedness is low, and switches signs when the level rises. These findings provide 
evidence of twin deficit hypothesis at low debt levels and twin divergence at high debt level.  
However, Ahmad, Aworinde, & Martin (2015) investigates the same question but uses the level 
of fiscal deficit as the threshold variable. Applying the same approach on a sample of nine African 
countries using threshold cointegration approach, the study argues that the twin deficit relationship 
is nonlinear due to the size of fiscal deficit. This implies that the effect of fiscal expansion on 
current account deficit differ depending on the size of the fiscal deficit. For instance, the impact 
could be more pronounced if the deficit exceeds a critical threshold level. Testing these conjectures 
on quarterly data covering the period 1980Q1-2009Q4, the study arrives at mixed findings. A 
positive cointegrating relationship supporting twin deficit hypothesis is found in six countries 
namely, Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and Tanzania. A negative cointegrating 
relationship is found in the remaining three countries, namely, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, hence 
lending support for twin divergence hypothesis. 
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3.3.3 Overview of empirical literature 
Empirical tests on effect of the fiscal balance on the current account balance yields mixed results. 
Some studies have confirmed existence of the twin deficit hypothesis (Abbas et al., 2011; Chinn 
& Prasad, 2003; Egwaikhide, 1997; Forte & Magazzino, 2015; Kalou & Paleologou, 2012; 
Monacelli & Perotti, 2007; Rafiq, 2010; Salvatore, 2006). Others have confirmed the twin 
divergence view (Kim & Roubini, 2008; Sakyi & Opoku, 2016). Moreover, others have found no 
significant relationship at all, an outcome that mirrors the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis  
(Aristovnik & Djuric, 2010; Burcu, 2011; Bussière et al., 2010; Corsetti & Müller, 2006; 
Kaufmann et al., 2002).  
Another conclusion coming out of empirical review is that most studies are concentrated in 
developed countries with only a few focused on sub-Saharan Africa (Ahmad et al., 2015; 
Egwaikhide, 1997; Sakyi & Opoku, 2016). Even for these few, majority are country specific. 
Studies focussing on the whole region are quite scarce. Also, emerging from empirical literature 
is the observation that very few studies have explored the link between public debt and the twin 
deficit hypothesis (Nickel & Tudyka, 2014; Nickel & Vansteenkiste, 2008).  Moreover, these 
studies mainly focus on industrialised countries. These are some of the gaps which this chapter 
seeks to address, particularly in the context of the sub-Saharan Africa region which is beset with 




3.4.1 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework underpinning the relationship between current account and fiscal 
balance is based on the intertemporal approach to current account (ICA) as proposed by Obstfeld 
& Rogoff (1995) and extended by Bussière et al.(2004), which includes liquidity constraints and 
habit formation. The derivation of the model proceeds in two steps. First, the aggregate 
consumption is derived followed by the dynamic model of current account.  
3.4.1.1 Aggregate consumption function 
This framework is based on a small open economy that takes world interest rates as given and 
trades with the rest of the world. The following variables are exogenous; output, government 
expenditure, taxes and investment. In addition, taxes are lump sum. The economy is assumed to 
be populated by a continuum of heterogeneous population normalized to one. Only two groups 
exist in this population. The first group is liquidity constrained and spends their disposable income 
in each period while the second one is not liquidity constrained and therefore optimizes their 
consumption behaviour over time. To distinguish the two categories, the first group is referred to 
as Non-Ricardian16 consumers while the latter are Ricardian consumers since their behaviour 
mirrors Ricardian equivalence preposition and the ICA model.  
The non-Ricardian consumers make up a fraction of the population represented by 𝜆 ∈ [0,1] unit 
interval. Therefore, the aggregate consumption 𝐶?̅? can be expressed as a weighted average of non-
Ricardian consumers  𝐶𝑡
𝑁𝑅 and Ricardian consumers 𝐶𝑡
𝑅 with 𝜆 and 1 − 𝜆 as respective weights. 
This can be expressed as follows: 
𝐶?̅? = 𝜆𝐶𝑡
𝑁𝑅 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐶𝑡
𝑅                                                                                (3.6) 
Further, it is assumed that the consumption function of the non-Ricardian agent is only based on 
disposable income which is defined as income less investment and taxes. This can be expressed 
 
16 This distinction is important insofar as determining which households face liquidity constraints and therefore have 
limited ability to smooth consumption over time. Non-Ricardian consumers are assumed to have no access to financial 
markets and therefore rely only on wage income to smooth consumption. These households are liquidity constrained 






𝑁𝑅 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡                                                                                     (3.7) 
On the other hand, the Ricardian consumer is assumed to optimize their consumption behaviour in 
accordance with the standard ICA model which is further extended by Bussière et al.(2004) to 
include habit formation. The introduction of habit formation captures the influence of past and 
present consumption behaviour on the intra period utility of the consumer. As such, the Ricardian 
consumer faces the following intertemporal maximization problem: 
 





]                                                            (3.8) 
s. t.  𝐵𝑠+1
𝑃 = (1 + 𝑟)𝐵𝑠
𝑃 + 𝑌𝑠 − 𝑇𝑠 − 𝐼𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠
𝑅 .                                          (3.9) 
Where 𝐸𝑡 is the expectations operator and agents are assumed to maximize the expected infinite 
sum of the intertemporal utility function given by the expression 𝑢(𝐶𝑠
𝑅 − 𝛾𝐶?̅?−1) discounted by 
subjective preference 𝛽. The parameter 𝛾, captures the degree of habit persistence which lies in 
the interval 0 < 𝛾 < 1. The budget constraint is represented by (3.9), where 𝐵𝑡
𝑃 is the net financial 
assets held by the representative agent at the end of 𝑡 − 1. 
Forward iteration of expression (3.9) and imposing a ‘no-Ponzi game’17 condition results in the 







= (1 + 𝑟)𝐵𝑡
𝑃 + 𝐸𝑡 ∑




                                    (3.10) 
 
 
17 The no-Ponzi game condition places restriction on a country’s ability to roll over debt indefinitely. It implies 
lim
s→∞








Maximizing (3.8) subject to (3.10) for every period 𝑠 ≥ 𝑡, leads to the following optimality 
condition shown by the Euler equation: 
𝑢′(𝐶𝑠
𝑅 − 𝛾𝐶?̅?−1) = (1 + 𝑟)𝛽𝐸𝑡{𝑢
′(𝐶𝑠+1
𝑅 − 𝛾𝐶?̅?)}.                                           
Assuming that 𝑢 is quadratic in 𝐶𝑠
𝑅 − 𝛾𝐶?̅?−1 and 𝛽 is equivalent to the market discount factor 
1 (1 + 𝑟)⁄ , the above Euler equation simplifies to: 
𝐶𝑠
𝑅 − 𝛾𝐶?̅?−1 = 𝐸𝑡{𝐶𝑠+1
𝑅 − 𝛾𝐶?̅?}.                                                                          (3.11) 
To derive a closed-form solution for the Ricardian consumer, equation (3.11) can be substituted 
into the intertemporal budget constraint (3.10), and after further simplification (see Appendix 




















             (3.12) 
Thus, aggregate consumption for both Ricardian and non-Ricardian agents can be obtained by 
substituting for 𝐶𝑡
𝑅 and 𝐶𝑡
𝑁𝑅 in (3.6) using (3.7) and (3.12) to obtain: 
𝐶?̅? = 𝜆(𝑌𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡) + (1 − 𝜆)
𝛾
1 + 𝑟




𝑃 … … … … .. 











                                                                       (3.13) 
The government, on the other hand, faces the following budget constraint: 
𝐵𝑡+1
𝐺 = (1 + 𝑟)𝐵𝑡
𝐺 + 𝑇𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡                                                             (3.14)  
Where 𝐵𝑡
𝐺 is government net assets in period 𝑡, 𝐺𝑡 is government spending in period 𝑡. Iterating 
equation (3.14) forward and imposing a ‘no-Ponzi game condition’ gives the following 
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 ,                                   3.15) 
Further note that non-Ricardian agents own no assets; as such, the stock of net foreign assets in 
the economy at the end of period 𝑡 − 1 is given by the assets owned by Ricardian households and 
the government: 
𝐵𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆)𝐵𝑡
𝑃 + 𝐵𝑡
𝐺 .                                                                    (3.16) 
3.4.1.2 Current account dynamics 
According to Obstfeld & Rogoff (1995), current account can be described as a change in net 
foreign asset position, i.e. 𝐶𝐴𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡+1 − 𝐵𝑡. Similarly, in terms of national accounts, the current 
account (net savings of the open economy) is equivalent to the sum of net investment income (net 
foreign assets return), 𝑟𝐵𝑡 and net output, 𝑁𝑂𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡 less aggregate consumption: 
𝐶𝐴𝑡 = 𝑟𝐵𝑡 + 𝑁𝑂𝑡 − 𝐶?̅?,                                                                 (3.17) 
Additionally, by substituting for aggregate consumption from (3.13) and with further 
simplifications (see Appendix A3.1), the dynamic model of current account determination is 
expressed as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆)𝛾𝐶𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝜆(𝑇𝑡 + 𝑟𝐵𝑡




+ (1 − 𝜆) (1 −
𝛾
1 + 𝑟
) (𝑁𝑂𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝑁?̃?𝑡),                                  (3.18) 
 
Assuming no habit formation and no liquidity constraint, i.e. 𝛾 = 0 and  𝜆 = 0, then equation 
(3.18) reduces to a standard ICA model expressed as 𝐶𝐴𝑡 =  𝑁𝑂𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝑁?̃?𝑡. This essentially shows 
that current account helps to smooth consumption whenever there is deviation of net output from 
its permanent level. This explains the consumption smoothing hypothesis of current account. 
Expression (3.18), yields important testable implications; Firstly, the term, 𝑇𝑡 + 𝑟𝐵𝑡
𝐺 − 𝐺𝑡  
represents the fiscal surplus that arises from the introduction of liquidity constraint in the model. 
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It shows that government spending affects consumption behaviour of liquidity constrained 
consumers (non-Ricardian agents) and therefore the general consumption in the economy. This 
further affects the current account since the fiscal surplus reduces the disposable income available 
to non-Ricardian consumers and the aggregate consumption in general hence resulting in current 
account surplus. This conclusion also mirrors the twin deficit hypothesis. Secondly, inclusion of 
habit formation in the standard ICA model introduces dynamics into the model. This is evident 
from the first term in the right-hand side of (3.18), whose implication shows that current account 
is a persistent variable and therefore depends on its past realizations. The extent of current account 
persistence is relative to the proportion of Ricardian agents in the population (1 − 𝜆)  and the value 
of habit persistence (𝛾). 
Expression (3.18) therefore provides a framework for current account determination which shows 
that it is not only persistent but also affected by, among other variables, the fiscal deficit. The next 
section presents an empirical model that tests the validity of these conclusions. 
3.4.2 Model specification. 
3.4.2.1 The Dumitrescu-Hurlin test for Granger causality 
Before estimation is performed, a pre-diagnostic test is conducted to determine if there is reverse 
causality between current account and fiscal balance. Economic theory alludes to such a 
possibility. If this is confirmed, then it creates a potential problem for endogeneity which should 
be taken care of in the formal model. Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012) provides a testing framework 
for the Granger non-causality in heterogeneous panels. The underlying regression for this test can 
be specified as follows: 






+ 𝑖,𝑡                                          (3.19)  
 
With 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 and 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇.; 𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 are respective current account balance and fiscal 
balance for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡. The model also assumes that these two variables are stationary; as 
such, a stationarity test is performed before carrying out the Granger causality test. The coefficients 
can differ across the countries but are assumed to be time invariant. The lag order 𝐾 is identical 




As noted in Granger (1969), causality test in this case would entail testing whether past values of 
fiscal balance have significant effect on the current value of the current account balance and vice 
versa. The null hypothesis of the absence of causality for all individuals in the panel can be 
specified as: 
𝐻0: 𝛽𝑖1 = ⋯ = 𝛽𝑖𝐾 = 0                       ∀ 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 
Against the alternative hypothesis that there is causality for some individuals, if not all. 
Dumitrescu-Hurlin (DH) proposes two Wald statistics, ?̅? (z-bar) and ?̃? (z-bar tilde), based on 
standard normal distribution to test this hypothesis. The ?̅? is ideal for large 𝑁 and large 𝑇 cases 
while ?̃? is ideal for large 𝑁 and small 𝑇 (Lopez & Weber, 2017). 
 
3.4.2.2 The baseline dynamic linear panel data model 
A dynamic panel data model is used to estimate the effect of fiscal balance on current account 
balance. This model can be specified as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡  + 𝐵
′𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡 ,                   𝑖,𝑡 ∼ 𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎
2)              (3.20)                                                                                                                                      
Where subscript i is an index of individual country and t is for time. CA is the current account 
balance as a share of GDP, FB is the fiscal balance as a share of GDP and 𝑋 represents vector of 
controls as postulated by economic theory and empirical studies such as Lane & Milesi-Ferretti 
(2012), Medina et al. (2010) and Das (2012), among others. These controls include: GDP growth, 
real effective exchange rate, trade openness, terms of trade and investment. 𝜆𝑡 represent time 
effects, 𝜂𝑖 is the unobserved country specific effects, and 𝑖,𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term. 
The dynamic model structure of equation (3.20), due to the presence of a lagged dependent 
variable, poses a potential problem of endogeneity if estimated by fixed effects. In addition, 
endogeneity could arise from reverse causality between current account and fiscal balance. 
Although, the fixed effects estimator eliminates the country specific effects through within group 
transformation of the original equation by time demeaning, it is not appropriate for a dynamic 
model. In a static model, it results in consistent estimates. However, in a dynamic case, such a 
transformation induces a correlation of order 1/𝑇 between the lagged dependent variable and the 
error term, a situation known as the Nickell bias after Nickell (1981). This bias is pronounced in 
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small 𝑇 and large 𝑁 case meaning few panel periods and many cross-section units respectively. 
Thus, given that the data structure used for empirical estimation in this study exhibits similar 
features (i.e. a case of 33 countries and 17 years), fixed effects needs to be applied with caution. 
  
These potential econometric challenges can be addressed using system GMM estimators for 
dynamic panels developed by Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system 
GMM estimator produces consistent estimates in dynamic panels. Furthermore, the estimator also 
produces robust results in the presence of omitted variable bias and a simultaneity problem. It uses 
lags of the regressors as instruments. This estimator combines regression equations in a single 
system both in levels and first difference, with each equation having a specific set of instrumental 
variables. Further, it has improved properties of stronger instruments compared to Arellano & 
Bond (1991) since variables in levels are likely to be weakly correlated with future differences if 
the series are close to a unit root. In addition, system GMM is appropriate for the dataset used in 
this study, as it fits into small 𝑇 and large 𝑁 case. The system GMM is therefore adopted as one 
of the estimators in this study. 
 
3.4.2.3 The dynamic panel threshold model specification 
The second part of our empirical strategy involves testing whether the relationship between the 
current account and fiscal balance depends on the level of indebtedness in the economy. To 
implement this test, the baseline linear dynamic panel data model (3.20) is transformed into a 
dynamic panel data model with threshold effects as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 = (𝛾1𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿1𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1
′𝑋𝑖,𝑡){𝑞𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛾} + (𝛾2𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2
′ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡){𝑞𝑖𝑡 > 𝛾} +
                𝜆𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                                                               (3.21)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Where the variables are as earlier defined in equation (3.20). In addition,  𝑞𝑖𝑡 is the threshold 
variable represented by debt to GDP ratio. 𝐼{∙} is the indicator function for the threshold variable 
𝑞𝑖𝑡,  which can either be above or below a threshold value 𝛾. The role of the threshold parameter 
𝛾 is to split the sample into two regimes, with observations either being in high or low debt regimes. 
Where 𝑞𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛾, implies a low debt regime and 𝑞𝑖𝑡 > 𝛾, implies a high debt regime. The slope 




The bulk of estimation techniques for dynamic panel threshold models assumes that the threshold 
variable is exogenous (Caner & Hansen, 2004; Dang etal., 2012; Ramírez-Rondán, 2015). 
However, it is possible for the threshold variable, in this case, the debt-to-GDP ratio, to be 
endogenous because of reverse causality and omitted variable bias18. If not accounted for could 
result in unreliable estimates. Seo & Shin (2016) proposes an estimation technique which accounts 
for endogeneity of the threshold variable and regressors. As such, this study adopts their approach 
in estimation of the threshold model (3.21) which proceeds in a sequence of steps.  
Firstly, the threshold level is determined by performing a series of least squares minimization 
procedures involving estimation of equation (3.21) based on all possible values of 𝑞𝑖𝑡. The 
corresponding estimates and the sum of squared residuals are stored19. Then the threshold value 𝛾 
is selected as the one that minimizes the residual sum of squares. Secondly, a linearity test is 
conducted to determine the presence of threshold effects in the model. This involves testing for 
the significance of selected threshold value 𝛾. However, this test suffers from the Davies problem20 
because the threshold parameter 𝛾 is not identified under the null hypothesis of no threshold effects 
(Davies, 1977). To remedy this situation, the critical values used for inference are based on a 
bootstrap procedure. Hence, this technique uses supremum statistics. Finally, if the threshold value 
 𝛾 is found to be significant, then the slope parameters of equation (3.21) are estimated by 
difference GMM on the created split sample. 
3.4.3 Data type and source 
A sample of 33 countries out of the 46 in the SSA region is selected based on availability of data 
(see Appendix A2.3 for the list of selected countries). Countries with missing data are excluded 
from the sample. The empirical analysis uses annual time series data for the period 2000-2016 
drawn from three databases namely, the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO), the World 
 
18 Since debt could be correlated with a range of other factors affecting current account but omitted from the model. 
Similarly, countries with high current account deficit are more likely to accumulate more debt than those with lower 
deficits. 
19 This step is repeated for each value of threshold series, through grid search on specified subset of the series which 
is trimmed in order to guarantee a minimum number observations in the resulting sub-samples (Baum, Checherita-
Westphal, & Rother, 2013). 
20 The inference problem when the nuisance parameter is not identified under the null hypothesis was first studied by 
Davies (Nickel & Vansteenkiste, 2008). 
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Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) and the UN’s United Nations Conference for Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). The variables description and descriptive statistics are presented 
in Appendix A3.2 and A3.4, respectively. 
3.4.4 Definition and priori expectation of variables 
Current account balance is the dependent variable and is measured as the sum of net exports of 
goods, services, net income and current transfers as a share of GDP. A positive value for this 
variable is interpreted as a surplus while a negative value as a deficit. The current account balance 
is the dependent variable and is expressed as a share of GDP. 
 
Fiscal balance is measured as the difference between general government revenue and 
expenditure expressed as a share of GDP. This variable is expected to have a positive relationship 
with the dependent variable since a fall in government spending or increase in government revenue 
increases fiscal balance which also increases current account balance. This is expected to be the 
case assuming that both Mundell-Fleming and Keynesian hypotheses hold. In an empirical context, 
this theoretical construct is known as the twin deficit hypothesis. 
 
Trade openness is measured as the sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP. It is expected 
to have a positive relationship with current account balance in line with the view that at a given 
exchange rate, more open economies are attractive to international trade due to fewer trade 
restrictions. This prediction has empirical support from Chinn & Prasad (2003) and Das (2012).  
 
Terms of trade is measured as the ratio of export to import unit value index. Terms of trade is 
expected to have a positive relationship with current account balance since an improvement in 
terms of trade is also associated with improvement in current account balance. This prediction is 
consistent with the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect, which conjectures that a deterioration in 
terms of trade lowers real income and savings, thereby worsening the current account.  
 
Real effective exchange rate (REER) is defined as a nominal effective exchange rate (a measure 
of the value of a currency against a weighted average of several foreign currencies) deflated by the 
price indices of the country and the corresponding partner countries. An increase (decrease) in the 
index implies a real appreciation (depreciation) of the domestic currency and therefore exports 
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become more (less) expensive compared to imports. Hence, an increase in REER indicates a loss 
of competitiveness. A priori, REER is expected to have a negative relationship with current 
account balance given that an appreciation contributes to loss of competitiveness of exports, 
thereby resulting in a decline in exports relative to imports. This is expected to have further adverse 
effects on the current account balance in line with the Mundell-Fleming model. Most sub-Saharan 
African countries are expected to be sensitive to exchange rate movements due to heavy reliance 
on primary exports, which are highly sensitive to commodity price fluctuations. 
 
GDP growth is measured as the annual change in the real GDP and is expected to have a negative 
relationship with current account balance. In line with the ICA, the GDP growth is expected to 
have a negative relationship with current account balance as high income is associated with high 
consumption, which results in current account deficit. The variable is lagged because income has 
lagged impact due to accelerator effect. The relationship between GDP growth and current account 
balance has been tested empirically by a number of studies (Bussière et al., 2004; Chinn & Ito, 
2008; Chinn & Prasad, 2003; Das, 2012; Glick & Rogoff, 1995). 
 
Total investment is measured as the total value of the gross fixed capital formation and changes 
in inventories as a share of GDP. This variable is expected to have a negative effect on current 
account balance since high investment leads to the narrowing of the savings investment gap, which 




3.5 Empirical Results 
3.5.1 The Granger causality test 
Before this test is performed, a stationarity test is conducted on current account and fiscal balance. 
The results indicate that the two variables are largely stationary in levels (see Appendix A3.6). 
Next, the Granger causality test of Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012) is performed and the results are 
reported in Table 3.1. The test rejects the null hypothesis of no Granger causality in both directions, 
meaning that fiscal balance does Granger-cause current account and vice versa. This result 
provides evidence of a bidirectional relationship between current account balance and fiscal 
balance. The implication of this dual causality is that fiscal balance is endogenous and should be 
treated appropriately in the formal model. 
 
Table 3.1: Granger non-causality test results21 
Fiscal balance Granger-cause current account balance 
Optimal number of lags (AIC): 3 (lags tested: 1 to 3).    
W-bar =           6.6751       
Z-bar =             8.6190  (p-value = 0.0000)     
Z-bar tilde =    2.5390   (p-value = 0.0111)      
Notes: H0: Fiscal balance does not Granger-cause current account balance,          
H1: Fiscal balance does Granger-cause current account balance for at least one country. 
         
Current account balance Granger-cause fiscal balance   
Optimal number of lags (AIC): 1 (lags tested: 1 to 3).    
W-bar =            2.5220       
Z-bar =              6.1823   (p-value = 0.0000)     
Z-bar tilde =     3.9891    (p-value = 0.0001)      
Notes: H0: Current account balance does not Granger-cause fiscal balance.          
H1: Current account balance does Granger-cause fiscal balance for at least one country. 
  
3.5.2 Dynamic linear panel data model 
The estimation results for the linear dynamic panel data model without threshold effects (3.20) is 
presented in Table 3.2. Three estimators are reported including system GMM, difference GMM 
and the fixed effects estimator. Due to Nickell bias arising from a fixed effects estimator on a 
 
21 Credits to Lopez and Weber (2017) for providing a user written program for this test 
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dynamic panel data model, the discussion of the empirical results focuses on the first two 
estimators. Both the system and difference GMM are estimated using the user written Stata 
program xtabond2 by Roodman (2009). As pointed out earlier, the lagged dependent variable and 
fiscal balance are endogenous. The GMM model takes this into account and uses second lags of 
these variables as instruments. The table displays the relevant specifications tests with 
corresponding p-values. The Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions confirms the validity of 
the instruments used in the model. The Hansen J statistic is 26.29 with a p-value of 0.61 for system 
GMM, hence we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are 
valid. 
 
Table 3.2: Regression results for linear dynamic panel data model  
Current account balance System GMM Difference GMM Fixed Effects 
       (1)      (2)   (3) 






    






    






    






    








    






    






ar1 -3.023 -2.954  
ar1p 0.00250 0.00314  
ar2 0.984 1.675  
ar2p 0.325 0.0939  
hansen 26.69 27.54  
hansenp 1.000 0.542  
Observations 528 495 528 
No of Countries 33 33 33 
Notes: The reported results assume that the fiscal balance and lagged cab are endogenous. Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
and asterisks denotes level of significance at standard conventional levels. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Time trends controlled 
for but not reported. ToT is terms of trade index. 
 
Furthermore, the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation does not reject the null hypothesis of no 
second-order serial correlation but rejects that for first-order serial correlation. This result is 
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consistent with the notion that the AR (1) process in first differences usually reject the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation, while the more important AR (2) test which detects 
autocorrelation in levels does not reject this hypothesis. This confirms that the model does not 
suffer from serial correlation. 
 
Turning to the point estimates for slope coefficients, the estimate on lagged dependent variable is 
positive and highly significant. This confirms the persistence of current account balance, with an 
estimate of 0.56. A similar result is reported for difference GMM estimator but with a lower 
estimate of 0.38. This finding is in line with Chinn & Prasad (2003), Calderón et al.( 2001) and 
Das (2012). The coefficient of primary interest in this study is that of fiscal balance which is also 
positive and highly significant as expected across all the three reported estimators. The system 
GMM reports a magnitude of 0.33 while difference GMM shows a lower estimate of 0.28. This 
finding suggests that an increase in fiscal deficit results in an increase in current account deficit. It 
further suggests that the twin deficit hypothesis holds in the sub-Saharan Africa region and thereby 
answers one of research questions in this chapter. This result is also consistent with both theoretical 
(including Mundell-Fleming and Keynesian hypotheses) and several empirical studies (Abbas et 
al., 2011; Chinn & Prasad, 2003; Egwaikhide, 1997; Forte & Magazzino, 2015; Kalou & 
Paleologou, 2012; Monacelli & Perotti, 2007; Rafiq, 2010; Salvatore, 2006). Demonstrating that 
fiscal deficit drives the current account deficit in the region, this finding implies that fiscal policy 
can be used as a potent policy option for controlling current account deficit. Again, these findings 
support the notion that fiscal consolidation can contribute to an improvement in external accounts. 
  
The results for the control variables are also reported. While most of them show expected signs, 
they lack significance as the system GMM model shows. On the other hand, the difference GMM 
reports a significant terms of trade index and total investment with the respective expected signs. 
The positive relationship between terms of trade and current account balance is consistent with our 
priori expectation and the theoretical argument that improvement in terms of trade has positive 
effects on current account balance so long as the Marshall-Lerner conditions hold. This finding 




The significance of the total investment means that an increase in investment expenditure reduces 
general savings in the economy which contributes to deterioration of the current account balance. 
This situation is driven by the fact that most countries in sub-Saharan Africa are still in the early 
stages of economic development, which requires importation of heavy equipment and machinery 
for infrastructure development and industrialization. Hence, deterioration of the current account 
arising from these activities sometimes turns out to be inevitable as these accrues future benefits 
to the economy.  
3.5.3 Dynamic panel data model with threshold effects  
Another research question that this study seeks to address is whether the relationship between 
current account balance and fiscal balance depends on the level of public debt. This question is 
investigated using a dynamic panel data threshold model which allows for an endogenous 
threshold variable and regressors following the empirical methodology of Seo & Shin (2016). The 
estimation and test results are reported in Table 3.3 showing the findings both in low debt and high 
debt regimes. In addition, the linear model results for the full sample are also reported for 
comparison purposes. The test for a null hypothesis of no threshold effects is performed based on 
supremum statistics and the results indicate a very low bootstrap p-value, close to zero. This 
suggests strong evidence for threshold effects in the current account model. The threshold variable 
in this case is debt-to-GDP ratio, which is endogenously estimated at 54 percent and does not differ 
much from the rule of thumb level of 55 percent set by the IMF. About 60 percent of the 
observations fall below the 54 percent threshold while 40 percent are above it. The observations 
below the 54 percent debt-to-GDP ratio threshold are regarded as being in the low debt regime 
while those above this level are regarded as being in the high debt regime.  
 
The fact that majority of countries, about 60 percent, fall in the low debt regime during the sample 
period is largely attributed to the HIPC debt relief initiative, which substantially lowered the debt 
burden on most countries in sub-Saharan Africa. As shown in Appendix A3.7, the concentration 
of countries in the high debt regime was high in early 2000s, with over 70 percent of countries 
reported in this category but later continued to drop steadily reaching 12 percent in 2012. However, 




Table 3.3: Regression results for dynamic panel data model with threshold effects 
Current account balance Low debt regime (≤
𝟓𝟒%) 
High debt regime (>
𝟓𝟒%) 
Full sample 














    






    






    






    






% of observation 60.25 39.75 100 
Threshold estimate 0.5377 0.5377  
Threshold p-value 0.087 0.087  
 Linearity p-value 0.00 0.00  
Notes: The slope coefficients estimated using difference GMM. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and asterisks denotes 
level of significance at standard conventional levels. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Our appreciation to Seo & Shin (2016) for 
providing the Stata codes for carrying out this regression. 
 
Turning to the point estimates, Table 3.3 shows considerable variation in sign and magnitude as 
well as the level of significance of variables depending on whether they are in low or high debt 
regimes. For instance, fiscal balance continues to maintain a positive and significant effect on 
current account balance in the low debt regime, providing strong evidence of twin deficit 
hypothesis. This effect, however, dissipates in the high debt regime, as the coefficient turns 
insignificant, suggesting fiscal deficit’s limited effect on the current account balance. The 
magnitude also declines from 0.26 in the low debt regime to 0.20 in the high debt regime. This 
implicitly suggests that at higher debt thresholds, fiscal policy is irrelevant in current account 
determination. This finding mirrors the Ricardian behaviour and is consistent with empirical 
findings by Nickel & Vansteenkiste, (2008) and Nickel & Tudyka (2014). Even though both 
studies are situated in industrialized countries with a much higher debt threshold level, the primary 
conclusion remains the same.  
 
Other results show the coefficient on lagged dependent variable losing significance across the 
regimes as well as in total investment in the low debt regime. On the other hand, trade openness 
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and the REER now becomes significant in the high debt regime. A negative and significant REER 
suggests that a real depreciation leads to improvement in current account balance in a higher debt 
regime in line with most open economy macroeconomics models such as Mundell-Fleming’s. 
Similarly, a positive and significant coefficient on trade openness at a high debt regime reflects 
that at a given exchange rate, more open economies are attractive to international trade due to 
reduced trade restrictions. In addition, the terms of trade remain significant but switches to 
negative sign in a high debt regime, implying that the terms of trade do not improve the current 






This chapter examined the effect of fiscal deficit on current account deficit and how this 
relationship is affected by different levels of public debt. A linear dynamic panel data model is 
estimated to address the first part of the objective; for the next part, a dynamic panel threshold 
model is estimated. A sample of 33 sub-Saharan African countries is selected for the period 2000-
2016 for this study. The empirical results based on the linear model show that fiscal deficit worsens 
the current account and, therefore, the twin deficit hypothesis holds. However, the introduction of 
nonlinearities in the model shows a switch in behaviour. This subsequent analysis is based on 
different levels of indebtedness determined through endogenously estimated threshold debt level, 
which splits the sample into low and high debt regimes. This approach is advantageous over levels 
chosen arbitrarily as the data is allowed to speak for itself.  The results from the dynamic panel 
threshold regression shows that at lower debt levels, the fiscal deficit continues to worsen the 
current account while at a higher debt level, fiscal deficit becomes ineffective on the current 
account. Intuitively, this reflects that the twin deficit hypothesis holds at low debt regime and, 
therefore, the economy behaves in a non-Ricardian manner. However, at a at high debt regime the 
Ricardian hypothesis dominates. These results receive support in the literature and provide an 
explanation for the mixed findings common in empirical studies possibly the result of not allowing 
for threshold effects in these models. This study shows that fiscal policy can be an effective tool 
in containing current account deficit when the level of public debt is moderate, but its effectiveness 
becomes uncertain when the debt level escalates. As such, due diligence must be observed in the 
use of fiscal policy when the level of public debt reaches certain high levels. The next chapter 
extends this debate further and explores whether fiscal rules can be used as a policy option for 





Appendix A3.1: Theoretical framework 
 
The Ricardian agent is assumed to face the following consumption function:  
𝐶𝑡
∗ = 𝐶𝑡
𝑅 − 𝛾𝐶?̅?−1                                                                             (3.22) 
Where 𝛾 captures degree of habit persistence on previous aggregate consumption 
Substituting for 𝐶𝑡
𝑅  in (3.10) to obtain: 




𝑁𝑅 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐶𝑠−1
𝑅 )
(1 + 𝑟)𝑠−𝑡
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… … … … …
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] − 𝛾𝐶?̅?−1                       
= [(1 + 𝑟) − 𝛾(1 − 𝜆)]𝐵𝑡
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1 + 𝑟 − 𝜆
1 + 𝑟
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𝑠=𝑡   is substituted in the second equation using ICA (3.10). Substituting (3.22a) 







= [(1 + 𝑟) − 𝛾(1 − 𝜆)]𝐵𝑡
𝑃 +
1 + 𝑟 − 𝛾
1 + 𝑟
𝐸𝑡 ∑








Using the Euler equation obtained in (3.11), the left-hand side of (3.23) can be simplified to obtain 





















.            (3.24) 
 
Next is expression deriving the dynamics of current account from (3.12) and using the definition 








𝐶𝐴𝑡 = 𝑟𝐵𝑡 + 𝑁𝑂𝑡 − 𝐶?̅? 
       = 𝑟𝐵𝑡 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑁𝑂𝑡 + 𝜆(𝑇𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡) … … … … .. 
         − (1 − 𝜆) [
𝜆
1 + 𝑟




𝑃 + (1 −
𝛾
1 + 𝑟
) 𝐸𝑡(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡)] 
        = 𝑟𝐵𝑡 + 𝜆(𝑇𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡) … .. 
        −(1 − 𝜆) [
𝛾
1 + 𝑟




𝑃 − 𝑁𝑂𝑡 + (1 −
𝛾
1 + 𝑟
) 𝐸𝑡(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡)] 
Using the government intertemporal budget constraint (3.15), it can be shown that: 








+ (1 + 𝑟)𝐵𝑡
𝐺) 
                               = 𝐸𝑡(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡) + 𝑟𝐵𝑡
𝐺 
                               = 𝐸𝑡𝑁?̃?𝑡 + 𝑟𝐵𝑡
𝐺 
And substituting for 𝐸𝑡(?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡) in the current account dynamics: 
       𝐶𝐴𝑡  = 𝑟𝐵𝑡 + 𝜆(𝑇𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡) … .. 
                   −(1 − 𝜆) [
𝛾
1 + 𝑟
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Rearranging above further we get: 
𝐶𝐴𝑡  = 𝑟𝐵𝑡 + 𝜆(𝑇𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡) … … … … … … … 
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           +(1 − 𝜆) (1 −
𝛾
1 + 𝑟
) (𝑁𝑂𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝑁?̃?𝑡) + (1 − 𝜆)𝛾𝐶𝐴𝑡−1                                                    
= (1 − 𝜆)𝛾𝐶𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝜆(𝑇𝑡 + 𝑟𝐵𝑡




+ (1 − 𝜆) (1 −
𝛾
1 + 𝑟
) (𝑁𝑂𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝑁?̃?𝑡) 
This is similar to (3.18). Note that the expression 𝐶𝐴𝑡−1 = 𝐵𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡−1 = 𝑟𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝑁𝑂𝑡−1 − 𝐶?̅?−1 
is used.  
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Appendix A3.2: Description of Variables 
 
Variable Name Description Units Source  
Current account 
balance  
Current account balance is the sum of net exports of goods, 




Fiscal balance  The fiscal balance is constructed as the difference between 
general government revenue and expenditure expressed as a 









Real effective exchange rate is the nominal effective exchange 
rate (a measure of the value of a currency against a weighted 
average of several foreign currencies) divided by a price deflator 





ToT index Net barter terms of trade index is calculated as the percentage 
ratio of the export unit value indexes to the import unit value 




Trade openness  Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports measured as a 




Total investment Investment or gross capital formation is measured by the total 
value of the gross fixed capital formation and changes in 






Public debt Public debt is general government gross debt which comprise of 
all liabilities that require payments of interest and/or principal 
by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in future. The debt 
liabilities in the form of SDRs, currency and deposits, debt 
securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee 




Notes: WEO is the World Economic Outlook database, UNCTAD is United Nations Conference for Trade and Development 
Indicators database, WDI is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
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Appendix A3.3: List of sampled sub-Saharan Africa countries 
 
Botswana Gabon Namibia Togo 
Burkina Faso Gambia Niger Uganda 
Burundi Ghana Nigeria Zambia 
Cabo Verde Guinea-Bissau Republic of Congo 
 
Cameroon Kenya Rwanda 
 
Central African Republic Lesotho Senegal 
 
Chad Madagascar Seychelles 
 
Comoros Malawi South Africa 
 
Côte d'Ivoire Mali Swaziland 
 





Appendix A3.4: Descriptive Statistics for the period 2000-2016 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Current account balance 561 -0.051 0.098 -0.841 0.216 
      
Fiscal balance 561 -0.018 0.061 -0.417 0.403 
      
Trade openness 561 0.800 0.419 0.114 3.511 
      
ToT index  561 118.476 40.844 21.397 269.679 
      
Real effective exchange rate 561 104.300 21.015 59.993 239.466 
      
GDP growth 561 0.046 0.067 -0.367 1.121 
      
Total Investment 561 0.223 0.092 0.022 0.649 
      
Public debt 561 58.672 48.397 0.474 344.370 
 
Appendix A3.5: Pairwise correlation matrix 
 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
(1) Current account balance 1.000        
         
(2) Fiscal balance 0.336 1.000       
         
(3) Trade openness -0.115 0.171 1.000      
         
(4) ToT index 0.180 0.100 -0.078 1.000     
         
(5) REER 0.001 -0.080 -0.300 0.074 1.000    
         
(6) GDP growth -0.152 0.127 0.312 0.075 -0.071 1.000   
         
(7) Total Investment -0.335 -0.009 0.460 0.155 -0.101 0.334 1.000  
         





Appendix A3.6: Panel unit root test results 
 
Levin-Lin-Chu unit root test 
 Specification without trend   Specification with trend 
  Current account  Fiscal balance     Current account  Fiscal balance 
Lags chi_sq p-value chi_sq p-value  Lags chi_sq p-value chi_sq p-value 
1 -5.3252 0.000 -2.9384 0.002  1 -5.4143 0.000 -4.5219 0.000 
2 -10.3581 0.000 -0.7207 0.2356  2 -7.5942 0.000 -2.4323 0.008 
3 -3.0326 0.001 0.62 0.732   3 -0.3362 0.368 0.0005 0.500 
           
           
Maddala and Wu (1999) unit root test (MW) 
 Specification without trend   Specification with trend 
  Current account  Fiscal balance     Current account  Fiscal balance 
Lags chi_sq p-value chi_sq p-value  Lags chi_sq p-value chi_sq p-value 
1 110.236 0.001 84.527 0.062  1 94.188 0.013 67.646 0.421 
2 170.33 0.000 72.171 0.281  2 111.997 0.000 68.136 0.404 
3 76.879 0.169 53.105 0.874   3 59.659 0.696 55.612 0.815 
Notes: The null hypothesis of above tests is that there is a unit root in all countries against the alternative of stationarity in some 




Appendix A3.7: Trends of countries in each regime by year 
 
Year 
Low debt regime (≤ 𝟓𝟒%)  High debt regime (> 𝟓𝟒%) 
Number of countries Percentage  Number of countries Percentage 
2000 8 24  25 
76 
2001 7 21  26 
79 
2002 9 27  24 
73 
2003 9 27  24 
73 
2004 12 36  21 
64 
2005 17 52  16 
48 
2006 23 70  10 
30 
2007 23 70  10 
30 
2008 24 73  9 
27 
2009 26 79  7 
21 
2010 27 82  6 
18 
2011 28 85  5 
15 
2012 29 88  4 
12 
2013 27 82  6 
18 
2014 25 76  8 
24 
2015 22 67  11 
33 
2016 22 67  11 
33 




Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Performance: The Case of sub-Saharan Africa 
4.1 Introduction 
Persistently high levels of the fiscal deficit pose significant concerns to fiscal sustainability. 
Behind the predisposition of developing countries to deficit bias is the unlimited demands in a 
growing modern economy as well as in the perverse incentives available to policymakers due to 
weak institutions. Therefore, the logical remedy to fiscal problems would be to address the 
motivations behind them in the first place. However, in reality, the forces behind the deficit bias 
are usually systemic in government and so deeply entrenched in political institutions making it 
difficult to devise a universal solution (Debrun at al., 2008). Furthermore, political institutions are 
rigid and intractable given the intricate horse-trading and tedious legislative approvals required. 
Part of the menu of solutions is the reform of the fiscal framework by limiting discretionary 
decisions by policymakers. Fiscal rules can play a pivotal role in this regard by strengthening the 
fiscal institutions and placing limits on the major fiscal aggregates such as the revenue, expenditure 
and debt.  
 
By impacting the fiscal deficit, fiscal rules can indirectly act as a potent tool for simultaneously 
addressing current account deficit. Through their disciplining effect, fiscal rules ensure that a 
country adheres to the set fiscal or debt limits which could contribute to an improvement in the 
fiscal balance (Debrun et al., 2008; Nerlich & Reuter, 2013). This can further have spillover effects 
on current account balance considering the close linkage between the current account and fiscal 
balances as shown in the chapter three. 
 
As a tool of fiscal governance, properly designed and implemented fiscal rules can help reduce the 
fiscal deficit bias and mitigate the time inconsistency problem in fiscal policy as well as enhance 
the commitment of the fiscal authorities to fiscal adjustment (Ter-Minassian, 2010). In addition, 
rules can correct distorted incentive in policymaking such as the common pool problem and 
government shortsightedness. In other words, well designed fiscal rules can result in improved 
fiscal outcomes through disciplinary effect. Fiscal rules also act as a signaling device to economic 
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agents on the commitment of policymakers, which helps to strengthen institutions and increase 
credibility of policymakers. 
 
Whereas fiscal rules can stem deficit bias, they come at the expense of macroeconomic 
stabilization and structural reforms that could otherwise provide future benefits to the economy. 
For instance, a rule which imposes spending cuts over public goods as well as programs associated 
with structural reforms may end up doing more harm than good to the economy (Beetsma & 
Debrun, 2004). Critics also argue that rules can limit the flexibility of policy makers to respond to 
economic shocks or even distract them from spending priorities. Moreover, fiscal rules can 
undermine transparency by encouraging ‘creative accounting’ which creates room for 
manipulation of accounts. Furthermore, fiscal rules can always be bypassed whenever the fiscal 
authorities decide to run deficits. Hence rules may sometimes not be effective enough to offer 
restraint on such behaviours (Krogstrup & Wälti, 2008).   
 
Despite these misgivings, fiscal rules remain the best option for dealing with fiscal profligacy. 
They can contribute to improved fiscal outcomes because of their strong fiscal governance 
principles and fiscal disciplining effects. The empirical impact of fiscal rules on fiscal performance 
has received extensive coverage in the literature, though the studies are concentrated in the US, 
the EU and Latin America (Badinger & Reuter, 2015, 2017; Dabla-Norris et al., 2010; Debrun & 
Kumar, 2007a; V. Hagen, 2002; Hallerberg & Wolff, 2008; Sutherland, Price, & Joumard, 2005). 
In comparison, the sub-Saharan Africa region has not had similar attention. As such, the 
effectiveness of fiscal rules as a tool for instilling fiscal discipline is yet to be determined in this 
region despite the growing adoption in most countries. This study fills this gap in the literature by 
conducting a study with a specific focus on sub-Saharan Africa using the updated IMF fiscal rule 
dataset (Lledo et al., 2017). The data set is comprehensive and enables an assessment of various 
aspects of fiscal rules, both at national and supranational level. This study also contributes to the 
literature by comparing fiscal performance between countries with and without fiscal rules in the 





To capture the effect of fiscal rule, a composite index of strength is constructed based on various 
characteristics of fiscal rule such as legal basis, coverage, escape clause, enforcement mechanism 
and institutions supporting the fiscal rules. The study uses fiscal balance as the fiscal aggregate for 
measuring fiscal performance and addresses three research questions. First, do fiscal rules improve 
fiscal performance? second, which types of fiscal rules have effect on fiscal performance? and 
finally, are there differences in fiscal performance between countries with and without fiscal rules?  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two discusses the concepts and design 
features of fiscal rules; section three presents the fiscal policy framework in sub-Saharan Africa; 
section four reviews the relevant literature on fiscal rules and fiscal performance. Section five 
describes the methodology of the study while section six presents and discusses the empirical 
results and the final section concludes the chapter.  
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4.2 Definition, Design Issues and Types of Fiscal Rules 
This section provides the conceptual background to fiscal rules and a detailed discussion of the 
main features in the design of the rules. 
4.2.1 Definition and types of fiscal rules 
In broad terms, fiscal rules can be defined as long lasting constraints on fiscal policy through 
numerical limits on fiscal aggregates such as revenue, expenditure, debt or budget balance (Kopits 
& Symansky, 1998). The numerical limits set a boundary for fiscal policy that cannot be changed 
frequently and provide operational guidance. In a narrow sense, fiscal rules can either be numerical 
or procedural. Procedural rules focus on the processes under which fiscal procedures are conceived 
and implemented. For instance, they prescribe requirements for reporting on fiscal outcomes both 
during and at the end of a fiscal year. Their main aim is to ensure that there is transparency and 
accountability in the fiscal policy process. Numerical rules, on the other hand, impose explicit 
numerical targets or ceilings on fiscal aggregates. They set limits on the amount that can be spent 
or borrowed and targets for the level of revenue collection (Bergman et al., 2016). Henceforth, this 
paper narrows the focus to numerical rules whenever referring to fiscal rules. 
 
The main objective of fiscal rules is to strengthen fiscal discipline by correcting distorted 
incentives of the policymakers and contain pressure to overspend in good times while also ensuring 
fiscal responsibility and debt sustainability. Other objectives include economic stabilization and 
promotion of intergenerational equity as well as provision of a credible medium-term anchor, a 
motive occasioned by the events of the 2007/8 Great Recession. 
 
There are four major types of fiscal rules: debt rules, budget balance rules, expenditure rules and 
revenue rules (Lledó et al.,2017). The debt rule specifies a ceiling on the debt-to-GDP ratio of a 
country, which in most cases ranges between 50 and 70 percent of GDP. However, it usually takes 
time for debt levels to be affected by budgetary measures. As a result, it may not provide clear 
short-term operational guidance to policymakers. Furthermore, when debt is way below its ceiling, 
debt rule provides no binding guidance. The debt rule can also be affected by developments, such 




The budget balance rule (or simply deficit rule) sets a limit on the size of the fiscal deficit. By 
imposing a constraint on fiscal deficit, it also influences the debt ratio. In contrast to debt rules, 
this rule is largely under the control of policymakers, thus providing clear operational guidance 
which can ensure that debt levels are within sustainable limits. The budget balance rules can further 
be specified as overall balance, primary budget balance (excluding interest payments), structural 
balance and cyclically adjusted balance. The overall balance and primary balance do not have 
economic stabilization features whereas structural and cyclically adjusted balance can account for 
economic shocks. The structural and cyclically adjusted balance rules are computationally 
complex especially in the calculation of output gap and, for this reason, only few countries 
implement them. A variant of the budget balance rule that exempts capital spending to promote 
long term growth is referred to as the golden rule. However, exempting capital spending could 
exacerbate debt sustainability concerns, and is hence at cross purposes with debt rule (Kumar et 
al., 2009). 
 
The third category of fiscal rules is the expenditure rule which sets limit on total primary or current 
spending. Expenditure rule can either cap growth in real or nominal terms. Unlike the debt rule, 
this rule is not directly linked to the debt sustainability objective but provides the operational tool 
for fiscal consolidation and determining the size of government. Furthermore, it can help limit 
overspending in times of economic boom when revenues are high and therefore fiscal limits are 
easily met.  
 
The final category is the revenue rule which either sets a floor on revenue target to ensure minimum 
revenue collection or a ceiling to prevent excessive tax burden on the population. Like the 
expenditure rule, this rule is also not directly linked to the debt sustainability objective. 
Implementing this rule could face operational difficulty because of cyclical nature of revenues 
with the business cycles which makes it difficult to set ceilings or floors. This rule is also prone to 
procyclicality because the ceilings and floors do not account for operations of economic stabilizers 
in a downturn or an upturn. Like the expenditure rule, this rule also targets the size of government. 





Due to trade-offs in fiscal rules, it is common for them to be implemented in combination rather 
than in isolation. Furthermore, even with all design features, not a single rule can meet all the 
objectives of fiscal sustainability and economic stabilization in isolation. Therefore, using a mix 
of fiscal rules is an appropriate option for addressing the gaps in single rules. For instance, 
combining the debt and expenditure rule can help not only with the debt sustainability objective 
but also provide policymakers with short-to medium-term operational guidance on the optimal size 
of government. Similar objectives can be met through a mix of debt and structural budget balance 
rules. 
4.2.2 Fiscal rules characteristics and design issues 
Political commitment enhances the efficacy of fiscal rules. Rules can reinforce the resolve of 
policymakers and politicians to govern the right way. However, rules cannot create commitment 
where none exists. Most countries fall within these two extremes; leaders are committed to being 
good stewards of the country’s finances, but political pressure seems to be a hurdle in meeting this 
objective. This is the dilemma facing most countries. Rules can therefore be effective in such 
environments if well designed, internalized and enforced (Budina et al., 2013).  
 
In designing fiscal rules, there is need to take into consideration some broad guiding principles 
(Kopits & Symansky, 1998). First is simplicity, which means that rules should be simple and easy 
to understand for ordinary members of the public as well as policymakers. Secondly, rules should 
promote the long-term sustainability objective of public finance as well as macroeconomic 
stabilization. Thirdly, it should be possible to translate the rule into clear guidance in the annual 
budget process. This means that the fiscal aggregate targeted by the rule should be largely under 
the purview of the policymakers. In addition, rules should have resilience, in that they should be 
permanent or be in place for a sustained period to be able to build credibility. This means that they 
should not be abandoned after a shock; although with escape clauses, they can be held in abeyance 
in difficult times. Finally, another important feature is that rules should be easy to monitor. This 





The main features to consider in the design of fiscal rules include, legal basis, coverage, escape 
clause, enforcement mechanism and institutions supporting the fiscal rules. The legal basis 
provides an anchor for the rules. Fiscal rules can be set in law (regular or organic), in supranational 
or international treaties, in coalition agreements or as a political commitment. A strong legislative 
basis greatly supports the implementation of fiscal rule but is not necessarily a precondition for 
the introduction of fiscal rule. This is because a government can announce its commitment to 
achieving some fiscal target without necessarily enshrining it into a law. Such pronouncements 
can have more credibility if the government has stable tenure, stronger execution of the budgets 
and a broad political and social consensus is seen on the rule. That notwithstanding, a firm legal 
foundation for the rules significantly enhances their implementation and sustainability. How strong 
this legal foundation should be is the next question. The hierarchy of the laws establishing the rule 
is an important factor in this regard as it makes it less prone to amendments. For instance, rules 
enshrined in the constitution are extremely difficult to amend as they require some legislative 
majority compared to ones in ordinary laws. However, in the sub-Saharan Africa region, the 
national fiscal rules lack strong legal foundation. Whereas supranational rules are backed up by 
international treaties, only few countries with national rules have them backed up by statutory 
laws. The few exceptions are Tanzania, Mauritius, Cape Verde and Botswana. The rest either have 
coalition agreements or political commitment, which makes them susceptible to being abandoned 
at will. 
 
Fiscal rules coverage or the scope of the rules is another feature that requires attention. It can be 
looked at from two dimensions. The first aspect of coverage is the level of government covered. 
For instance, do the rules cover central, general or sub-national government. In this case, rules 
coverage may be confined to fiscal operations of the central government, or alternatively may 
extend further to include the local government or even the entirety of public-sector entities such 
as state-owned enterprises. In a nutshell, the broader the coverage, the better the credibility of 
rules. Confining the rules to the central government may give a distorted picture of the overall 
fiscal stance of the government especially when sub-national fiscal authorities and social security 
funds also undertake fiscal operations. However, broader coverage of rules to general government 
may pose some challenges as this could require reliable and timely flow of information on the 
fiscal aggregates as well as effective mechanisms in the coordination of budgetary decisions 
92 
 
among different government units (Ter-Minassian, 2010). As far as sub-Saharan Africa is 
concerned, the fiscal rules coverage is narrower, with most concentration at the central 
government; only Mauritius has coverage up to the general government level. Best practices have 
shown that rules with broader coverage up to the sub-national level or even the entire public sector 
are more effective. 
 
The second aspect of coverage is the number of fiscal aggregates covered, looking at the extent to 
which fiscal aggregates such as expenditure or revenues are excluded from targets. The most 
commonly excluded item is the capital expenditure because of its potential to contribute to the 
long-term growth of the economy. Another commonly excluded item is interest payments and 
cyclically sensitive expenditures. 
 
The inclusion of escape clauses in the rules provide flexibility for dealing with exogenous shocks 
that may be real or financial and domestic or external. Examples include; political upheaval or 
civil war, large shifts in the terms of trade, catastrophes or even sudden stops among others. The 
fact that a country is exposed to unpredictable shocks should not preclude the application of fiscal 
rules. Rather, care should be made ex ante to deal with such circumstances when they arise. In 
addition, escape clauses should specify the nature and magnitude of the shock to be 
accommodated, the length of time for suspension of the rule and the roadmap to return to full 
implementation. Furthermore, the person responsible for activating the escape clause as well as 
monitoring the implementation should be known in advance. 
 
Fiscal rules also need to have appropriate enforcement mechanisms to be effective. Enforcement 
mechanisms may take different forms. On the one hand, there may be a reputational cost for non-
observance of the rules. This approach is more common in countries with well specified political 
and social consensus for social responsibility. On the other hand, criminal sanctions can be meted 
out on officials responsible for implementation. Such actions may however create undue risks to 
those officials especially if the deviation is occasioned by exogenous shocks. In between these two 
extremes are financial penalties which may be imposed on members of a monetary union (for 
instance, as in the EU’s stability and Growth Pact) or on the sub-national government. However, 
enforcement of such penalties is rare due to lengthy and complicated procedures. A more 
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pragmatic approach would be to have a pre-specified automatic correction mechanism in the rules 
in case of deviations. For instance, Switzerland has a ‘debt brake’ option which requires that 
deviations from the structural budget balance be recorded in a notional account and when the 
cumulative sum of these deviations exceeds 6 percent of annual budgetary expenditures, then the 
government should institute remedial measures to get rid of these deviations within a period of 
three years (Danninger, 2002). 
 
The effectiveness of fiscal rules also depends on strong supporting arrangements or institutions. 
For instance, an independent body such as a fiscal council with technical capacity can be assigned 
the responsibility for setting budget assumptions and providing fiscal forecasts. This greatly 
enhances credibility and ensures accuracy in budgetary aggregates.  Another aspect of institutional 
arrangement is when the fiscal targets upon which fiscal rules are set is based on some economic 
framework or is integrated into a framework that includes the process for setting them, their linkage 
to the budget, and the way they are to be enforced or adjusted. Typically, such frameworks are 
incorporated into a medium-term expenditure process which covers three to five years. Fiscal rules 
tend to be more effective when based on a framework than if they derive from freestanding22 
pronouncements. Framework based rules arise from a process that takes account of economic 
conditions, the budget situation, and political preferences. Therefore, these rules are likely to have 
greater flexibility and commitment than rules fixed in advance without due regard to circumstances 
in any given year. Furthermore, since they are adjusted periodically (i.e. annually, biannually), 
framed rules are  more sensitive to shifts in political sentiments and other relevant conditions 
(Budina et al., 2013). This argument reinforces the belief that supranational rules, such as those 
promulgated by regional economic blocks are inherently weaker than country specific ones since 
the former lack frameworks. The fiscal responsibility law (FRL) is another institutional 
arrangement that can greatly enhance fiscal rules. The FRLs set out procedural and transparency 
requirements and the overall fiscal strategy of the government.  
 
Several issues arise as to the timing of introducing fiscal rules. For instance, whether the rules 
should be introduced at the beginning of fiscal consolidation or when this is already in process. 
 
22 Freestanding targets are determined independent of the fiscal policy process by independent fiscal institutions. Such 
limits are fixed in law, or in government directives, or imposed by supranational authority. 
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Additionally; should the introduction of rules occur during a period of high economic uncertainty, 
such as when the economy is in deep recession, or should it wait until the economy recovers. On 
the first issue of fiscal consolidation, arguments favor both viewpoints. One school of thought 
holds that the adoption of fiscal rules signals government commitment to fiscal consolidation, a 
fact that enhances the credibility of government.  On the other hand, rules can be viewed as having 
a lock-in effect on the consolidation process that is already underway. The empirical evidence 
seems to agree with the latter argument that fiscal rules are more likely to be introduced by 
countries where fiscal consolidation is already underway rather than in those where it is beginning 
(Kumar et al., 2009). On the second point about whether fiscal rules can be introduced during a 
period of economic uncertainty or not, there is broad consensus that their introduction requires 
some level of stability in the economy. This is consistent with empirical evidence that the 
probability of introduction of rules is lower in countries facing output declines, large currency 
depreciation or even worsening terms of trade. Thus, the credibility of fiscal rule is enhanced when 
introduced at the beginning of a cyclical expansion. This is to avoid the perception of political 
expediency if fiscal rules are introduced during a downturn.   
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4.3 Fiscal Policy Framework in sub-Saharan Africa 
This section describes stylized facts on fiscal policy framework in sub-Saharan Africa on two 
fronts. Firstly, the fiscal performance in the region is examined with a specific focus on fiscal 
deficit. Secondly, the status of fiscal rules adoption and implementation is assessed. 
4.3.1 Fiscal performance evidence 
Using fiscal balance as a measure of fiscal performance, there has been mixed evidence in sub-
Saharan Africa over the past couple of decades. For the period under review between 2000 and 
2017, the region was in deficit throughout except for a short-lived spell from 2004 to 2008 (Figure 
4.1). Evidently, the magnitudes of the deficits were much larger in the later periods of 2008 
onwards compared to early periods between 2000 and 2004. The moderate deficits in the earlier 
parts of the last decade are attributed to the boom in global commodity prices since most countries 
in the region are commodity exporters.  
 
Figure 4.1: Trends in fiscal deficit in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: WEO, April 2018 
The sustained boom alongside improved growth on the world stage propelled the region into a 
fiscal surplus that for the first time, rose from 0.3 percent in 2004 to peak at 5 percent in 2006. At 
the height of the 2007/8 global financial crisis and ensuing global recession, the balance fell 
sharply to a deficit of 4.5 percent in 2009. Countries in sub-Saharan Africa embarked on fiscal 
stimulus programs to stimulate domestic demand. The program involved huge public expenditure 
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a deficit of 4.5 percent in 2009. There was a significant improvement after end of recession from 
a deficit of 4.5 percent to 1.2 percent in 2011. This improvement was however short-lived as the 
fiscal position again experienced a steep decline, hitting a bottom of 4.9 percent in 2017, a 
deterioration not experienced even during the 2008 great recession. 
 
These aggregated figures reflect overall trends although they may mask cross country variations, 
which become clearer in Figure 4.2. As shown, majority of countries in the region experienced 
fiscal deficit in 2017, except for Botswana and Seychelles which had a 0.4 and 1 percent fiscal 
surplus respectively. The magnitude of the deficits was high in more than half of the countries 
exceeding 4 percent of GDP. An extreme case is seen in Eritrea which had the highest deficit of 
over 14 percent of GDP 
 
Figure 4.2: Fiscal position for selected sub-Saharan African countries in 2017 
 
Source: WEO April 2018 
Turning attention to movements in fiscal performance for selected countries, Figure 4.3 shows the 
changes in fiscal balances across countries during the periods 2011-2013 and 2014-2017. The 
largest deterioration occurred in the Republic of Congo (from an average surplus of 6 percent of 
GDP in 2011-2013 to a deficit of 18.4 percent in 2014-2017) and Angola (from an average surplus 
of 4.4 percent of GDP in 2011-2013 to a deficit of 5.1 percent in the 2014-2017 period). Other 
notable countries with large deterioration in fiscal balance include Comoros (from a surplus of 7.5 
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deficit widened further from 3.6 percent in 2011-2013 to 9.7 percent in 2014-2017). In contrast, 
Ghana, the Central African Republic, and Cabo Verde registered significant improvements in their 
deficits. The deficit in Cabo Verde fell from an average of 9.1 percent of GDP in 2011-2013 to 4.6 
percent in 2014-2017, which is an improvement of 4.5 percentage points of GDP. The Central 
African Republic improved from a deficit of 3 percent of GDP in 2011-2013 to a surplus of 0.6 
percent in 2014-2017 while Ghana narrowed its deficit from 10.3 percent in 2011-2013 to 7.5 
percent in the 2014-2017 period. 
 
Figure 4.3: Trends in fiscal performance for selected sub-Saharan Africa countries 
 






































4.3.2 Fiscal rules adoption in sub-Saharan Africa 
Until the last decade, fiscal rules were prevalent in advanced and emerging economies. Few 
countries in the sub-Saharan Africa region had fiscal rules. By the year 1999, only Kenya and Cabo 
Verde had adopted the rules. However, this trend has drastically changed over the past decade. 
Figure 4.4 shows the trend in the number of countries with fiscal rules in sub-Saharan Africa 
between 2000 and 2015. The number grew from 10 in 2000 to 25 countries in 2015 representing 
about 150 percent growth in adoption over a 15-year period. Majority of growth came from the 
supranational rules which expanded from 8 countries in 2000 to 19 countries in 2015, compared 
to national rules which grew from two to seven countries in 2015. During the same period, Kenya 
was the only country with both national and supranational rules.  
 
Figure 4.4: Trends in number of countries with fiscal rules in the sub-Saharan Africa 
region 
 
Source: IMF Fiscal Rule Dataset, 2017 
Majority of countries with rules show more preference to supranational rules. These countries are 
confined within currency and monetary unions. The sole purpose of subjecting countries in a 
regional economic bloc to rules is to internalize the regional costs of fiscal indiscipline and 
establish a framework for the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy mix (Schaechter et al., 
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inconsistent with the fiscal framework of the monetary union. The sub-Saharan Africa region has 
three main regional economic blocs with supranational rules. These are, the East African Monetary 
Union (EAMU)23, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)24 and the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC)25. The South African Development 
Community (SADC) as a regional economic bloc does not have formal supranational rules. 
 
These supranational rules differ in design across the three monetary unions. In CEMAC, the 
structural fiscal balance of the central government is required to be in balance or surplus. The 
structural balance is calculated by replacing actual oil revenue by its three-year moving average. 
In addition, the non-oil basic fiscal balance should be in balance or surplus. The rules exclude 
public investment or other priority items from the ceiling. In addition, the rules require the stock 
of public debt to be kept below 70 percent of GDP. In EAMU, the fiscal convergence criteria 
require that member countries attain a target of 3 percent of GDP for the overall fiscal deficit 
(excluding grant) by the fiscal year 2020/21. In addition, the stock of public debt should not exceed 
50 percent of GDP. In WAEMU, the fiscal convergence criteria set up since 2000 requires member 
countries to maintain the overall fiscal deficit (excluding budget grants and foreign-financed 
capital expenditures) of the central government to no more than 3 percent of GDP and the stock of 
total public debt should not exceed 70 percent of GDP. In addition, the rule sets a non-binding 20 
percent floor on revenues. The rules also exclude public investment or other priority items from 
this ceiling. However, there is an escape clause for a temporary large fall of GDP and government 
revenue. 
 
At country level, the adoption of national fiscal rules is meant to rein in growing fiscal deficits and 
public debt as well as to lock in the gains from fiscal consolidation. Though only few countries 
have national rules compared to supranational rules, there has been a significant increase from two 
countries in 2000 to seven countries in 2015 (see Figure 4.4). The countries with national rules 
include Kenya (since 1997) and Cabo Verde (since 1998). These two being the early countries to 
 
23 The EAMU is a six-member country union still under protocol set up in 2013. Though not yet a fully-fledged monetary union, 
the EAMU protocol sets the stage for a fully-fledged union in 2023. The members are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, 
Tanzania and Uganda 
24 The WAEMU is an eight-member country union since 2000 comprising Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo 
25 The CEMAC is a six-member country union which adopted the rules since 2002 and comprises Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon 
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roll out the rules. Others include Botswana (since 2008), Liberia (since 2009), Mauritius (since 
2008), Namibia (since 2010) and Nigeria (since 2007).  
 
The pattern of the adoption of fiscal rules by type differs across countries in the region. The most 
common rule is budget balance and debt rule while expenditure and revenue rules are the least 
adopted (Figure 4.5). In 2015, there were 23 countries with debt rule compared to 21 with budget 
balance rule. On the other hand, only nine and three countries had revenue and expenditure rules 
respectively.  
 
Figure 4.5: Types of fiscal rules in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: IMF, Fiscal Rules Dataset, 2017 
Another apparent trend regarding fiscal rules adoption is that majority of countries prefer multiple 
as opposed to single rules. These choices are informed by different objectives and trade-offs found 
in rules. The budget balance and debt rule are the most common mix followed by the revenue and 
budget balance rule. There are 20 countries with a combination of debt and budget balance rules, 
followed by nine with revenue and budget balance and only two with expenditure and debt rule 
(Figure 4.6). A few other countries have single rules, including Nigeria (budget balance rule only) 
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Figure 4.6: Fiscal Rules Combinations in sub-Saharan Africa, 2015 
 
Source: IMF, Fiscal Rules Dataset, 2017 
The fiscal targets for the rules vary across countries. In Botswana, there is a binding commitment 
on the level of public debt and two fiscal targets, namely total expenditure and budget balance as 
set out in the country’s National Development Plan. The debt limit is set at 20 percent of GDP 
level while the fiscal framework sets a limit on central government expenditure at not more than 
40 percent of GDP. In Cabo Verde, domestic borrowing should not exceed 3 percent of GDP and 
the stock of public debt should not exceed 60 percent of GDP (though this ceiling is not binding 
and does not require action). Kenya has policy goals for debt ratios although these are not binding 
and are subject to change; the limit on the stock of public debt is set at 45 percent of GDP. In 
addition, the government overdraft at the Central Bank of Kenya is limited to 5 percent of revenue 
of the previous year. Furthermore, total revenue collection is set at 21-22 percent of GDP. In 
Mauritius, the legally mandated debt ceiling until the end of 2017 was 60 percent of GDP, which 
was to be lowered to 50 percent of GDP starting in 2018. In addition, there is an escape clause for 
emergencies and large public investment projects. In Namibia, government expenditure should be 
below 30 percent of GDP. In addition, the stock of public debt should fall in the range of 25-30 
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4.4 Review of Literature 
4.4.1 Theoretical literature 
Economic theory provides explanations as to why an economy can experience fiscal deficit. 
According to Keynesian economics, fiscal policy is an important tool for stabilizing the economy. 
When the economy is in recession (period of low aggregate demand) running fiscal deficit is 
necessary to boost aggregate demand; running surplus (period of high aggregate demand) is 
necessary when the economy is in a boom to recover from inflationary pressures. In contrast, the 
neoclassical theory denies the stabilizing role of fiscal policy. Barro (1979),  argues that taxes have 
distortionary effects in the labour market and that the welfare effects of these distortions increase 
when tax rates are changed continuously. As such, when the economy is faced with extraordinary 
situations like drought or war, taxes should be moderately raised and run deficits until the need for 
extraordinary spending abates. When the situation normalizes, the economy should run a surplus 
to repay the debt (Hallerberg et al., 2009).  
 
Economic theories on government spending can also be used to explain deficit bias. For instance, 
Wagner’s Law, also known as the law of increasing state spending, named after the German 
economist Adolph Wagner (1835-1917), argues that public expenditure rises constantly as the 
economy develops due to heavy demand for public goods and services. Another explanation is 
provided by the Baumol cost disease theory which attributes the deficit to productivity differences 
in the public and private sector. There is lower productivity in the public as compared to private 
sector; for parity to be realized in the two sectors, the share of government spending must rise.  
 
Besides the conventional economic theories, deficit bias has been attributed to political economy 
factors (Eden et al., 2013). This is because politicians act as optimizing agents instead of 
benevolent planners. Thus, their actions lead to suboptimal economic outcomes that result in 
deficit bias (Krogstrup & Wälti, 2008). The most common political economy explanations are the 
common pool theory as advanced by Hallerberg & von Hagen (1999) and  von Hagen & Harden 
(1995); the agency problem by von Hagen (2002); the time inconsistency theory of preferences by 





The common pool problem arises when interest groups involved in budget making do not fully 
internalize the cost of their choices. Whereas the cost of public spending is borne by the national 
tax base (thus the costs are widely spread both geographically and across interest groups), the 
benefits accrue to a narrow interest group depending on the strength of the lobby (Morris et al., 
2006). The interest groups could be line ministries, lobby groups or even political parties who 
compete for their own stake without due regard for how their choices contribute to higher spending 
which raises deficit further. The agency problem arises because voters (principal) elect politicians 
(agents) to make decisions about public spending on their behalf using their taxes. However, in 
this principal-agent relationship, politicians (through the policymakers) do not always carry out 
their delegated authority in the best interest of the voters. The politicians often do extract rents by 
misusing resources entrusted to them to pursue their own selfish interest, manifesting through 
corruption, undue perks or outright waste that eventually increases the deficit. Hence, voters may 
wish to mitigate these behaviors by subjecting politicians to rules that stipulate limits on their 
actions. 
 
The time inconsistency problem as first advanced by Kydland & Prescott (1977) argues that ex-
ante, the government may announce fiscal adjustments only to renege on such promises because 
of political and economic pressures (Schuknecht, 2004). The deficit bias may also arise due to 
government shortsightedness based on its tendency to discount future events such as public 
spending at a higher discount rate than the electorate. This could result in budgetary imbalances. 
Alesina & Tabellini (1990) also notes that government shortsightedness could be due to fear of 
losing an election. A related issue is that of election-budget cycle where deficits increase during 
or around the election period., a phenomenon also known as political business cycle. This happens 
especially if the governing party staring at election loss induces voters with tax cuts or pork barrel 
spending in the run-up to the election. Similar argument can also be attributed to information 
asymmetry existing between policy makers and the voters. Persson et al. (1997) notes that when 
citizens elect their leaders, they delegate decision-making on policy matters to the holders of public 
office. However, due to information asymmetry, policymakers have better information on the true 
fiscal position than the population at large; they can use this advantage to cut taxes or increase 




According to Hallerberg et al. (2009), political competition in government and the nature of the 
electoral system can contribute to fiscal deficit. This argument notes that coalition governments 
tend to be characterized by stiff political competition, polarization, disagreements and short 
tenures in office (due to lower probability of re-election). As a result, in the event of a negative 
fiscal shock hitting the economy, coalition partners may fail to agree on whose constituency should 
bear spending cuts or tax increases. On the contrary, a one-party government is more decisive on 
such matters. This further shows that there is a strong link between the electoral system and the 
number of parties in government on the one hand and fiscal deficit on the other. A minority 
government (associated with coalitions or proportional representation26) tends to have larger 
deficits than a majority government (associated with single party or plurality27).  
 
Economic theory further explains that fiscal institutions can affect fiscal policy outcomes. For 
instance, the motivations underlying deficit bias can be constrained through the adoption of fiscal 
rules. von Hagen (2002) observes that the principal-agent problem that contributes to deficit bias 
can be addressed through the adoption of fiscal rules. Imposing fiscal rules ex-ante restricts the 
scope of choices available to elected politicians regarding public finances. Debrun & Kumar 
(2007) advances the signaling hypothesis of fiscal rules by demonstrating that governments adopt 
rules as a sign of commitment and transparency. Such measures reduce the risk of voters 
associating adverse budgetary outcomes with government incompetence; rather voters perceive 
the issues as arising from situations out of government control (idiosyncratic shocks). This 
enhances the re-election chances of the incumbent government and reduces the incentive to run 
excessive deficits. In this case, fiscal rule may be viewed as a signaling device that enhances fiscal 
performance by reducing the information asymmetry existing between voters and policymakers. 
4.4.2 Empirical literature 
The empirical literature on fiscal rules and fiscal performance can be grouped into three categories. 
The first presents the evidence of fiscal rules on fiscal performance. The second strand reviews 
various approaches for the construction of a fiscal rule index. The third strand looks at empirical 
 
26 Under proportional representation, the proportion of seats a party wins in electoral district corresponds to the votes 
the party receives in elections. Therefore, seats are distributed based on votes received.  
27 Under this system, only one representative is elected in the electoral district and all seats goes to the winner. 
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evidence of other factors with a potential effect on fiscal deficit including economic and political 
economy factors.  
 
Early studies on this subject in the US focused on the effectiveness of borrowing constraints on 
fiscal deficits (Alt & Lowry, 1996; Bohn & Inman, 1996). The results show that states with tighter 
fiscal limits had greater fiscal discipline. This finding is also supported by Sutherland et al.( 2005) 
whose findings shows a negative correlation between fiscal rules and debt at the sub-national level. 
Recently, studies have investigated the link between fiscal rules and fiscal performance based on 
fiscal rules’ measure of strength. For instance, von Hagen (2005) results suggest that an increase 
in the strength of fiscal rules improves fiscal balance. Similarly, Ayuso-i-Casals et al. (2006) 
arrives at same conclusion using fiscal rule indices based on the EU dataset. Debrun et al. (2008) 
examined the effects of national fiscal rules for EU countries based on survey dataset and found 
that rules have statistically significant positive impact on cyclically adjusted primary balances. 
Similar results were found by  Badinger & Reuter (2017) for 74 countries spread across different 
economic groups  and Krogstrup & Wälti (2008), who focused on 25 cantons in Switzerland.  
 
On the other hand, a few other studies have found that fiscal rules do not necessarily lead to better 
fiscal outcomes. For instance Feld & Kirchgässner (2001) found that fiscal rules do not restrict the 
public debt of Swiss municipalities. Milesi-Ferretti (2003) observes that fiscal rules can prompt 
policymakers to come up with creative ways to bypass the restrictions especially when imposed in 
an environment devoid of transparency. The paper shows that when rules are imposed in such an 
environment, they create room for creative accounting and less fiscal adjustment. von Hagen & 
Wolff (2006) finds that creative accounting was common in EU members states after fiscal rules 
became effective and binding. 
 
Empirical studies employ various approaches to capture fiscal rules in regression models. Some 
studies use dummy variables (Brzozowski & Siwińska-Gorzelak, 2010; Gali & Perotti, 2003; 
Krogstrup & Wälti, 2008; Nerlich & Reuter, 2013) while others construct an index of strength. 
The drawback of using dummies is that they have limited information content and there is a 
limitation on the number that can be included in a regression. On the other hand, using a composite 
index retains most of the information in the data by exploiting the design characteristics of  fiscal 
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rules. ACIR (1987) is a pioneer study on this approach to investigate fiscal discipline mechanisms 
in the US. Other studies that have used similar method include Alesina et al.(1999) in Latin 
America and Debrun et al. (2008) in the EU. These studies relied much on questionnaire- 
administered surveys to gather information from government agencies and fiscal experts. 
Some studies have also used a fiscal rule index based on a common approach in natural and 
technical sciences known as partially ordered set (POSET). This approach uses set theory 
methodology to construct indices. Studies following this line include Badinger & Reuter (2015) 
and Badinger & Reuter (2017), both based on IMF Fiscal Rules dataset for the period 1985-2012. 
Although composite and POSET based indices differ in methodology, Badinger & Reuter (2017) 
shows that the two approaches are closely related and often arrive at quantitatively similar results. 
In this regard, this study adopts the composite index approach following Debrun et al. (2008).  
Besides institutional variables like fiscal rules, Bohn (1998) notes that fiscal behavior can also be 
modelled as a reaction function of primary balance to economic and political variables. The 
economic factors controlled for in such a regression are debt ratio and output gap (Badinger & 
Reuter, 2015, 2017; Debrun & Kumar, 2007a; Debrun et al., 2008; Maltritz & Wuste, 2015). A 
positive response of fiscal balance to debt-to-GDP ratio signifies that a country is running a 
sustainable fiscal policy in the sense of satisfying IBC (Bohn, 1998). The output gap on the other 
hand controls for business cycle influence on fiscal policy. 
 
The empirical evidence on influences of political economy factors on fiscal policy has also been 
examined. This strand of literature focuses on testing the common pool hypothesis and how 
political decisions contribute to deficit bias. The political factors tackled range from the type of 
government in place i.e. whether a majority or minority, the tenure of government as well as the 
polarization and fragmentation of the political system. Egger & Koethenbuerger (2010), for 
instance, tests the common pool hypothesis using a panel of 2,056 municipalities in Germany’s 
Free State of Bavaria and finds evidence that council size has a strong effect on municipal 
spending, which provides strong evidence of ‘pork barrel spending’. Alesina & Perotti (1995) 
investigates the link between government type and fiscal stance based on a sample of 20 OECD 
countries between 1960 and 1992. The study finds evidence that coalition governments are 
associated with large fiscal deficits compared to single-party governments. Roubini & Sachs 
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(1989) and Grilli et al. (1991) all reach the same conclusion and further show that higher deficits 
are common on average in countries with a short tenure of government. The build-up of deficits in 
the period leading to a general election, also referred to as political business cycles, has featured 
prominently in this area of empirical research. Shi & Svensson (2006) finds evidence that the 
deficit increases on average by 1 percent of GDP in an election year and that the increase is more 
common in developing than developed countries. Similar evidence is also confirmed by Brender 
& Drazen (2005) and Debrun et al.(2008). 
4.4.3 Overview of the literature 
The general conclusion from the literature is that studies on the impact of fiscal rules on fiscal 
performance are concentrated in developed countries, especially EU and OECD countries; similar 
studies on sub-Saharan Africa are scarce. Furthermore, comparative studies on fiscal performance 
between countries with and without fiscal rules are not common. Such an exercise could give an 
unequivocal picture on the effectiveness of fiscal rules. In view of the foregoing, this analysis 
extends the literature by first investigating the impact of fiscal rules on fiscal performance with 
specific focus on sub-Saharan Africa region. The fiscal rule is measured using a composite index 
of strength constructed using updated fiscal rules dataset covering 1985-2015. As noted in the 
above reviewed empirical studies, there is no quantitative difference in either using the composite 
index approach of Debrun et al. (2008) or  the POSET index approach of Badinger & Reuter 
(2017). Secondly, an assessment is done on whether there is any difference in fiscal performance 
between countries in the region with fiscal rules and those without fiscal rules. A treatment effect 
methodology is used to conduct this comparison which is another dimension that has not been 




4.5.1 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework underpinning the role of fiscal rules in fiscal policy is adopted from a 
political economy model28 in the spirit of Alesina & Tabellini (1990) and extended by Debrun & 
Kumar ( 2007b). The analysis is based on a representative-agent model of a small open economy 
facing deficit bias due to electoral uncertainty of political parties. The prospect of not being re-
elected into office significantly shortens the outlook of the party in power. Thus, the partisan 
policymaker representing the ruling party discounts future economic outcomes at a greater rate 
than is socially desirable. The resulting effect is that most of the resources are spent on current 
provision of public good, leading to a deficit bias; correspondingly, few resources are allocated for 
future investment projects. Altogether, this creates a justification for the introduction of some form 
of a fiscal restraint mechanism. The model further highlights the critical role of electorates viewed 
from the perspective of determining the extent of the bias (because of tolerance to policy failures) 
as well as selecting the enforcers of fiscal rules. Though highly stylized, the framework provides 
motivations and incentives facing a typical policymaker in implementing fiscal policy. 
4.5.1.1 The Model 
Private Agents 
The model considers a small open economy existing for two periods with infinite number identical 
individuals who derive utility from consumption of both public and private goods. The 
representative individual preference is represented by a time separable utility function specified 
as: 
𝑈 = 𝐸0 [∑ 𝑢(𝑐𝑡) + 𝑣(𝑞𝑡)
2
𝑡=1
],                                                                       (4.1) 
Where 𝑐𝑡 is consumption of private good in period 𝑡, while 𝑞𝑡 is provision of public good in period 
𝑡. The utility functions 𝑢(∙) and 𝑣(∙) satisfies the standard properties29. 𝐸0 is the expectation 
 
28 Such a model is adopted since politics matter a great deal in economic decisions made by policymakers. Political 
influence cannot be assumed. 
29 Assumed to be concave, strictly increasing and twice continuously differentiable with 𝑢(0) = 0, 𝑢′ > 0, and 𝑢′′ <




operator based on information available at the beginning of the period. For simplicity, the real 
interest rate and the social discount rate are both assumed to be equal to unity. It is further assumed 
that the consumer can freely borrow in both domestic and international capital markets and 
maximize utility in (4.1) subject to the following IBC: 
𝑐1 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑦1 + 𝑙,                                                                                   (4.2𝑎) 
𝑐2 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑦2 − 𝑙,                                                                                 (4.2𝑏) 
Where 𝜏 is a constant and exogenous income tax rate (this represent the size of the government), 𝑙  
is the stock of debt at the end of period 1, and 𝑦𝑡 is personal income at time 𝑡. In addition, it is 
assumed that 𝑐𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝑡 = 1,2 , which implies  −(1 − 𝜏)𝑦1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ (1 − 𝜏)𝑦2. Period 1 income faces 
a random shock ∈ [− ;̅ ]̅ with ̅ < 1, while period 2 income is assumed to be deterministic30: 
𝑦1 = ?̅?(1 + ),                                                                                            (4.2𝑐) 
   𝑦2 = ?̅?,                                                                                                        (4.2𝑑) 
The economy also has two political parties indexed by 𝑄 = 𝐶, 𝐿. Both parties share the preferences 
of individuals in this economy only to the extent that they are in power to deliver the public good. 
The public good is therefore identical irrespective of the party in power. 
The Government 
The fiscal policy in place is subject to a mechanism that discourages policymakers from 
accumulating debt 𝑏 beyond a certain threshold ?̅?. If this threshold is breached, there is a utility 
cost31 𝑆(𝑏), with 𝑆(𝑏) = 0, if 𝑏 ≤ ?̅?, and 𝑆(𝑏) = 𝑘(𝑏 − ?̅?) with 𝑘 > 0 if 𝑏 > ?̅?. The term 𝑏 − ?̅? 
in this context is seen as a numerical fiscal rule, and 𝑘 as enforcement mechanism, such that 
violation of the rule results in utility loss for the policymakers. 
 
 
30 This assumption is made to simplify computation. Making period 2 income random complicates the notation without 
adding additional insight. 
31 Utility cost depends on the extent of the breach, i.e. the extent to which 𝑏 exceeds ?̅?. 
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The policymaker faces the following objective function (expressed in per-capita terms): 
𝑉𝑄 = 𝐸0 [∑ 𝑢(𝑐𝑡) + 𝑣(𝑞𝑄,𝑡) − 𝑆(𝑏)
2
𝑡=1
] , 𝑄 = 𝐶, 𝐿                                                (4.3) 
Where 𝑞𝐶,𝑡 = 0 if 𝑄 = 𝐿 and 𝑞𝐿,𝑡 = 0 if 𝑄 = 𝐶. Private consumption, 𝑐𝑡 enters policymaker’s 
utility function because the preference of the consumer matters to the policymaker. 
Assuming away borrowing restrictions both domestically and internationally, the governments’ 
fiscal policy decisions are subject to the IBC: 
𝑞𝑄,1 = 𝜏𝑦1 + 𝑏 − 𝛿1,                                                                                        (4.4𝑎) 
𝑞𝑄,2 = 𝜏𝑦2 − 𝑏 − 𝛿2,                                                                                       (4.4𝑏) 
Where 𝛿𝑡 is a random failure in delivery of the public good which can be attributed to unforeseen 
policy mistakes, administrative capacity weaknesses, or corrupt policymakers. To simplify the 
analysis, 𝛿𝑡 is uniformly distributed over the interval [0: 𝛿̅]. Both parties face the same distribution 
of failure so that there is no distinction in ‘types’ (the competent and less competent for instance) 
between the two political parties. Further, a nonnegative constraint on public good provision is 
imposed such that, 𝑞𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝑡 = 1,2, implying −𝜏𝑦1 + 𝛿̅ ≤ 𝑏 ≤ 𝜏𝑦2 − 𝛿̅.  
The only source of inefficiency in this model is information asymmetry facing the voters about the 
ability of policymakers to efficiently deliver public goods. This is a common assumption in 
theoretical models of fiscal bias. A similar conclusion can be found in Morris et al. (2006). As a 
result, voters can only infer such an ability based on actual action. Particularly, they assign a non-
zero probability to the fact that a policy failure beyond a certain threshold 𝛿+ signals an underlying 
lack of competence; in other words, such failures are considered too big to be purely random. 
Voters also ignore the true ex-ante probability distribution of 𝛿, and whether there exists any 
difference in type among policymakers of different parties. However, they do observe 𝑏.  
Formally, voters assign a fixed probability 𝜓 ∈ [0,1/2] that a policy failure 𝛿𝑡 > 𝛿
+ can occur 
under a competent government. At the end of period 1, individuals either re-elect the incumbent 
(in this case, party C by assumption) or vote it out. Party C will be re-elected if: 
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𝐸1[𝑣(𝑞𝐶,2)] ≥ 𝐸1[𝑣(𝑞𝑙,2)],                                                                          (4.5) 
Where 𝐸1 represents the expectations operator at the end of period 1. Expression 4.5 indicates that 
if the incumbent is believed to be more competent than the opponent, then the incumbent will be 
re-elected. While voter’s belief about competence are the same for both parties at the beginning of 
period 1, they are updated following the realization of 𝛿1. This result can be summarized in the 
form of a proposition: If 0 ≤ 𝜓 < 1/2 and voters follow (4.5), then, at the beginning of period 1, 
the incumbent assigns a probability 𝑟 = 1 − (𝛿+ 𝛿̅⁄ )  of not being re-elected. The probability 𝑟 of 
losing elections depends on how flexibly voters assess policy failures. 
This is the chain of events. In period 0, a representative constitutional convention (or a referendum) 
imposes a debt (or deficit) ceiling ?̅? which carries a utility cost 𝑆(𝑏) when 𝑏 > ?̅?. At the beginning 
of period 1, Nature draws the governing party (C by assumption), then the shock  is realized and 
government (policymakers) chooses 𝑏 and 𝑞𝐶,1 to maximize 𝑉𝑐. After that, 𝛿1 materializes, and 
private consumers select 𝑙 and 𝑐1 to maximize their expected utility 𝑈. Finally, elections take place. 
In period 2, all debts are paid off and the world ends. The equilibrium is found by backward 
induction to ensure time-consistency. 
4.5.1.2 Optimal fiscal policy under social planner 
If the social planner is in charge, the first best solution results in optimal fiscal policy. In this case, 
electoral constraints and fiscal institutions play no role. The social planner selects public debt level 
𝑏∗ defined as: 
𝑏∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 max
𝑏
[2𝑢(𝑐1
∗) + 𝑣(𝜏?̅?(1 + ) + 𝑏 − 𝛿̅ 2)⁄ + 𝑣(𝜏?̅? − 𝑏 − 𝛿̅ 2)⁄ ]                 (4.6) 
 
The first order condition for (4.6) is: 
 
𝑣′(𝜏?̅?(1 + ) + 𝑏∗ − 𝛿̅ 2⁄ ) = 𝑣′(𝜏?̅?−𝑏∗ − 𝛿̅ 2⁄ )                                             (4.7) 
 
The socially optimal public debt 𝑏∗ equates the marginal utility of additional deficit financed by 
public good provision in period 1 with the marginal disutility of forgone public provision in period 





∗ . Further simplification of (4.7) yields 𝑏∗ = −𝜏?̅? /2, implying that the optimal public 
debt is zero, and that deficits or surpluses are only used to smooth out the income shock. 
 
4.5.1.3 Optimal fiscal policy under a partisan policymaker 
In this political equilibrium, the policymaker is exposed to electoral uncertainty and possible costs 
of breaching the thresholds set by fiscal rules 𝑆(𝑏). Denoting 𝑏∗∗ as the debt maximizing 
policymakers’ expected utility, it can be shown that: 
 
𝑏∗∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 max
𝑏
[2𝑢(𝑐1
∗) + 𝑣(𝜏?̅?(1 + ) + 𝑏 − 𝛿̅ 2)⁄ + (1 − 𝑟)𝑣(𝜏?̅? − 𝑏 − 𝛿̅ 2) − 𝑆(𝑏)⁄ ]     (4.8) 
 
Equation (4.8) shows that uncertainty about re-election brings the policymaker’s discount factor 
(1 − 𝑟) below the social discount factor. The first order condition for (4.8) becomes: 
 
𝑣′(𝜏?̅?(1 + ) + 𝑏∗∗ − 𝛿̅ 2⁄ ) = (1 − 𝑟)𝑣′(𝜏?̅?−𝑏∗∗ − 𝛿̅ 2⁄ ) + S′(𝑏∗∗)                     (4.9) 
 
Where 𝑆(𝑏∗∗) = 0,  if 𝑏 ≤ ?̅?, and  𝑆(𝑏) = 𝑘(𝑏 − ?̅?)  with 𝑘 > 0 if 𝑏 > ?̅?. 
 
Equation (4.9) implicitly defines 𝑏∗∗ (and corresponding 𝑞1
∗∗  and 𝑞2
∗∗) as a function of all other 
parameters and variables in the model.  
 
Applying implicit function theorem on (4.9) and totally differentiating it with respect to 𝑘 yields; 
𝜕𝑏∗∗ 𝜕𝑘⁄ = [𝑣′′(𝑞𝐶,1
∗∗ ) + (1 − 𝑟)𝑣′′(𝑞𝐶.2
∗∗ )]
−1
< 0                                      (4.10) 
 
Equation (4.10) shows that intense enforcement of fiscal rules (that is, higher 𝑘) reduces the deficit 
level 𝑏∗∗. Relating this result to equation (4.9), it shows that 𝑘 making any deviation from the 
optimal debt level 𝑏∗ is sufficiently costly enough to discourage deficit bias. The main conclusions 
from this analysis is that the level of debt 𝑏∗∗ is sub-optimally higher than optimal level 𝑏∗ if  𝑏 >





Figure 4.7 shows a graphical representation of the foregoing analysis. The graph displays marginal 
utility function 𝑣′(∙) in terms of 𝑏 for = 0. The bold downward sloping curve from left to right 
represents marginal utility derived from the provision of public goods in period 1, 𝑣′(𝑞𝐶,1), while 
the three upward sloping curves represent expected marginal utility for the provision of public 
goods in period 2 under different scenarios: a social planner (plain bold line), electoral uncertainty 
under fiscal rules (light dotted/dashed line) and electoral uncertainty without fiscal rules (orange 
line). 
 
Figure 4.7: Fiscal policy under different political scenarios 
 
Source: Adopted from Debrun & Kumar (2007b) 
 
At each point of intersection, curves with opposite slopes represent a solution to the optimization 
problem, and its projection to the horizontal axis gives a corresponding deficit. Point A identifies 
the social planners’ solution defined by (4.7).  At this point, there is no electoral uncertainty and 
the equilibrium debt 𝑏∗ = 0. However, with electoral uncertainty, the policymaker discounts the 




(1 − 𝑟)𝑣′(𝑞𝐶,2) 









Consequently, the plain upward sloping thin curve (orange in colour) is flatter than the bold 
counterpart (for the social planner), leading to political equilibrium B, defined by (4.9), which has 
higher deficit, 𝑏∗∗ > 𝑏∗. When enforcement 𝑘 > 0 associated with fiscal rule which sets 𝑏 = 𝑏∗ is 
introduced, the curve shifts up (dotted curve), reducing the equilibrium deficit to the optimal level 
𝑏∗∗ = 𝑏∗. As a result, the wedge between political and socially optimal discount factors is 
eliminated.  
4.5.2 Summary and empirical implications of theoretical model 
The model has important implications for fiscal outcomes. First, the model places electoral 
uncertainty at the heart of deficit bias due to the perceived risk of losing elections driving the 
discount rate of policymakers below the social optimum. The implication is that countries with 
higher political instability, and a high risk of losing election, are more likely to experience higher 
deficits on average. Secondly, fiscal rules can play a crucial role in mitigating the bias by 
increasing the marginal disutility of the policymaker. More importantly, it is not just the presence 
of fiscal rules per se that matters, but also their enforcement. Thus, the rules need to have strong 
enforcement mechanisms for them to be effective. Whereas this simplified model has emphasized 
on electoral uncertainty and fiscal rules as the main elements of fiscal outcomes, there are other 
factors that could affect fiscal outcomes. These are highlighted in section 4.6. 
4.5.3 Construction of the fiscal rule index of strength 
The stringency of fiscal rules is measured using a composite index of strength constructed in two 
stages following the approaches of Debrun et al (2008) and Schaechter et al. (2012). In the first 
stage, a sub-index is constructed by country for each year for the four types of fiscal rules, namely 
budget balance, debt, revenue and expenditure rules. This is done by assignment of scores to each 
of the seven supporting indicators to each rule (see flow chart in Figure 4.8 and Appendix A4.5), 
namely legal basis, coverage, enforcement mechanism, escape clause, supporting institutions, 
cyclically adjusted budget balance and rules excluding public investment. For legal basis and 
coverage, the scores assigned depend on their importance. For instance, the legal basis indicator is 
assigned a maximum score of four if the rule is enshrined in a constitution and a minimum score 
of one if it is based on coalition or political agreements. In this case, a lower score implies that the 
rule is not legally binding and therefore can be amended easily. A similar approach is used for 
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coverage indicator, where a rule covering the general government is assigned a higher score of 
two, compared to a score of one for the rule limited to the central government. On the other hand, 
the scores assigned to the rest of five indicators are binary in nature taking a value of one if the 
rule contain the indicator and zero if otherwise.  The aggregate score for each rule is then computed 
by simple summation of all the scores assigned to its indicators, which are then standardized32 to 
generate the sub-index for the respective type of rule (Figure 4.8). 
 
Figure 4.8: Fiscal rules sub-indices by type of rule 
 
                           Source: Adopted from Schaechter et al. (2012) 
 
 
32 We use standard deviation from the mean scheme. This scheme imposes a standard normal distribution (i.e. a mean 
of 0 and a standard deviation of 1). See Freudenberg (2003) for more details on this scheme 
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In the second stage, the overall index of strength by country and year is derived by summation of 
respective sub-indices relating to the four types of fiscal rules. The following formula is used to 
derive the overall index of strength: 
𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡
4
𝑗=1
                                                                                             (4.11) 
Where 𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡  is the overall fiscal rule index in country 𝑖 in year 𝑡 and 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 is the sub-index for rule 
type 𝑗 for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡. The stringency index in equation (4.11) therefore captures both the 
characteristics and the number of rules in place each year for a given country. It is however 
important to note that the fiscal rule dataset used to construct these indices is only able to capture 
the countries which have the fiscal rules and not the extent of adherence or enforcement to the 
rules. As such a high index can be observed in a country with poor fiscal outcomes since the 
presence of a rule may not necessarily imply its enforcement. 
 
Figure 4.9: Trends in evolution of aggregate fiscal rule index of strength (Annual average for SSA) 
 
Source: Own computation 
 
Figure 4.9 shows the evolution of the aggregate fiscal rule index over time in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The time varying index for the region is computed as a simple average across the countries in the 
region. Since the indices are standardized with a mean 0 and standard deviation of 1, an index 
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the strength of a specific rule increases with the magnitude of its index. The figure shows that the 
overall fiscal rule index ranges between -1.3 and 1.9, between 1997 and 2015 respectively. This 
implies that fiscal rules have become comprehensive and robust in design over time in the region. 
This strengthening is particularly driven both by the budget balance and debt rules, which shows 
a considerable upward pattern over time. On the other hand, the revenue rule jumped only in 2000 
and remained almost constant for the rest of the period while the expenditure rule has not had much 
growth in strength since countries begun adopting the rules.  
 
4.6 Model Specification. 
Following Bohn (1998) and (Debrun et al., 2008), fiscal behavior can be modelled as a reaction 
function of primary balance to economic, political and institutional variables. The inclusion of 
political variables is informed by the fact that fiscal policy decisions are influenced by political 
actors besides economic and institutional factors. 
4.6.1 The baseline regression model 
The basic regression model can generally be specified as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑦𝑖𝑡−1+𝛿𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 ,              𝑖,𝑡 ∼ 𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎
2)                            (4.12) 
                                                                                                                                                  
Where subscript 𝑖 indexes country and 𝑡 is time in years. 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of primary balance to GDP 
in country 𝑖 and time 𝑡. 𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑡 is a measure of the fiscal rules index of strength and is time and country 
specific, 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of other controls drawn from economic theory and empirical studies. The 
controls include debt-to-GDP ratio, output gap, political stability index, legislative election 
dummy and district magnitude index. 𝜂𝑖 is the unobserved country specific effects that represents 
country specific characteristics affecting fiscal policy but possibly omitted in 𝑥𝑖,𝑡. 𝑖,𝑡 is an 
idiosyncratic error term. (A detailed discussion and description of the variables is given in section 
4.6.4 and Appendix A4.1). The regression model (4.12) is estimated for period 1997-2015 to 
coincide with the implementation period of fiscal rules in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Estimation of equation (4.12) poses some econometric issues. Considering the dynamic nature of 
the model, there is a potential problem for using fixed effects estimation. This estimator is 
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asymptotically inconsistent and contains a bias of order 0(𝑇−1) also known as the Nickell bias 
following Nickell (1981). The lagged dependent variable included as one of the regressors and the 
possible correlation between country specific effects and regressors gives rise to a potential 
endogeneity problem. The other econometric issue imminent in our empirical strategy is 
endogeneity arising from the fiscal rules. First is reverse causality because of the possibility that 
fiscal outcomes are in fact driving fiscal rules and not the other way. For instance, a government 
facing fiscal deficit is more likely to adopt the rules than the one which is not. In such a case the 
adoption of fiscal rules is driven by the circumstance of the economy rather than by rules adopted 
to change conditions in the economy (Dabla-Norris et al., 2010). Similarly, a government with a 
deep preference for fiscal discipline is more likely to adopt the rules than those without this 
inclination. Equally possible is that countries with a good spell of fiscal performance are more 
likely to adopt fiscal rules to lock in the gains of fiscal consolidation. Hence, a positive correlation 
between fiscal rules and fiscal performance could reflect a reverse causality running from fiscal 
performance to fiscal rules. The second potential problem is omitted variable bias due to the 
exclusion of variables driving the relationship between fiscal rules and fiscal performance. Failure 
to account for these factors could overstate the effect of fiscal rules. Lastly, it is possible for the 
fiscal rule index to have measurement errors. All these issues, if not dealt with, could result in 
biased and inconsistent estimates. Addressing them requires the identification of a proper 
instrument that is correlated with fiscal rules but uncorrelated with the error term.  
 
As a result, an instrumental variable approach in estimation of equation (4.12) is necessary. One 
of the candidates for this is the instrumental variable (IV) estimator proposed by Anderson & Hsiao 
(1982). The Anderson-Hsiao (AH) estimator addresses the Nickell bias through first difference 
transformation of (4.12). Thereafter, it uses the second and third lags of the dependent variable as 
instruments either in the form of differences or lagged levels. This helps to deal with the induced 
correlation between lagged dependent variable and the error term as a result of difference 
transformation. In addition to internal instruments, this estimator also allows for external 
instruments. This estimator provides consistent estimates as 𝑁 and 𝑇 or both tends to infinity. The 
other alternative estimator is the GMM estimator for dynamic panels (Arellano & Bover, 1995; 
Blundell & Bond, 1998). The GMM estimator is based on the same transformation as the AH 
estimator, with the only difference being that it uses more orthogonality conditions and 
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instruments. The GMM estimator also produces consistent estimates in dynamic panels. 
Furthermore, it generates robust results in the presence of omitted variable bias and simultaneity 
problem; also, GMM estimator uses lags of the regressors as instruments.  
4.6.2 Difference in differences model 
The next empirical strategy involves a comparison of fiscal performance between countries with 
and without fiscal rules. This exercise is undertaken using the difference in differences (DiD) 
technique. The approach compares the differences in fiscal outcomes in the period before and after 
the adoption of fiscal rules for countries with and without the fiscal rules. According to Villa 
(2016), the DiD approach splits the sample into two groups of 𝑖 units, namely a treated group 
which receives the treatment (𝑍𝑖 = 1) and a control group which does not receive the treatment or 
is not affected by the policy intervention (𝑍𝑖 = 0). Letting the period before and after intervention 
be defined by an indicator variable 𝐷 = 0 and 𝐷 = 1, respectively and the outcome variable be 
represented by 𝑌𝑖𝑡, the treatment effect is the difference in the average outcome for treated and 
control groups before and after the intervention. Further defining the period before and after 
intervention as  𝑡 = 0 and 𝑡 = 1 respectively, the DiD treatment effect can be expressed as: 
 
𝛿 = {𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡=1|𝐷𝑖𝑡=1 = 1, 𝑍𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡=1|𝐷𝑖𝑡=1 = 0, 𝑍𝑖 = 0)}
− {𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡=0|𝐷𝑖𝑡=0 = 0, 𝑍𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡=0|𝐷𝑖𝑡=0 = 0, 𝑍𝑖 = 0)}              (4.13) 
 
Additional control covariates (𝑋𝑖) can be added to the DiD framework (4.13) to help with 
identification strategy, however these should not be affected by the treatment. 
  
𝛿 = {𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡=1|𝐷𝑖𝑡=1 = 1, 𝑍𝑖 = 1, 𝑋𝑖) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡=1|𝐷𝑖𝑡=1 = 0, 𝑍𝑖 = 0, 𝑋𝑖 )}
− {𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡=0|𝐷𝑖𝑡=0 = 0, 𝑍𝑖 = 1, 𝑋𝑖 ) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡=0|𝐷𝑖𝑡=0 = 0, 𝑍𝑖 = 0, 𝑋𝑖 )}   (4.14) 
 
Equation (4.14) is estimated using a linear regression model described as follows. A sample of 40 
sub-Saharan African countries is selected and divided into treatment and control groups. The 
treatment group comprises 24 countries implementing fiscal rules while the control group 
comprises the remaining 16 countries that do not have fiscal rules (see Appendix A4.2 for selected 
countries). The period covered is 1980-2015, with the period for the implementation of the fiscal 
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rules commencing in 1997. These effects are then captured using two dummy variables. 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 
is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the country implements fiscal rules and zero 
otherwise. Similarly, 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for years 1997-2015 
and zero otherwise (i.e. period 1980-1996). The treatment effect estimation model can then be 
specified as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 + 𝛿(𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷𝑖  × 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖) +  𝛾′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡              4.15 
  
Where the outcome variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the primary balance as previously defined and the coefficient 𝛿  
as defined in (4.14) is the DiD estimator for the treatment effect that captures the change in fiscal 
balance due to the implementation of fiscal rules. In addition, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector of controls that are 
not affected by the treatment. The estimated coefficients in (4.15) have the following 
interpretation: 
• ?̂?1 is the mean outcome of the control group before the introduction of fiscal rules 
• ?̂?1 + ?̂?2 is the mean outcome of the control group after the introduction of fiscal rules 
• ?̂?3 is the difference between the treated and control groups before the introduction of fiscal 
rules 
• ?̂?1 + ?̂?3 is the mean outcome of the treated group before the introduction of fiscal rules 
• ?̂?1 + ?̂?2 + ?̂?3 + 𝛿 is the mean outcome of the treated group after the introduction of fiscal 
rules 
• 𝛿 is the DiD estimator 
4.6.3 Data  
The baseline regression and the DiD model uses annual secondary data covering different periods, 
owing to the distinct nature of empirical analysis in this chapter. For the baseline regression (4.12), 
the variable of interest is the fiscal rule index of strength whose construction is discussed in section 
4.5.3. The dataset used for this index is drawn from the fiscal rule database of the IMF for period 
1985-2015. This dataset is an updated version of the previous one covering 1985-2012. This latest 
database is more comprehensive covering additional countries and time periods between 1997 and 
2015 in the sub-Saharan Africa region. Other databases used include the WEO, the WGI and the 
Database of Political Institutions. The variables extracted from these databases are described in 
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Appendix A4.1.  
The second part of our empirical strategy involves using the treatment effects model to compare 
the fiscal performance between countries with and without fiscal rules. For this exercise, the 
sample comprises of two sets of countries, i.e. 24 countries with fiscal rules and 16 countries 
without the rules. This brings the total sample used in this study to 4033 countries out of the 46 in 
sub-Saharan Africa (see Appendix A4.2 for the list of selected countries). Furthermore, the period 
of coverage is extended to include the period before and after the adoption of the rules. For this 
reason, the period before adoption runs between 1980 and 1996, while the period of adoption runs 
between 1997 and 2015. Hence, the full sample period is 1980-2015. 
4.6.4 Definition and measurement of variables 
Primary balance is the dependent variable and is expressed as a share of GDP. It measures the 
difference between total government revenue and expenditures excluding interest payments for 
outstanding debt. Interest payments are excluded because they relate to past debt (except for short-
term debt) and, therefore, do not depict the current situation. Primary fiscal balance is used as an 
indicator of fiscal performance and is expected to react to economic, institutional and political 
variables in the fiscal policy reaction function (Bohn, 1998; Debrun et al., 2008). 
Public debt is measured as general government gross debt as a share of GDP and is lagged one 
period. It consists of all liabilities that require payments or payments of interest and/or principal 
by the government to creditors at dates in the future. Public debt is expected to have a positive 
relationship with the fiscal balance signifying that the economy is meeting its solvency 
requirement and IBC (Bohn, 1998).  
 
Output gap is lagged one period and measured as the difference between the actual output and 
potential output. It captures the effect of a cyclical fluctuation or business cycle on fiscal 
performance. Output gap is constructed using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Thus, a positive 
output gap implies that GDP growth is above potential output and vice versa. According to the 
standard Keynesian economics, economies should run fiscal surplus during expansion and deficits 
 
33 Liberia even though is one of the countries that implements the fiscal rules is dropped from the sample due to several 
years of missing data 
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during contraction. However, stylized facts from developing economies show a tendency towards 
procyclical fiscal policy, in that there is increased spending pressure during economic expansion 
and cut backs during contraction (Alesina et al., 2008; Ilzetzki & Vegh, 2008). Thus, the output 
gap is expected to have a negative relationship with fiscal performance.  
 
Fiscal rule index is the variable of interest in this study. It measures the overall index of the 
strength of fiscal rules. It is constructed as a composite index based on aggregation of the four 
types of rule namely, budget balance, debt rule, revenue rule and expenditure rule. (see section 
4.5.3 and Appendix A4.5 for more details on how the index is developed). A priori expectation is 
that fiscal rules contribute to improved fiscal performance by instilling fiscal discipline (Badinger 
& Reuter, 2015; Debrun & Kumar, 2007a; Debrun et al., 2008). 
 
Political stability index measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and 
politically motivated violence, including terrorism. It ranges between -2.5 to 2.5, with political 
stability increasing towards 2.5. The index is obtained from WGI database. Political stability 
matters for fiscal outcomes as it influences the degree by which the incumbent can use debt 
strategically to influence the policy choices of the successor (Alesina & Tabellini, 1990). As noted 
in the theoretical framework, the incentive to incur deficits and leave behind debt is larger the 
lower the chances of re-election. This index therefore captures the uncertainty of losing an election 
and is expected to have a positive influence on fiscal performance because more politically stable 
governments are likely to run low fiscal deficits. The empirical evidence on this index is however 
mixed. Some studies find that political stability improves the fiscal balance (Grilli et al., 1991; 
Hallerberg & von Hagen, 1999) while other studies find no evidence of its influence (Ricciuti, 
2004). 
 
Legislative election is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1, in a given country in a given 
year of general election and 0 otherwise. This variable captures political business cycles in the 
economy. It is common to find high budget deficits in the run-up to or during an election year. The 
legislative election dummy is expected to have a negative effect on fiscal outcomes as shown by 




District magnitude index measures the average size of parliamentary seats per electoral district or 
constituency. It explores the link between the electoral system and fiscal outcomes while also 
capturing the voter preferences in policymaking. An important dimension of electoral system is 
the electoral formula and district magnitude. The three main forms of electoral formulas are: the 
plurality system (where only one representative is elected in the electoral district and all seats go 
to the winner), the proportional representation system (where seats are distributed in proportion to 
the votes) and a mixed system which is a combination of both. The district magnitude is a more 
continuous representation of the electoral systems between the two polar cases of pure plurality 
system and proportional representation. The implication is that an electoral system with large 
district magnitude index, i.e. where the number of representatives elected per district is large 
(proportional representation), is associated with multi-party systems or minority governments. As 
a result, this system tends to have governments with shorter tenures than single party majority 
(associated with plurality). Hence, a high district magnitude index is expected to be associated 
with coalition or minority governments with unstable tenures, low probability of re-election and 
therefore high deficits (Stein et al., 1998). This conclusion has received empirical support from 
Debrun et al. (2008), while Badinger & Reuter (2015) and Nerlich & Reuter (2015) finds no 
evidence. 
 
𝑷𝑬𝑹𝑰𝑶𝑫 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the period 1997-2015 and zero otherwise. 
The dummy captures the period before and after introduction of fiscal rules 
 




4.7 Empirical Results 
 
This section reports and discusses empirical results based on the fiscal rule model as well as the 
difference in differences regression. 
4.7.1 Baseline regression model 
The empirical results for the baseline model that explores the effect of fiscal rules on fiscal balance 
are presented in Table 4.1. The table reports three estimators, namely the two-stage instrumental 
variable (IV) regression (first column), the difference general method of moments (GMM) 
estimator (second column) and the fixed effects (FE) estimator (third column). 
 
Table 4.1: Dynamic panel model-baseline specification  
Estimator IV GMM FE 
 (1) (2) (3) 










































 Observations 339 329 353 
 sarganp 0.577   
 estatp 0.00290   
 hansenp  1.000  
 ar1p  0.0237  
 ar2p  0.0804  
Notes: The dependent variable is primary balance. Standard errors are in parentheses and asterisks denote the level of significance 
at standard conventional levels. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
 
The point estimate for the variable of interest that captures the effect of fiscal rules, as represented 
by the fiscal rule index of strength is positive and significant across the three estimators. The 
estimate based on IV regression shows a much larger effect of fiscal rule index at 0.09 compared 
to 0.02 and 0.01 for the GMM and FE estimators respectively. These results equally confirm that 
fiscal rules positively impact fiscal performance, in line with the political economy model 
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discussed earlier and previous empirical studies (Badinger & Reuter, 2015; Dabla-Norris et al., 
2010; Debrun & Kumar, 2007a; Debrun et al., 2008). Due to endogeneity concerns on fiscal rules, 
external instruments are used in the IV regression. Performing the Durbin-Wu Hausman test for 
endogeneity shows that endogeneity of fiscal rules cannot be rejected (p-value of 0.00290 rejects 
the null hypothesis that fiscal rule is exogenous). Following Debrun et al., (2008), two institutional 
variables are chosen as instruments, namely fractionalization index and government effectiveness. 
The selected instruments are tested for meeting requirements for validity, i.e. the instrument should 
be correlated with fiscal rules but orthogonal to the errors. The Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions confirms that these instruments are indeed valid. With a p-value of 0.577, the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid cannot be rejected. 
 
Table 4.1 also presents results for the control variables. Across all the three estimators, the results 
show a positive and significant coefficient for the lagged primary balance. The coefficient is 
highest under IV estimator at 0.56 and lowest under FE estimator at 0.41. This finding implies that 
the fiscal balance exhibits a significant degree of persistence. Public debt has a positive and 
significant effect on fiscal balance according to both IV and GMM estimators. This is consistent 
with the solvency requirement that a country should respond to rising debts by running a fiscal 
surplus (Bohn, 1998). The output gap has a negative and significant sign across all the three 
estimators, confirming most findings from empirical studies of the tendency of fiscal policy to be 
procyclical in developing countries (Alesina et al., 2008; Ilzetzki & Vegh, 2008).  The coefficient 
on the legislative election dummy is negative and highly significant according to the GMM model. 
This is in line with a priori expectation of high budget deficits in the run-up to an election or during 
election year. This empirical regularity captures political business cycles in the economy and is 
consistent with empirical findings in Debrun et al. (2008). Despite the two remaining political 
variables (political stability and the district magnitude index) having correct signs, they are both 
insignificant. 
4.7.2 Fiscal rule impact by type 
Further analysis is done to identify the specific impact of the four types of rules. The findings are 
reported in Table 4.2, based on the IV regression. The coefficient on the budget balance, debt and 
revenue rule have a significant positive sign at a 5-percent level of significance. The coefficient 
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on expenditure rule is, however, not significant despite having right sign. Incidentally, the three 
sets of rules with a significant impact on fiscal balance are the most commonly adopted in the sub-
Saharan Africa region.  
 
Table 4.2: Effect of fiscal rules on fiscal performance- by type of rule  
Type of rule Budget 
Balance Rule 
Debt Rule Revenue Rule Expenditure 
Rule 
Overall Index 
 (1)        (2)           (3)            (4) (5) 
































































































Fiscal rule index     0.0889** 
(0.0378) 
Observations 339 339 339 339 339 
sarganp 0.230 0.895 0.442 0.0506 0.577 
estatp 0.00780 0.00254 0.00248 0.209 0.00290 
Notes: The dependent variable is primary balance. The model estimated using 2SLS and fiscal rules instrumented using government 
effectiveness and fractionalization index. Standard errors are in parentheses and asterisks denotes the level of significance at 
standard conventional levels. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
4.7.3 Fiscal rule impact by national versus supranational rules 
Table 4.3 reports the effect of fiscal rules by national versus supranational levels. The results show 
a significant and positive effect for supranational rules. However, there is no effect derived from 
the national rules suggesting that most of the strength of fiscal rules comes from the supranational 
rules. This comes as no surprise considering that only few countries have national rules compared 
to supranational ones. As of late 2015, only 7 out of the total 25 countries with fiscal rules had 
national rules while the remaining 19 countries had supranational rules. Kenya had both national 
and supranational rules. This finding further reveal that supranational rules have better 
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enforcement mechanism compared to the national rules in the sub-Saharan Africa. This is because 
supranational rules are usually anchored on international treaties that are not easy to modify 
without broad consensus from the Member States. On the contrary, national rules are prone to 
manipulation, especially in an environment with weak institutions. Hence their efficacy depends 
on the commitment of policymakers and the strength of institutions monitoring their 
implementation. If there are vulnerabilities in these institutions, then it is possible for the executive 
to defy the rules without any repercussions. On the other hand, there seems to be more commitment 
with supranational rules due to independent surveillance and enforcement mechanism that require 
countries to meet their obligations as set out in a treaty which establishes the rules within the 
regional economic bloc. 
 
Table 4.3: Effect of fiscal rules on fiscal performance - national vs supranational rules 
Fiscal Rule Full sample National rules Supranational rules 
             (1)              (2)                              (3) 










































Observations 339 89 266 
sarganp 0.577 0.554 0.229 
estatp 0.00290 0.990 0.00453 
Notes: The dependent variable is primary balance. The model estimated using 2SLS and fiscal rules instrumented using government 
effectiveness and fractionalization index. Standard errors are in parentheses and asterisks denote the level of significance at standard 
conventional levels. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
 
4.7.4 Robustness check 
This exercise tests whether the choice of method of constructing the fiscal rule index may alter our 
general finding from the previous section that fiscal rules improve fiscal performance. The 
possibility that the method used may not have correctly captured the strength of the fiscal rule 
cannot be ignored. To examine such a possibility, the baseline regression is repeated but, this time 
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using a fiscal rule index constructed using an alternative method based on the principal component 
analysis (PCA)34. Table 4.4 presents the results that show close similarity to earlier findings. The 
fiscal rules index based on the PCA method is still positive and significant according to all the 
three estimators. The other covariates also continue to maintain the same sign and level of 
significance. This implies that the earlier findings are robust to alternative methods of fiscal rule 
index construction. 
 
Table 4.4: Effect of fiscal rules (PCA based index) on fiscal performance 
Estimator IV GMM FE 
 (1) (2) (3) 










































Observations 339 329 353 
sarganp 0.596   
estatp 0.00275   
hansenp  1.000  
ar1p  0.0239  
ar2p  0.0808  
Notes: The dependent variable is primary balance. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and asterisks denotes the level of 
significance at standard conventional levels. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Year dummies although controlled for in the 
regression(s), are not reported. 
 
4.7.5 Is there any difference in fiscal performance between countries with and without fiscal 
rules? 
This question is addressed using DiD model specified in equation (4.15). The empirical findings 
for this regression are presented in Table 4.5 showing the mean value of the primary balance for 
both the control and treated groups before and after the introduction of fiscal rules in the sub-
Saharan Africa region. The model in the first column includes controls while the second column 
 
34 This is a statistical method of index construction whose underlying idea is to account for the highest possible 
variation in the original data (indicator set) using the smallest possible number of factors usually referred to as 
principal components. The factors selected are those with eigenvalues greater than one. 
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does not include them. The results indicate a significant difference in the mean estimates between 
the countries that implement the rules and those that do not. Turning to the first column, the results 
shows that the mean value of the primary balance is 26 percent lower for the treated group 
compared to the control group prior to adopting the rules. However, the mean value improves 
significantly after the introduction of fiscal rules. The gap narrows to 0.9 percent, representing a 
25-percentage point improvement in primary balance for the treated group relative to the control 
group. This is shown by a positive and highly significant DiD estimate for the treatment effect at 
0.25, signifying a 25 percent improvement.   
 
Table 4.5: Difference in differences estimation results 
Outcome Variable: Primary balance (1) (2) 
      
Diff-in-diff   0.252***      0.207*** 
 (0.0955)   (0.0714) 
Covariates Yes No 
   
Observations 723 973 
Before treatment   
            Mean control (C) 0.0283 -0.0157 
            Mean treated (T) -0.232 -0.211 
             Diff (T-C) -0.261 -0.195 
After treatment   
             Mean control (C) 0.048 -0.0156 
             Mean treated (T) 0.0389 -0.00404 
             Diff (T-C) -0.00917 0.0116 
Notes: The outcome variable is primary balance. The covariates include public debt, output gap, legislative election and district 
magnitude. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and asterisks denote the level of significance at standard conventional levels. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
These results continue to hold even when the control variables are omitted from the model albeit 
with a reduced magnitude of 0.21 which is still highly significant. Generally, these findings are 
suggestive of the fact that fiscal rules could be driving the difference in fiscal performance between 
the countries that have adopted fiscal rules and those that have not adopted them. Therefore, 
adoption of fiscal rules could be a panacea for persistent fiscal deficits in the region.  
 
Whereas the empirical results suggest that sub-Saharan African countries are beginning to reap the 
benefits of embracing the rules, more effort still needs to be put in place to make them even more 
effective. Most countries in the region with rules still face institutional weaknesses and design 
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challenges. As shown by the non-significance of national rules and pointed out in the background 
to this chapter, there are several design gaps that need to be addressed. For instance, the sanction 
mechanism is not well defined and where one exists is not punitive enough to deter fiscal 
indiscipline. As a result, those charged with implementing the rules do not have an incentive to 
enforce them. To be effective, the opportunity cost of defiance should be as high as possible to 
encourage compliance. The scope of the coverage of rules in the region is also narrow, with most 
rules concentrated within the central government. Only Mauritius has a broad coverage of up to 
the general government level. Best practices have shown that rules with broader coverage of up to 
the sub-national level or even the entire public sector are more effective given that these layers of 
government also act as quasi-fiscal entities.  
 
Most rules also lack a strong legal foundation. For instance, none of countries in the region have 
their rules backed up by the constitution. Whereas this is not a strict prerequisite for adopting the 
rules in the first place, the consensus is that a strong legal anchor insulates the rules from political 
pressure. Only countries with supranational rules can be said to have relatively firm legal status as 
these are substantiated by international treaties that cannot be modified without consensus from 
the Member States. Most national rules are anchored in statutory law which is relatively lower in 
hierarchy compared to international treaties. The countries whose rules are backed up by statutory 
laws include Tanzania, Mauritius, Cape Verde and Botswana. The rest, however, have weaker 
legal framework as their rules are either backed up by coalition agreements or political 
commitments.  
 
In terms of supporting institutions, few countries have an independent body to set budget 
assumption or fiscal responsibility laws. Rather, the executive sets most of the assumptions and 
implements them at the same time. This could open windows for manipulation as there are minimal 
checks and balances. The critical watchdog role played by independent fiscal institutions cannot 
be overemphasized. It is of concern that so far only Kenya35 and South Africa36 have fiscal councils 
that can play the role of an independent fiscal watchdogs. However, most of these institutions exist 
in developed countries like for instance, the Congressional Budget Office in the US.  
 
35 The Parliamentary Budget Office act as a fiscal institution in Kenya 




This chapter sought to examine the overall impact of fiscal rules on fiscal performance in the sub-
Saharan Africa region. In addition, it sought to assess if there are any significant differences in 
fiscal performance between countries with and without the fiscal rules. Fiscal balance was used as 
a measure of fiscal performance while a composite fiscal rule index of strength was constructed 
and used to capture the effect of fiscal rules. The index was constructed using the updated IMF 
Fiscal Rules dataset. In the baseline regression, a fiscal policy reaction function was estimated to 
examine the effect of fiscal rules on fiscal performance. The regression results closely mirror most 
empirical findings in previous studies, showing that fiscal rules improve fiscal performance. The 
budget balance, debt and revenue rules were especially found to have a positive impact on fiscal 
performance. Further analysis was done based on national versus supranational rules. Only rules 
at the supranational level were found to have significant positive effect on fiscal balance while 
there was no evidence for effectiveness of rules at the national level. These results suggest that 
supranational rules are more effective than national rules perhaps due to design weaknesses and 
weak enforcement mechanisms at the country level. The next empirical strategy involved a 
comparison of fiscal performance between countries that have fiscal rules and those that have none. 
A difference in differences model was estimated, and the results show better fiscal performance 
for countries with fiscal rules compared to those without fiscal rules. The main conclusion from 
this chapter is that fiscal rules have been effective in instilling fiscal discipline in the sub-Saharan 
Africa region. As such, fiscal rules should be considered as a viable policy option for addressing 
perennial fiscal deficit challenges as well as persistent current account deficit given that fiscal 





Appendix A4.1: Description of variables 
 
Variable Name Description Source  
Primary fiscal 
balance (% of GDP) 
The primary fiscal balance is constructed as the difference between 
general government revenue and expenditure excluding interest 
payments on outstanding debt expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
WEO 
   
Public debt      
(% of GDP) 
Public debt is general government debt as a share of GDP WEO 
   
Output Gap  Measured as the difference between the annual actual output in the 
economy and potential output. The potential output estimated using 
the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. 
Own 
computation 
   
Fiscal rule index 
  
A composite index measuring the strength of fiscal rules. This index 
comprises of the four rule types: budget balance, debt rule, revenue 
rule and expenditure rule.  
Own 
computation  
   
Political stability 
index 
Measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or 
politically motivated violence, including terrorism. The indicator 
ranges between -2.5 to 2.5, with political stability increasing towards 
2.5. 
WGI  
   
Legislative election  A dummy variable which takes the value of 1, in a given country in a 
given year of general election and 0 if otherwise 
DPI 
   
District magnitude 
index 









Appendix A4.2: List of selected sub-Saharan Africa countries 
 
Countries with Fiscal rules   Countries without fiscal rules 
Benin   Angola 
Botswana   Comoros 
Burkina Faso   Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Burundi   Eritrea 
Cabo Verde   Ethiopia 
Cameroon   Gambia 
Central African Republic   Ghana 
Chad   Guinea 
Cote d'Ivoire   Lesotho 
Equatorial Guinea 
  Madagascar 
Gabon 
  Malawi 
Guinea Bissau 
  Mozambique 
Kenya 
  Sierra Leone 
Mali 
  South Africa 
Mauritius 
  Swaziland 
Namibia 
  Zambia 
Niger    
Nigeria    
Republic of Congo    
Rwanda    
Senegal    
Tanzania    
Togo    





Appendix A4.3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Primary balance 440 -0.004 0.066 -0.410 0.406 
Public debt 454 0.606 0.552 0.005 4.349 
Output-gap 456 -0.022 0.141 -0.542 0.879 
Fiscal rule index  456 0.518 0.994 -0.784 2.363 
Political stability 384 -0.471 0.926 -2.699 1.219 
Legislative election 456 0.197 0.398 0.000 1.000 
District magnitude 422 1.043 1.105 -0.329 3.970 
 
 
Appendix A4.4: Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) Primary balance 1.000 
(2) Public debt -0.037 1.000 
(3) Output-gap 0.458* -0.143* 1.000 
(4) Fiscal rule index -0.051 -0.189* 0.043 1.000 
(5) Political stability -0.054 -0.203* 0.049 0.176* 1.000 
(6) Legislative election  0.004 -0.026 -0.017 0.028 -0.003 1.000 
(7) District magnitude  0.017 0.096* -0.075 -0.010 0.159* -0.014 1.000 





Appendix A4.5: Criteria and scores for construction of fiscal rule index of strength 
 
Type of Rules: 
BBR= Budget balance rule,  DR= Debt rule,  ER=Expenditure rule,  RR= Revenue rule 
 
Criterion 1: Legal basis of the rule 
4: Constitutional, 3: International treaty, 2: Statutory law, 1: Either coalition agreement or political commitment 
 
Criterion 2:  Coverage 
2: General government or wider 
1: Central government. The score is adjusted upward to account for similar rules applying to different levels  
 
Criterion 3: Enforcement- Are there enforcement mechanisms in place? 
The score of this criterion is constructed as a simple average of the two sub-elements below 
Formal enforcement procedure; (Yes: 1, No: 0)  
Monitoring of compliance outside the government; (Yes: 1, No: 0)  
 
Criterion 4: Well-specified escape clause 
Are there well-specified escape clause; (Yes: 1, No: 0)  
 
Criterion 5: Supporting procedures/ institutions 
The score of this criterion is constructed as a simple average of the three sub-elements below 
Multi-year expenditure ceiling in place; (Yes: 1, No: 0)  
Independent body sets budget assumptions; (Yes: 1, No: 0)  
Fiscal responsibility laws present; (Yes: 1, No: 0)  
 
Criterion 6: Fiscal balances defined in cyclically adjusted terms 
Yes: 1, No:0 
 
Criterion 7: Rules excludes public investment or other priority items from ceiling 






General Conclusion and Policy Implications 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
This thesis contributes to the literature on current account dynamics and fiscal rules in the sub-
Saharan Africa region. The choice of the region is motivated by the fact that it has been 
characterized by large and persistent current account and fiscal deficits over the past two decades. 
In addition, the region has also experienced a renewed upsurge in levels of public debt. The 
coexistence of growing public debt with large and persistent current account and fiscal deficit 
poses significant downside risks to macroeconomic stability and limits the policy options available 
to policymakers in case of adverse shock. Adoption of fiscal rules is therefore seen as one way of 
mitigating these risks. This is because fiscal rules can rein in discretionary fiscal policies that breed 
government failures and incentive structures that encourage deficit bias. Through their positive 
impact on fiscal outcomes, fiscal rules can also indirectly impact the current account considering 
the direct linkage between current account and fiscal balance. This thesis interrogates the foregoing 
issues within a broad context of three interrelated empirical chapters. The study adopts a 
regionwide approach, covering a group of countries in the larger sub-Saharan Africa region, a 
novel approach as most studies on this subject are concentrated in developed countries; of the few 
studies in this region, most are country specific. In addition, this is the first study in sub-Saharan 
Africa to explore the link between current account and fiscal deficit on the one hand and public 
debt on the other. Furthermore, this study performs a comprehensive assessment of the 
effectiveness of fiscal rules in this region. 
 
Chapter two examines the sustainability of current account balances in the sub-Saharan Africa 
region. In addition, it evaluates the strength of sustainability of these balances and the pattern of 
their adjustment. The test for sustainability involves checking the violation of the intertemporal 
budget constraint (IBC). This is the  common approach in the literature and it involves checking 
whether past current account series follow a stationary process or if there is cointegration between 
the components of the current account (Taylor, 2002; Trehan & Walsh, 1991). This evidence 
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provides a basis for the conclusion that the current account balance is consistent with solvency and 
is therefore sustainable. This chapter adopts the cointegration approach as it enables us to study 
the dynamics of current account adjustment as well as the strength of sustainability. A test for 
cointegrating relationship between exports and imports is carried out within a panel error 
correction framework on a sample of 35 sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1980-2017. 
The results reveal that a significant number of countries (16 out of 35) face unsustainable balances; 
for those with sustainable balances, their balances are only weakly sustainable. These findings are 
consistent with observed trends in the region over the last two decades, over which countries have 
been facing large and persistent current account deficits. The results further reveal a slow pattern 
of adjustment back to equilibrium as it takes on average six years for a complete adjustment back 
to long-run equilibrium in case of a short-run disturbance. This situation is likely to result in a 
prolonged spell of current account deficits and a build-up of external debt, since emerging deficits 
are not cleared quickly. Such a situation, if not addressed, could crowd out private consumption 
and investment, which could have a negative impact on GDP growth. It could also impair the 
ability of these countries to service their debt, thereby also increasing the probability of debt 
distress. Furthermore, the rising levels of external debt raises the vulnerability of these countries 
to exogenous shocks. These findings motivated our next chapter, which sought to find out whether 
the activities of the public sector could have contributed to this current account situation based on 
the dominant role played by the public sector in the region’s economic activities.  
 
Chapter three, therefore, examines the effect of fiscal deficit on current account deficit and how 
this relationship is affected by different levels of public debt. A linear dynamic panel data model 
is estimated to address the first part of the objective; for the second part, a dynamic panel threshold 
model is estimated. A sample of 33 sub-Saharan African countries is selected for the period 2000-
2016. The empirical results for the linear model show that fiscal deficit worsens the current account 
and therefore the twin deficit hypothesis holds. However, the introduction of nonlinearities in the 
model shows a switch in behaviour. The non-linear effects are captured using different levels of 
indebtedness in the sample. The threshold level of debt is estimated endogenously at 54 percent, 
thus splitting the sample into either low or high debt regimes depending on whether observations 
fall below or above this threshold. The estimated threshold level does not depart much from the 
rule of thumb level of 55 percent recommended by the IMF. Besides, the approach used in this 
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study comes with the additional advantage that the threshold level is not arbitrary and therefore 
the data is allowed to ‘speak’ for itself. The results from the dynamic panel threshold regression 
shows that at a lower debt regime, fiscal deficit continues to worsen the current account while at a 
higher debt regime, the pattern changes. At higher levels of debt, fiscal deficit has no significant 
effect on current account as it loses significance. Intuitively, this shows that at a low debt regime, 
the twin deficit hypothesis holds while at a high debt regime the Ricardian hypothesis prevails. 
This implicitly points to the unreliability of fiscal policy when the level of public debt becomes 
large. Theoretically, according to Sutherland (1997), the impact of fiscal expansion on private 
consumption depends on debt levels. At moderate levels, fiscal policy has Keynesian effects 
because the current generation of consumers discounts future taxes with the knowledge that they 
may not be alive in future when taxes are raised. However, when debt rises to extreme levels, the 
current generation of consumers knows that there is a high probability that they will be alive to 
pay the extra taxes. In such an environment, households are likely to save more to offset future tax 
increase. The rise in private savings, in this case, reduces consumption, leading to improvements 
in the current account. Hence, when debt grows out of bounds, fiscal deficit could be 
contractionary. These findings receive support in empirical studies and further explain the reason 
for mixed results on the effect of fiscal deficit on current account deficit. A possible explanation 
is that different debt regimes are not accounted for in these models.  
 
Chapter four examines the overall impact of fiscal rules on fiscal performance in the sub-Saharan 
Africa region. In addition, this chapter carries out an assessment as to whether there are differences 
in fiscal performance between countries with and without the fiscal rules. Having noted in the 
previous chapter that fiscal deficit plays a role in worsening external balances, this chapter attempts 
to test whether the fiscal rules measures so far adopted by countries have had any significant 
impacts on fiscal performance. In this case, fiscal balance is used as a measure of fiscal 
performance while a time varying composite fiscal rule index of strength is used to capture the 
effects of the fiscal rules. The fiscal rule index is constructed based on the updated IMF Fiscal 
Rules Dataset. In the baseline regression, a fiscal policy reaction function is estimated on a sample 
of 24 countries that implement the rules for the period 1997-2015. The regression results closely 
mirror empirical findings in the previous studies showing that fiscal rules improve fiscal 
performance. The budget balance, debt and revenue rules are found to have positive and significant 
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effects on fiscal performance. The regression is also performed based on national and 
supranational rules. Only rules at the supranational level are found to have significant effect. The 
fact that national rules do not have significant impact on fiscal performance could be attributed to 
weak enforcement at the country level compared to supranational level. As such their efficacy 
depends on the commitment of policymakers and the strength of institutions monitoring their 
implementation. On the contrary, the fact that supranational rules are usually anchored in 
international treaties makes them difficult to modify without broad consensus from the Member 
States. The second part of empirical strategy in this chapter compares the fiscal performance 
between countries that have fiscal rules and those that have none. The sample is expanded to 
include 16 additional countries that do not implement the rules and uses this set of countries as the 
control group in this experiment. The sample period is also expanded to cover 1980-2015. A 
difference in differences model is estimated, and the results show that there is a significant 
improvement in the fiscal balance for countries with fiscal rules (treated group) compared to those 
without fiscal rules (control group). The main conclusion from this exercise is that fiscal rules have 
been effective in instilling fiscal discipline in the sub-Saharan region.  
 
5.2 Policy Implications 
Several policy implications can be drawn from this thesis. Chapter two concludes that current 
account balances are generally weakly sustainable in the sub-Saharan Africa region with some 
countries running unsustainable balances. Furthermore, countries in this region experience a 
gradual adjustment of current account imbalances back to equilibrium in the event of a 
disequilibrium. It implies that these economies could be facing a bigger structural problem than 
just short-term disequilibrium. Therefore, rather than relying solely on short term macroeconomic 
policies to address these problems, there is a need for structural reforms such as productivity 
improvement and trade reform such as the diversification of exports.  
 
In chapter three, the general conclusion is that the relationship between fiscal balance and current 
account depends on the level of indebtedness in the economy. This is because current account 
response to fiscal balance differs depending on debt levels. At moderate levels of debt, fiscal deficit 
worsens the current account while, current account does not respond to fiscal deficit when debt 
level exceeds some threshold. This conclusion shows that fiscal policy can be an effective tool in 
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containing current account deficit when the level of public debt is moderate, but its effectiveness 
becomes uncertain when the debt level grows out of bounds. Although, the extent in this context 
is relative, as countries have different tolerance levels for debt depending on macroeconomic 
fundamentals, what is certain is that when debt exceeds some thresholds, it triggers unfavourable 
effects on the economy. There is, therefore, a need for due diligence in the use of fiscal policy as 
a policy option when public debt reaches excessive levels. In addition, there is also need for fiscal 
adjustment and consolidation sooner rather than later as the level of debt gets out of hand due to 
limited alternatives for policy makers to stabilize the economy. 
 
In the fourth chapter, the findings show that fiscal rules have a significant impact on fiscal 
performance and can therefore be an effective tool for dealing with deficit bias prevalent in the 
sub-Saharan Africa region. Hence, there is merit in adopting the fiscal rules. Furthermore, the 
results also reveal that supranational rules are more effective compared to the national 
counterparts. This could be attributed to institutional weaknesses and design gaps common with 
national rules. More substantial attention is required to address these design gaps and strengthen 
the institutional mechanisms anchoring the national fiscal rules.  
 
5.3 Limitations of the Study and Areas for Further Research 
There are some limitations emerging from the empirical chapters in this thesis. In chapter two, the 
intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) is used as the criteria for sustainability assessment. 
According to the IBC approach, a country is deemed to be running sustainable balances even if it 
is presently experiencing persistent deficits; so long as it can generate sufficient surpluses at least 
once in future even if it means a distant future. This criterion imposes a rather weak condition and 
so relying on it alone may not fully capture the comprehensive extent of sustainability. As an 
extension, this study recommends that further studies should consider more robust criteria such as 
comparing the observed paths of current account with the equilibrium benchmark that is based on 
optimal decisions of economic agents and macroeconomic fundamentals. In this case, any 
misalignment would give a better indication as to whether the observed current account trajectory 




While fiscal rules are meant to stem the discretionary component of fiscal policy, primary fiscal 
balance is used as a measure of fiscal policy in chapter four. This measure includes both 
discretionary and non-discretionary components such as cyclical fluctuations. Thus, using primary 
balance as a measure of the discretionary component of fiscal policy may be misleading. As an 
extension, this study recommends that future research should use a cyclically adjusted fiscal 
balance instead. Again, this thesis defines fiscal performance in a narrower sense to mean fiscal 
balance. In addition to fiscal balance, the definition of fiscal performance can also broadly 
encompass government spending and public debt.  Future research should therefore consider a 
broader measure of fiscal performance that encompasses government expenditure and public debt 
as these aggregates also capture fiscal performance. 
 
Finally, the general inference drawn from the empirical chapters in this thesis is that there is a 
potential, but unexplored relationship between current account and fiscal rules because fiscal 
balance is so closely linked to both current account balance and fiscal rules. This study therefore 
recommends that future research should consider a formal study examining the effect of fiscal 
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